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Restrictive Covenants and the Pricing of Private and Public Placement 
Bonds 
 
Pascal Böni1, Philip Joos2, Frans de Roon3 
 
Abstract 
Using a sample of 1,217 US dollar denominated private and public placement bonds issued by 
European firms in the period 2002-2015, we find that the spread on private placements is on 
average more than 100 basis points higher than for public placements. Firms issuing private debt 
appear to do this in times of higher uncertainty about future economic events, seeking an option 
for flexible debt restructuring ex post. These firms pay excess spreads partially explained by credit 
risk but equally important by the use of covenants. These are used to warrant the potential re-
allocation of control rights to bondholders in times of adverse contingencies. Together with credit 
risk, covenants also explain an important part of the variation in spreads of public placement 
bonds. We provide evidence of a U-shape  effect of covenant intensity on spread. Differentiating 
between investment and financing covenants, the data suggests that the use of investment 
covenants resolves moral hazard problems, resulting in lower spreads. In contrast, financing 
covenants are used to facilitate debt renegotiation, resulting in higher ex ante spreads as 
investors request a compensation for contracting under higher uncertainty. 
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A substantial literature exists on the structure and pricing determinants of public debt. Prior 
literature suggests looking beyond the pure credit risk viewpoint when searching for the 
determinants of credit spread (e.g. Collin-Dufresne et al., 2001) and include a liquidity premium 
(Chen et al. , 2007; Longstaff, 2004; Longstaff et al., 2005; de Jong & Driessen, 2012) or other 
factors, such as macroeconomic and financial variables (Chen, 2010) or tax (Elton, 2001). 
Typically, these studies cannot, however, find any set of variables that can explain credit spread 
with high accuracy and rest with the wisdom of Jones et al. (1984) that credit models only 
inaccurately predict spread. Extensive tests of corporate bond pricing are predominantly 
concerned with models that attempt to estimate the spread more precisely (e.g., Eom et al. 
(2004). More recently, the interdependence of leverage and investment decisions (Kuehn & 
Schmid, 2014) or ownership heterogeneity ( Huang & Petkevich, 2016) and their impact on spread 
have been researched. Although these studies have contributed importantly to our 
understanding of credit spreads, the use of covenants has largely been ignored in almost all 
modelling of bond spreads.  
The use of covenants, however, may be important when pricing bond issues. On the one side, 
the use of covenants may mitigate agency conflicts between debtholders and shareholders. The 
same basic adverse selection argument that is used by Myers and Majluf (1984) for equity issues 
can be employed: To the extent that debt involves default risk, managers may have an incentive 
to borrow when their private information about the state of the firm suggests that markets will 
price a bond issue at a relatively favorable spread. Moreover, the severity of potential debtholder-
shareholder agency conflicts may also affect bond pricing. We thus build on the work of Jensen 
and Meckling (1976) and Smith and Warner (1979) and test what we refer to as the moral hazard 
hypothesis. On the other side, incomplete contracting theory suggests that agency conflicts can 
be mitigated by the allocation of state-contingent control rights: management is rewarded with 
continued control if it honors existing debt contracts and makes the respective payments, 
whereas it is punished with loss of control otherwise (Aghion & Bolton, 1992). Restrictive 
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covenants are typically used to warrant the potential re-allocation of control rights to 
bondholders and mitigate debtholder-shareholder agency conflicts. We build on the work of 
Aghion and Bolton (1992) and test what we refer to as the debt renegotiation hypothesis. 
We study the pricing of both public and private debt issues, which have relatively low and 
relatively high agency costs respectively. Since the relative market share of private placement 
bonds in terms of total issue volume of primary corporate bonds, has more than doubled from 
14% in 2008 to 30% in 20154, sufficient number of observations to compare those two channels 
of placing bonds are provided nowadays. The two groups of bond placements are of interest 
because they represent two ends of the Smith and Warner’s (1979) spectrum of controlling the 
conflict between bondholders and shareholders: Private placement bond issuers experience 
more information asymmetries and higher agency costs than public placement issuers 
(Krishnaswami et al., 1999; Cantillo & Wright, 2000). As a result, covenants in private placement 
bonds are found to be more restrictive compared those in public placement bonds (Kwan & 
Carleton, 2010). 
Previous studies suggest that private and public debt are priced differently (Blackwell & 
Kidwell, 1998; Fenn, 2000; Chaplinsky & Ramchand, 2004; Kwan & Carleton, 2010). In explaining 
the difference, various studies follow a transaction cost approach (Blackwell & Kidwell, 1998), an 
information asymmetry approach (Fenn, 2000) or an issuer quality approach (Chaplinsky & 
Ramchand, 2004; Kwan & Carleton). However, studies that test the effect of covenants on yield 
spreads are sparse (Reisel, 2014) and, to the best of our knowledge, do not make the distinction 
between privately and publicly placed bonds. The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, we aim 
to provide a comprehensive analysis of the pricing differences of 690 private placement bonds 
relative to 527 public placement bonds, issued by 310 different European firms in the years 2002 
to 2015. Second, we explore whether those pricing differences can be explained by the use of 
covenants.  
                                                     
4 Böni & Rietmann (2016) 
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We focus on European issuers as their placement volume of PPBs has increased substantially 
in recent years. In percent of total issue volumes of primarily corporate debentures in European 
developed markets, PPBs increased their relative market share of approximately 10% in 2005 to 
almost 30% in 2015.5 Simultaneously, the annual private debt fundraising for European-focused 
funds, according to Preqin (2019), has grown almost eightfold between 2007 and 2018 and 
reached a level of approximately USD 60 billions in 2018. Although still larger in absolute terms, 
US focused funds only quadrupled annual private debt fundraising volumes over the same period, 
collecting  approximately USD 94 billion from investors in 2018. These numbers illustrate the 
trend towards a less bank reliant economy6 in the euro area and lend strong support to 
researching European issuers in more depth.  
We analyze which factors determine the spread to the risk free government bond rate and 
whether there is a difference in spread between public and private bonds7, i.e., the excess spread. 
We evaluate whether part of those pricing differences can be explained by the use of covenants 
and do this in three ways. First, we use covenant intensity, the number of restrictive covenants 
used in each bond issue. Second, we introduce an investment and a financing covenant factor 
derived from a factor analysis of covenants. Third, we test the relationship between spread and 
covenants individually, using dummy variables. 
On average, we find an excess spread for private bonds that is 116 basis points higher than 
that for public placement bonds. However, the average credit risk of firms issuing private bonds 
is also one notch higher than for public bonds and relative to public bonds, private bonds are 
issued by smaller and younger firms, with slightly higher leverage, and with more covenants 
                                                     
5 Volumes retrieved from S&P Capital IQ 
6 Today, bank lending accounts for around 55% of debt financing of euro area firms. In the United States, 
firms source around 70% of their debt financing directly from non-banks, and only 30% from banks. See 
Benoît Coeuré’s (2019) remarks at the International Swaps and Derivatives Association in Frankfurt, 
retrievable from https://www.bis.org/review/r190627h.pdf .  
 
7 Throughout this paper we will use the terminology "private placement bonds", "private placements", 
and "private bonds" interchangeably, and likewise for "public placement bonds", "public placements", 
and "public bonds". 
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attached to them. Controlling for credit risk, we still find a significant 46 basis points excess spread 
of private over public bonds.  
We use a binary choice model to better understand why firms would accept this difference in 
the cost of debt. Analyzing switchers, that is firms that use both private and public debt markets, 
we find that firms place bonds privately in times of higher uncertainty about future economic 
events.  In such times, firms may issue private debt as it provides an option for flexible 
renegotiation ex post (Detragiache, 1994; Roberts & Sufi, 2009). Private debt providers appear to 
be more flexible in reorganizing debt (Bolton & Freixas, 2000; Cantillo & Wright, 2000; 
Chemmanur & Fulghieri, 1994), thereby avoiding premature and costly liquidation often observed 
with public debt. Incomplete contracting theory suggests that not all agency conflicts can be 
resolved through ex ante contracting. It therefore matters who controls potential agency conflicts 
when adverse contingencies occur. According to Aghion and Bolton (1992) this is best done by 
the allocation of state-contingent control rights, i.e. the use of covenants. The results of this 
binary choice analysis provides some support for the debt renegotiation hypothesis.  
Next, we hypothesize that the use of covenants is priced in private bonds ex ante and test this 
prediction empirically using OLS regressions and factor analysis. Our regression results show that 
credit risk variables explain about 50% of the variation in spreads. Liquidity variables and market 
condition variables each help in further explaining the variation in spreads, but do not explain the 
level difference in spread between private and public bonds. Adding additional variables that 
typically control for information asymmetries, such as firm age or the involvement of a top tier 
arranger, the results remain largely unchanged. It is only when we add covenant intensity - i.e., 
the number of covenants attached to a bond - and its squared value in the analysis, that the 
difference in spread becomes insignificant, both statistically and economically. Moreover, the use 
of covenants appears to have as much additional explanatory power as liquidity and market 
condition variables together.   
We find that credit risk, liquidity, market conditions, covenant intensity, and control variables 
jointly explain about 70% of the variation in spreads, and that the difference in spread between 
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private and public bonds is approximately equally driven by credit risk and covenant intensity. 
The effect of covenant intensity on spread is non-linear, with the first number of covenants 
lowering the spread, whereas a high number of covenants increases the spreads again. In our 
regression model, the effect of covenant use on the spread ranges between -96 and +305 basis 
points, implying that the effect of covenant use, is in the order of magnitude of 400 basis points. 
To compare: in the regression model the difference between the highest and lowest rating score 
implies a spread of 465 basis points. 
Next, we extract an investment and a financing covenant factor from factor analysis and a 
conditional frequency analysis. The investment factor consists of covenants that mainly limit the 
firm in making investments and divestments (selling its assets). The second factor is a financing 
factor and consists of covenants that prevent a firm from obtaining additional debt and making 
cash distributions to shareholders and junior debt. The investment factor lowers the spread by 
resolving agency problems between shareholders and bondholders. The financing factor 
increases the spread as these covenants limit the firm in making positive NPV investment for 
which additional financing is needed and optimizing its capital structure. These opposing effects 
and our finding that, if present, investment factor covenants are included first, followed by 
financing factor covenants, explain why the effect of covenant intensity on the spread is non-
linear, leading to a U-shaped pattern. 
In an additional analysis, we use covenants individually as dummy variables: all financing 
covenants show the expected sign. Attaching a limit of indebtedness covenant to a bond increases 
bond spread by a significant 80 basis points in the cross section. Also, we find that firms issuing 
private bonds are more restricted in financing activities but less restricted in investment activities 
than those issuing public bonds. It appears that financing covenants do in fact play an important 
role in explaining spreads, but also the excess spread of private versus public bonds.  
These results are robust in a number of directions. First, we allow for interaction effects 
between the type of placement (private versus public) and the different variables that explain the 
spread, which does not change our findings. We employ two-stage least squares to account for 
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potential simultaneity concerns regarding the determination of covenant use and spread, and 
cannot reject the hypothesis that the use of covenants is exogenous. To test whether other 
contract terms are likely to be subject to simultaneity, we rerun the regressions excluding 
potential endogenous variables, leaving the results unaltered. We use alternative proxies for 
various variables and include additional control variables, which does not affect our conclusions 
either. 
Finally, we conduct an out-of-sample test to evaluate the ability of our empirical model to fit 
market prices. As in Eom et al. (2004) we consider the error in predicted spread to be the most 
informative measure of model performance. We use a sample of 1,855 Euro denominated 
publicly placed corporate bonds, issued in the same sample period and using the same sample 
restrictions. On average, our model yields a prediction error of 11 basis points. Excluding the 
covenant variables from the model, the prediction error increases to almost 47 basis points. The 
out-of-sample R2 of the model is 29% and the correlation between the out-of-sample excess 
spreads and predicted spreads is 0.56. The model slightly under-predicts bond spreads by a mere 
4.7%, on average, much lower than the models analyzed by Eom et al. (2004)8 for which they find 
predictions between -53% and 270%, with the lowest prediction error rendering an under-
prediction of -6.6% and the second best prediction error rendering an over-prediction of 43%.  
Our contribution to the literature is manifold. First, we show that variables that are known to 
be important in explaining the spreads on public bonds are also important to explain the spread 
on private bonds but do not fully explain the excess spreads of private over public bonds. Credit 
risk variables (e.g. Longstaff & Schwarz, 1995; Collin-Dufresne et al., 2001; Huang & Huang, 2012), 
liquidity variables (e.g. Chen et al., 2007; Covitz & Downing, 2007; de Jong & Driessen, 2012) and 
market conditions (e.g. Chen 2010; Jankowitsch 2014) explain approximately 55% of the variation 
in spread but leave a significant excess spread unexplained. The use of covenants (e.g. Kwan & 
                                                     
8 Eom et al. (2004) analyze the models of Merton (1974), Geske (1977), Longstaff and Schwartz  
  (1995), Leland an Toft (1996), and Collin-Dufresne and Goldstein (2001). 
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Carleton, 2010; Christensen & Nikolaev, 2012) explains the remaining difference in excess spread 
entirely and increases the model fit substantially to an approximate 70%.  
Second, we show that the effect of covenant use is twofold: first, as in previous studies 
(Cantillo and Wright, 2000; Denis & Mihov, 2003; Christensen & Nikolaev, 2012; Reisel, 2014) we 
find that the use of covenants can lower the spread by resolving agency problems between 
shareholders and bondholders. This is reflected by the use of covenants that represent our 
investment factor. This spread lowering effect provides support for our moral hazard hypothesis. 
However, our new finding is that the use of additional covenants, reflecting our financing factor, 
increases the spread again. We find evidence that the spread increasing effect can be as 
substantial or even larger than the spread decreasing effect related to the use of covenants. This 
observation provides support for our debt renegotiation hypothesis.  
Third, we show that the effect of covenant use on the spread is as important as credit risk and 
that including agency costs in asset pricing models may substantially improve their explanatory 
power.  
Fourth, we show that firms issuing private bonds are more restricted in financing activities 
but less restricted in investment activities than those issuing public bonds. 
Finally and importantly, we provide a new explanation for the excess spread of private over 
public bonds to the literature, which was so far focused on transaction costs, issuer quality or 
information asymmetry. We provide new evidence that the use of covenants do not only mitigate 
problems related to information asymmetry and therefore reduce spread, but that investors may 
consciously accept increased monitoring and renegotiation efforts when contracting for private 
debt under higher uncertainty and request compensation for these efforts. Leaning on 
incomplete contracting theory, or results suggest that firms may prefer private debt markets as 
they seek the benefits of flexible debt renegotiation at the expense of additional debt limitations.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the data, variables, 
and summary statistics.  Section 3 reports the results on the binary choice model, followed by our 
cross-sectional analysis of spreads of private placement bonds and public placement bonds and 
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the difference in their pricing in Section 4. Section 5 provides further analysis and a series of 
robustness tests, and Section 6 concludes the paper. 
 
2 Data, Variable Construction, and Summary Statistics 
2.1 Data 
We collect data on public and private bond issues from issuers domiciled in Europe, meaning 
that the ultimate parent company is domiciled in Europe. Our primary bond data are from S&P 
Capital IQ (S&P). Our sample period starts in 2002, as S&P rating scores are available from 2002 
onwards, and ends in 2015. This sample period includes complete business cycles as well as the 
Global Financial Crisis in 2008 followed by the European Debt Crisis. 
Our initial sample consists of 11,037 public debt issues and 1,340 private debt issues. 
Following previous literature, we eliminate issues by financial firms, issues with maturities shorter 
than one year, or longer than 30 years, and issues in currencies other than USD. This results in a 
final sample of 1,217 corporate bond issues by 310 firms, 527 of which are public debt issues and 
690 are private debt issues. For some bond issues a package of securities is offered. These 
packages often differ in contract terms (e.g. maturity and covenants) and issue dates. Therefore, 
as in Kwan & Carleton (2010), each security is treated as a different issue. 
As the S&P database might not be complete for the private debt issues, we cross-check the 
private debt issues for 2015 with the Bloomberg database. There are 24 private debt issues in the 
Bloomberg database that are not available in the S&P database. However, for 18 of these issues 
no additional information is available in the Bloomberg database, leaving us with only 6 issues 
that are not covered by S&P. Relative to the 89 issues that are covered by S&P we conclude the 
S&P database to be representative for the population covered by both data providers. 
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2.2 Variable Construction 
Our aim is to analyze the pricing of private and public placement bonds and the difference in 
(credit) spreads between them. Spread is the difference between the yield on a corporate (fixed 
coupon) bond at issue and the yield on a riskless maturity-matched government bond on the 
same issue date. US government Treasury yields are from the Federal Reserve, which publishes 
constant maturity Treasury rates for a range of maturities. Treasury yields are matched to the 
corporate debt maturities using linear interpolation. 
We use a comprehensive set of variables to explain the credit spreads of public and private 
placement bonds, and their difference. Based on a linear regression model, Collin-Dufresne et al. 
(2001) and Campbell & Taksler (2003) use proxies for credit risk and market conditions, as well as 
control variables to explain variation in credit spreads. As in these studies, we also use proxies for 
credit risk and market conditions, but also add proxies for liquidity and the use of covenants. Next 
to these four categories, we also use firm and issue specific control variables. Appendix A provides 
an overview of the variable definitions.  
Credit risk 
A commonly used proxy for credit risk is the credit rating of a bond or a firm (e.g. Collin-
Dufresne et al., 2001; Campbell & Taksler, 2003; Longstaff et al., 2005). Since credit ratings are 
not available for private debt, we calculate the rating score using credit model 2.6 of S&P Global 
Market Intelligence (see Appendix B for details). The rating score is calculated using the most 
recent financial data of the firm preceding the debt issue. The model generates a letter grade 
score from AAA (with numerical value 1) to CCC or lower (with numerical value 18), representing 
a company's standalone credit risk.9 Since bond prices are strongly affected by short-term 
                                                     
9 Rating score is an ordinal variable with values ranging from 1 to 18. Ordinal variables are often used 
as continuous variables without harm to the analysis when applying five or more categories (Johnson & 
Creech, 1983; Norman, 2010; Sullivan & Artino, 2013; Zumbo & Zimmerman, 1993). We analyze the 
linearity assumption and estimate fitted values from a linear and a polynomial estimation, the values being 
approximately identical over the whole range of rating scores. The polynomial estimation only deviates from 
the linear estimation at the extremes (rating scores below values of 4 and larger than 15). These scores are 
equivalent to very good, that is AA- or better, and very bad, that is B- or worse, rating scores. The frequency 
of those firms in the sample is very low. For example, only 5 firms with very good and 7 firms with very bad 
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earnings information (Callen et al., 2017), this rating score is likely to be a better indicator than 
an agency's credit rating. The advantage of using this model score is that it is based on recent 
financial data and measures the financial condition of a bond issuer, whereas traditional ratings 
measure the creditworthiness of a corporation over long investment horizons (Alp, 2013) and 
tend to be updated slowly (Cornaggia & Cornaggia, 2013). In addition to the rating score, and 
motivated by the Merton (1974) model, we use as an additional proxy to measure credit risk and 
use book leverage, calculated as the ratio of total long-term debt to total assets of the issuer. 
Market conditions 
We use a number of different variables to measure market conditions. As shown by Hale and 
Santos (2008), firms time their bond issues to avoid recessionary periods and take advantage of 
favorable market conditions. To capture ups and downs in economic cycles we follow Alp (2013) 
and use real GDP growth rates10 for a period of 360 calendar days prior to the bond issue. 
Next, as in Chen et al. (2007) and Campbell & Taksler (2003), we use the risk-free rate of the 
benchmark bond and the difference between the 10-year and 2-year Treasury rates to account 
for the level and the slope of the yield curve. As in Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001), we interpret 
“slope” as an indicator of the overall state of the economy: a positive change in slope indicates 
bond investors are expecting higher economic growth, higher inflation and future interest rate 
increases. Likewise, a decrease in slope may imply a weakening economy. From this perspective 
and following David (2008), in our models a high level of slope is a proxy for investors’ assessed 
risk of the economy shifting to a low-growth state. 
                                                     
ratings that place bonds privately are in the overall sample. To control for potential effects from the rating 
score being an ordinal variable, we re-run the regressions presented later in this paper and restrict the 
sample to firms with rating scores higher or equal to 4 and lower or equal to 15, the results do not change 
in any material way. 
 
10 We use European GDP data from Eurostat (http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/nationalaccounts/ 
data/main-tables adjusted for inflation given by the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) oft he 









Merton (1974) predicts that equity volatility impacts the likelihood of reaching boundary 
conditions for default. Campbell & Taksler (2003) find that an increase in equity market volatility 
increases credit spreads. To capture changes in aggregate equity market volatility, we use the 
CBOE VIX-index values, which are a weighted average of eight implied volatilities of near-the-
money options on the OEX (S&P 100–Index). 
As in Acharya et al. (2007), we measure whether an industry is distressed by the return of the 
index representing the issuer’s industry. Following Cremers et al. (2008), we calculate the index 
return over the past 180 days prior to a bond issue. We use the MSCI Europe Index family and its 
industry specific derivatives to calculate this 180 day return prior to a bond issue. We also use 
Europe wide total stock market returns. 
Following Fenn (2000) and Chaplinsky and Ramchand (2004), we include a time index dummy 
variable (“time”), equal to 0 in 2002 and increasing by 1 every year thereafter to control for 
potential structural changes over time. Alp (2013) studies the time-series variation in corporate 
credit rating standards from 1985 to 2007, and finds that rating standards are subject to structural 
shifts, with investment-grade standards tightening and sub-investment-grade standards 
loosening in the same period. We therefore also interact the time index with the proxy for rating.    
Finally, We use the Rule of Law score as developed by Kaufmann et al. (2010)11 and used in 
Brown (2016) to proxy for the quality of the enforcement environment of an issuer. Higher scores 
equate to a higher quality of enforcement environment. 
Liquidity 
Previous literature has shown that corporate bond spreads can partially be explained by 
liquidity factors (e.g., Longstaff et al., 2005; Chen et al., 2007; Covitz & Downing, 2007, de Jong & 
                                                     
11 Rule of Law is one of six dimensions measured within the Worldwide Governance Indicators  
project of the World Bank, covering 200 countries since 1996. The six governance indicators are    
based on different data sources including commercial business information providers, public  
sector data providers as well as non-governmental organization data providers and survey  
providers. A more comprehensive description is available on www.govindicators.org.  
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Driessen, 2012). We use three measures of liquidity in our analysis to explain the difference in 
spreads between public and private bonds. 
The first measure for liquidity is the log issue amount, which aims to gauge the bond specific 
liquidity. The second measure is the liquidity premium obtained from decomposing sovereign 
bond yields into a credit and liquidity component (e.g., Longstaff, 2004; Ejsing et al., 2012; 
Helwege et al., 2014). Here a liquidity premium is obtained by comparing pairs of bonds with the 
same credit risk but with different liquidity. We use Refcorp (Resolution Funding Corporation) 
bonds, which are fully collateralized by Treasury bonds and guaranteed by the US Treasury. The 
yield on these Refcorp bonds compared to the more liquid, but with the same credit risk, US 
government benchmark rate gives an estimate of bond market liquidity. We use a 90-day moving 
average of the spread between the 7-year Refcorp bond-yield and the respective government 
bond benchmark rate for each issue date as a liquidity measure. 
The third liquidity measure is the Pástor & Stambaugh's (2003) stock market liquidity 
measure. As shown by e.g., Lin et al. (2011), de Jong & Driessen (2012), and Acharya et al. (2013), 
expected corporate bond returns are strongly affected not only by bond market liquidity, but also 
by stock market liquidity. 
Covenant use 
“Agency costs are as real as any other costs” (Jensen & Meckling, 1976, p.357). They are based 
on information asymmetry between borrower and lender and typically mitigated by the use of 
covenants. However, covenant use is rarely used in explaining bond spreads. As in Bradley & 
Roberts (2015), Hollander & Verriest (2016), and Demerjian (2017) e.g., we use covenant 
intensity, which is the number of covenants (ranging from 1 to 18) to measure the effect of 
covenant use. To allow for the possibility that the effect of covenant intensity may be non-linear 
as in Reisel (2014), or because of diminishing marginal effects of additional covenants on the 
spread, we use both covenant intensity as well as its squared value in our regression model. In 
addition, to reduce the dimensions of the 18 covenants, we will also use factor analysis to replace 
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the covenant intensity by a limited number of factors that may possibly summarize the 
information in the covenants. Appendix C provides an overview of the 18 debt covenants.  
Information asymmetry problems are also mitigated by financial intermediaries, such as banks 
involved in a bond placement. We use a dummy variable indicating whether the bond issue was 
placed by a top tier arranger (as in McCahery & Schwienbacher, 2010). A bank is classified as a 
top tier arranger when it was one of the three biggest players in terms of market share in the year 
preceding the debt issue. Data on market share for total annual placements in the European bond 
market are obtained from Bloomberg. 
Based on the reputation building theory of Diamond (1984), we use the log age of the firm to 
additionally control for information asymmetry effects. In line with James and Wier (1990), Berger 
and Udell (1995) and Krishnaswami et al. (1999) we expect younger firms with limited financial 
histories to have a greater degree of information asymmetry. Age is defined as the number of 
years since inception.  
Control Variables 
We add a number of firm and issue specific control variables to the regressions. Firm size is 
measured by the logarithm of total assets and total revenues of the issuer. Profitability of a firm 
is measured by the ratio of EBIT to revenues (profit margin). To control for industry affiliation, we 
include industry dummy variables taking the value of one, if an issuer is affiliated to a certain 
sector defined by its Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS) sector code. We keep 9 out of 
11 GICS sectors (we drop financials and real estate) and the benchmark sector is “industrials”. To 
control for effects in excess of the country enforcement environment (D. P. Miller & Reisel, 2011), 
we include a dummy variable for issuer domicile, with the UK being the benchmark domicile.   
Finally, we control for bond maturity, and use a dummy variable indicating whether the issuer 
or its parent company is a listed company.  
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2.3 Summary Statistics 
Bond characteristics, Firm characteristics, and Market Conditions 
Table 1 presents summary statistics for bond and firm characteristics, as well as for the market 
conditions at the issue date of the debt. Summary statistics are reported separately for public and 
private debt issues. 
Panel A shows statistics for bond specific variables. Comparing the public and private debt 
issues, we see that on average the spread on private bonds is 116 basis points higher than on 
public bonds. Average maturity and issue size are comparable for both sets of bonds, although 
the median maturity for private bonds is one year longer than for public bonds. Private bonds are 
issued with top-tier banks more often than public bonds (49% versus 39%) and have on average 
more covenants attached to them as well (7.4 versus 6.6). This is also witnessed by the median 
covenant score (9 versus 8). 
Firm characteristics are described by Panel B. Here we see that firms issuing private debt are 
on average 9 years older than firms issuing public debt, although the median age is only one year 
higher. Both in terms of assets and revenues, firms issuing private debt are about one third 
smaller than firms issuing public debt, whereas their median size is about half of that of the firms 
issuing public debt. Firms issuing private debt have a bit higher average leverage and are less 
often listed, whereas in terms of profitability they are similar to firms issuing public debt. Finally, 
the average rating score of private debt issuing firms is with 9.5 about one notch below that of 
public debt issuing firms, which also holds for the medium rating score (9 versus 8). As this may 
be the reason why the average spread of private bonds is 116 basis points higher than for public 
bonds, we will look at the cross-sectional variation in spreads and rating scores to address this. 
La2stly, Panel C shows the market conditions at play when debt is issued. Focusing on the 
significant differences, we see that relative to public debt, private debt is issued more often 
following lower GDP-growth, but also after high stock market returns for the own industry. It is 
also issued relatively more often when (benchmark) interest rates are lower and the yield curve 
is steeper, and when stock market volatility is relatively low. 
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Appendix Table I shows the Pearson product-moment correlation coeffcients (r) of the 
variables used. We find mostly weakly12 correlated (r < 0.39) independent variables. Some few 
variables show moderate or strong correlations. As it is likely that some economic variables, such 
as for example VIX and the MSCI index return or market liquidtity are moderately to highly 
correlated with each other, we use the variance inflation factor (VIF) to control for potential 
collinearity and multicollinearity problems in our regression analysis. We use a tolerance limit to 
detect instances where an independent variable should not be allowed into the regression model 
of 10 for VIF  and 0.1 for 1/VIF. 
 
Risk-adjusted Excess Spreads 
The summary statistics in Table 1 show that private debt issues on average have a higher 
spread, but also a higher rating score. To see whether the higher spreads are caused by higher 
credit risk, Table 2 shows excess spreads adjusted for rating score, based on the regression 
 
     𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡,    (1) 
 
where spreadit is  the difference between the yield on a corporate fixed coupon bond calculated 
as internal rate of return (IRR) and the yield of the riskless maturity matched government bond 
on the issue date and ratingit is the (numerical) rating score. spreadit refers to issue i at date t. 
Panel A of Table 2 shows the average residual it , or risk-adjusted spread, of private placement 
bonds over public placement bonds, per rating category. The last two columns show the 
difference between the average risk-adjusted spreads for private versus public debt issues. The 
cross-sectional excess spread of private over public bonds amounts to 43 basis points. For 11 out 
of the 15 rating categories, private bonds have higher risk-adjusted spreads than public bonds, 9 
                                                     
12 We tentatively label the strength of the association for absolute values of r, 0-0.19 as very weak, 0.2-
0.39 as weak, 0.40-0.59 as moderate, 0.6-0.79 as strong and 0.8-1 as very strong correlation, these limits 
arbitrarily chosen and applied in the context of using the VIF as our main indicator for potential problems of 
collinearity and multicollinearity problems.   
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of them statistically significant so, ranging from 15 to 243 basis points. It is only for the B and B+ 
rated bonds that the private bonds have a marginally significantly lower average risk-adjusted 
spread, whereas the other categories where the risk-adjusted spread for private bonds is lower 
have a low number of observed bonds in either category. 
Panels B and C show the average risk-adjusted spreads across different maturity groupings or 
industry affiliation. For all three maturity groups, private bonds have higher average risk-adjusted 
spreads than public bonds. Grouping bonds according the firm's industry affiliation, except for 
issues in the consumer discretionary GICS sector, private bonds always have higher risk-adjusted 
spreads than public bonds. In Appendix Table 2 we show similar results when grouping bonds 
according the firm’s domicile country, except for issues in the Netherlands. We thus conclude that 
accounting for credit risk with the rating score cannot account for the difference in spreads 
between private and public debt issues. 
 
3. The Choice for Private Placement Bonds versus Public   
Placement Bonds 
Economically, for an average private offering in the amount of USD 500 million and a cross-
sectional risk-adjusted excess spread of 43 basis points by our sample, the difference in spread 
represents an annual cost to a firm of approximately USD 2.15 million. With an average maturity 
of nine years, this translates into a total cost of approximately USD 19 million. This leads to the 
question why firms place bonds privately instead of publicly and bear this incremental cost of 
debt. Prior literature offers several potential explanations. We refer to these as (1) the costly 
information production hypothesis, (2) the moral hazard hypothesis and (3) the debt 
renegotiation hypothesis.13 
                                                     
13 An additional hypothesis offered by prior literature is the information disclosure hypothesis: Firms may 
not want to disclose proprietary information potentially valuable to competitors in the context of a debt 
placement. These firms will prefer private debt as private lenders have the ability to keep sensitive 
information confidential (Campbell, 1979;  Bhattacharya and Ritter, 1983; Krishnaswami et al., 1999). 
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First, the costly information production hypothesis suggests that firms may prefer private over 
public debt because the cost of producing the information required for public debt financing is 
comparatively higher (Blackwell & Kidwell, 1988; Eugene F Fama, 1985). Consistent with the costly 
information production hypothesis, various papers find a positive relation between firm size and 
the level of public debt in a firm’s balance sheet (Cantillo & Wright, 2000; Denis & Mihov,  2003; 
Houston & James, 1996 and Krishnaswami et al., 1999).  
Second, the moral hazard hypothesis suggests that firms with risky debt need to be monitored 
as they might engage in actions damaging to debtholders. Based on agency theory, the main 
concerns may arise from information asymmetries leading to asset substitution where 
shareholders invest in risky projects given bounded (limited) liability but unlimited benefits 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Galai and Masulis, 1976). Myers (1977) shows that moral hazard may 
lead to underinvestment problems as firms with risky debt forgo positive net present value 
projects when cash flows primarily flow towards debt repayments. Rational investors, in this 
argumentation, will ask higher returns or intensify monitoring of such borrowers.  
Third, we propose the debt renegotiation hypothesis: firms may prefer private over public debt 
because of its flexibility to be renegotiated or restructured (Detragiache, 1994) and avoid pre-
mature liquidation (Chemmanur & Fulghieri, 1994). Our debt renegotiation hypothesis is based 
on incomplete contracting theory (Grossman & Hart, 1986; Hart & Moore, 1988; Aghion & Bolton, 
1992; and Hart & Moore, 1998) and based on the assumption that it is often impracticable to 
specify all relevant contingencies related to later changes in the state of the world. Parties to a 
debt contract then manage contingencies by the use of covenants and anticipate renegotiation 
in the future. Roberts & Sufi (2009), for example, show that over 90% of long-term private debt 
contracts are renegotiated prior to maturity (determined by changes in credit quality, investment 
opportunities, collaterals, macroeconomic fluctuations, equity market conditions). The 
renegotiation-based explanation of debt choice is built on the hypothesis that private lenders 
                                                     
Testing this hypothesis, however, would require observations ex post the observed bond issues and we do 
not test this hypothesis as this is beyond the scope of this study. 
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have superior ability, compared to public lenders, to decide about the liquidation or continuation 
of a lending relationship based on their access to private information (Rajan, 1992; Chemmanur 
& Fulghieri, 1994; Bolton & Freixas, 2000; Cantillo Wright, 2000) . Private lenders request more 
restrictive covenants used to manage events of adverse contingencies (Arena and Howe, 2009) 
and these covenants are expected to reduce the overall cost of debt (Smith & Warner, 1979; 
Reisel, 2014; Bradley & Roberts, 2015). The debt renegotiation hypothesis is also in line with more 
recent research: Demerjian (2017) examines the use of financial covenants when contracting for 
debt under uncertainty. He finds that a lack of information about future economic events and 
their consequences for the borrower’s creditworthiness is positively related to covenant 
intensity. According to Nikolaev (2017), monitoring mechanisms, such as the use of covenants, 
are positively related to renegotiation intensity. Christensen et al. (2019) find that credit-supply 
frictions influence the type and strictness of covenants in debt contracts, and that financial 
covenants represent a channel through which economic shocks to lenders are transmitted to the 
nonfinancial sector. Drawing on the literature of Demerjian (2017), Nikolaev (2017) and 
Christensen et al. (2019), it appears plausible that debt renegotiation is costly and it is conceivable 
this explains the excess spread of private over public bonds.  
We analyze a firm’s choice for private versus public debt for our sample and to analyze whether 
we find support for our hypotheses above. We use logistic regressions as described in equation 
(2) below.  
 
𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽0 + ∑ 𝛽1𝑗𝑖𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑗𝑖𝑡
𝐾𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡









                                         ∑ 𝛽5𝑗𝑖𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑗𝑖𝑡
𝐾𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙
𝑗=1 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                                                                                   (2) 
 
We regress the dummy variable placementit that is one for private placement bonds and 
zero for public placement bonds, on a constant and the different categories of variables discussed 
in Section 1.2: credit risk variables, market conditions, liquidity variables, agency cost variables, 
and a set of control variables. For instance, there are KCredit different credit risk variables creditijt, 
j=1..KCredit. Prior literature suggests that covenant choice is endogenous with respect to financing 
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(Demiroglu & James, 2010; Smith & Warner, 1979). We therefore estimate the logistic regressions 
without using covenant intensity to avoid a potential endogeneity bias.14  
Table 3 shows our binary choice model. We use the odds ratio to indicate an increase 
(odds ratio > 1) or decrease (<1) in the odds of placing a bond privately. The percentage change 
in odds for a one standard deviation increase in the used variables is indicated in brackets. Column 
1 of Table 2 shows the results when we include the total sample, that is all bond issues. Column 
2 includes bond issues executed by firms that use private and public bonds, which we call 
switchers. This group is of interest as these firms access both markets and actually choose 
between issuing private versus public bonds. Column 3 includes bond issues by non-switchers, 
i.e., firms that issue either private or public bonds. 
We find little evidence of a significant relation between placement choice and credit risk, 
as proxied by the rating score or leverage. Also, profitability appears to be of minor importance 
when choosing either a private or public placement. These results contrast the findings of Denis 
and Mihov (2003) and Kwan and Carleton (2010), who find that firms with higher credit risk, 
higher leverage or with less profitability borrow privately rather than using public debt sources.  
Quite contrary, the odds ratio indicates that a higher rating score (equal to higher credit risk) 
reduces the likelihood of placing a bond privately.  
Turning to our three hypotheses (costly information production, moral hazard and debt 
renegotiation), we find no support for the costly information production hypothesis as we 
observe a negative relation between firm size and the likelihood of placing debt publicly. Also, the 
issue amount is statistically significant in all specifications and greater than one, indicating that 
larger issue amounts increase the odds of placing a bond privately. The data suggests that the 
likelihood of placing a bond privately increases by approximately 60% for switchers and with a 
one standard deviation increase in issue amount. If out of pocket transaction costs were the main 
determinant of placing a bond privately, then the likelihood of placing a bond by this channel 
                                                     
14 Using a probit model with endogenous covariates (ivprobit) and based on Wald’s exogeneity test of the instrumented variables, 
we reject that covenant intensity is exogenous with p = 0.04 (p = 0.01) for specifications one (two).  
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would decrease with an increase in issue amount. This observation contrasts again Kwan and 
Carleton (2010), who find that firms use the private market when the issue size is small. 15  
Turning to the moral hazard hypothesis, for firms that use both placement channels 
(switchers in column 2), the odds of placing a bond privately is two times higher when a top-tier 
bank is involved. Our alternative measure for agency costs, firm age, is significant in columns (1) 
and (3) but not for switchers as indicated in column (2).   
Turning to the debt renegotiation hypothesis, the level and the slope of the yield curve 
both affect the likelihood of placing a bond privately. An increase in the risk-free rate or a 
steepening of the slope increase the odds of placing bonds privately for switchers. Conversely, an 
increase in equity volatility (VIX) makes it less likely that a firm places bonds privately. Also, 
favorable industry conditions as measured by the index return and a higher quality enforcement 
environment as proxied by the rule of law score appear to reduce the odds of placing a bond 
privately.  
A number of interpretations can be drawn from these findings:  
First, firms appear to place bonds privately when the yield curve slope is steep and the 
risk-free rate high. A steep slope is an indicator of the state of the business cycle (Collin-Dufresne 
et al., 2001) pointing  towards strong business activity (Eugene F. Fama, 1986). This can be seen 
as a proxy for investors’ assessed risk of the economy shifting to a lower growth state in the future 
(David, 2008). Second, higher risk-free rates might make a firm more prone to default and less 
likely to tap credit markets directly (Cantillo and Wright, 2000), increasing the likelihood of using 
a private placement. Third, the odds ratios observed for industry conditions and the quality 
enforcement environment reveal additional information on debt choice: The likelihood for 
                                                     
15 Also, Blackwell and Kidwell (1988) find a difference in flotation costs between private and public 
placement bonds in the magnitude of 32 basis points. These flotation costs consist of the underwriter’s 
compensation and out-of-pocket expenses for issuing a bond. They are expensed at or around the bond 
issue time, therefore being one-time costs. The risk-adjusted excess spread of private over public placement 
bonds amounts to approximately 43 basis points annually (see Table 2). Considering the average bond 
maturity of nine years, this leads to an increase in the cost of debt of 387 basis points. It appears 
unreasonable to assume a rational firm would borrow at this incremental cost of debt without good reason. 
The costly information production hypothesis thus provides little explanation for the choice for private 
placements bonds.     
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placing a bond privately increases when industry conditions are worse and default probabilities 
increase (Acharya et al., 2007), and when firms are domiciled in countries with a lower quality 
enforcement environment. The latter affects a lender’s perception of borrower risk, as it is a proxy 
for how strictly debt contracts can be enforced and thus correlated with the likelihood of the 
lender being repaid in the event of bankruptcy (Brown, 2016). These findings are consistent with 
the debt renegotiation hypothesis put forth earlier. In uncertain market conditions, firms may 
require flexibility to renegotiate or restructure debt ex post (Detragiache, 1994; Roberts & Sufi, 
2009) with private lenders requesting more restrictive covenants used to manage events of 
adverse contingencies (Arena and Howe, 2009). 
Fourth, turning to the moral hazard hypothesis, switchers that place bonds privately appear to 
use top tier arrangers more often. Krishnaswami et al. (1999) and Cantillo and Wright (2000), find 
that firms are largely driven by agency costs when choosing the private market to place capital. 
In line with this view, firms issuing private placement bonds appear to use a top-tier arrangers’ 
reputation to certify the quality of a bond being placed (McCahery & Schwienbacher, 2010) and 
reduce costs associated with information asymmetries. Fang (2005), for example, finds that the 
involvement of reputable arrangers leads to pricing improvements, in particular for junk bonds, 
for which information asymmetries are expected to be highest. She finds that reputable arrangers 
are selective and apply more stringent underwriting criteria when it comes to junk bond issues. 
In line with Diamond’s (1991) theory of bank loan demand,16 firms issuing private placement 
bonds may lean on arranger reputation in circumstances in which reputation effects are 
important.  As suggested by the moral hazard hypothesis, firms issuing risky debt might need to 
be monitored as they might engage in actions damaging debtholders as described in agency 
theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Myers, 1977).  
                                                     
16 Diamond (1991) analyzes the conditions under which debt contracts are monitored by lenders directly 
as opposed to banks that monitor moral hazard. He concludes from his theory of bank loan demand that (p. 
716) “in periods of high present or anticipated future real interst rates or low present or future anticipated 
economywide profitability, a higher credit rating is required to borrow without monitoring, implying that the 
demand for bank loan monitoring is then high and that the average new bank loan goes to a safer, higher-
rated customer.” 
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Overall, the results from the binary choice model in Table 3 suggest that a firm’s decision to 
issue a bond privately is not driven by credit risk or profitability but mainly by the issue amount 
and uncertain market conditions. The latter are expressed by a steep slope, a high level of the 
risk-free rate, worse industry conditions as measured by industry specific index returns and a 
lower quality enforcement environment.  
 
4. The Cross-Section of Excess Spreads of Private Placement Bonds  
     versus Public Placement Bonds 
Both hypotheses, debt renegotiation and moral hazard, are associated with the use of 
restrictive covenants. Under the debt renegotiation hypothesis, debt issuers and investors 
manage events of adverse contingencies and avoid pre-mature or costly liquidation (Chemmanur 
& Fulghieri, 1994; Arena & Howe, 2009) by flexible debt renegotiation (Detragiache, 1994; 
Roberts & Sufi, 2009) with private lenders requesting more restrictive covenants (Arena and 
Howe, 2009).  
Under the moral hazard hypothesis, the same basic adverse selection argument that is used 
by Myers and Majluf (1984) for equity can be applied to debt. To the extent that debt involves 
default risk, managers may have an incentive to borrow when their private information about the 
state of the firm suggests that markets will price a bond issue at a relatively favorable spread. 
Information asymmetries and especially the way potential debtholder-shareholder agency 
conflicts are mitigated may therefore affect bond pricing.  
The use of restrictive covenants can be measured in different ways. We first use covenant 
intensity, which is a count of covenants attached to each bond issued, and hold that the way debt 
renegotiation and moral hazard are managed affect bond pricing ex ante. Smith and Warner 
(1979) argue that since the restrictions imposed by the use of covenants are costly to the firm, 
they must confer some offsetting benefit. According to them, the benefit of using covenants is 
the reduction in agency costs, which translates into a lower cost of debt. Consistent with this 
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prediction, Bradley & Roberts (2015) find that the inclusion of covenants in loan contracts leads 
to lower yields. Reisel (2014) likewise finds that covenants reduce the cost of debt for public 
straight bonds, but she also finds that covenants restricting payouts and additional debt leads to 
a marginally significant increase in the cost of debt, indicating that the effect of covenants may 
be ambiguous.  
We expect that the use of covenants explains some of the variation in bond spreads. To verify 
this assumption and to explain the cross-section of spreads on private versus public placement 
bonds, we use the following regression model: 
 
𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑖𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽2𝑗𝑖𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑗𝑖𝑡
𝐾𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡











𝑗=1 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡.                                                (3) 
 
Thus, we regress spread (spreadit) for issue i in year t on a constant, a dummy placementit that 
is one for private placement bonds and zero for public placement bonds, and the different 
categories of variables discussed in Section 1.2: credit risk variables, market conditions, liquidity 
variables, agency cost variables, and a set of control variables. For instance, there are KCredit 
different credit risk variables creditijt, j=1..KCredit. Equation (2) is essentially an extension of 
Equation (1), where we add next to credit risk the other categories of variables as well as the 
private placement dummy.17  
 
4.1 Baseline regressions 
Table 4 shows OLS-estimates of different versions of Equation (2), where in each column we 
set different subsets of variables to zero.  
Column 1 of Table 4 shows the results when we only include credit risk variables. This 
specification is comparable to Equation (1), except that we also include leverage as a credit risk 
                                                     
17 And note that we also add leverage as a credit risk variable. 
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variable. Credit risk variables (together with the private placement dummy) can explain a bit more 
than 50% of the cross-sectional variation in credit spreads, as witnessed by the R2. However, the 
coefficient for the private placement dummy shows that private bonds have on average a 46 basis 
points higher spread than public bonds, which - with four standard errors - is reliably different 
from zero. Thus, from the average difference of 116 basis points between excess spreads on 
private versus public bonds reported in Table 1, credit risk variables can explain more than half of 
it, both in terms of cross-sectional variation and in level, but there is still a sizeable and significant 
difference left. 
Looking at Columns 2 and 3, we see that adding either market condition variables or liquidity 
variables helps in explaining the cross-sectional variation in spreads by an additional five percent 
(the R2's increase to 56%), but hardly affect the private placement dummy. Thus, these variables 
do not help in explaining the difference in spreads between private and public placement bonds.  
It is only when we add covenant intensity and its squared value next to credit risk that the 
private placement coefficient falls to an insignificant 13 basis points, as is shown in Column (5). 
The R2 increases to almost 60%, so covenant use explains as much of the cross sectional variation 
as the liquidity and market condition variables together. Importantly, it is indeed the combination 
of covenant intensity and its squared value that helps explaining the average difference in 
spreads, as including only covenant intensity itself, as in Column (4) of Table 4, leaves the private 
placement coefficient at 43 basis points and shows only a minor improvement in the R2 relative 
to baseline specification in Column (2) with only credit risk variables.18  
The lasts columns of Table 4 show that combining the four categories of variables (Column 
(6)) and adding control variables (Column (7)) increases the R2 to 66% and 68% respectively and 
slightly lowers the private placement coefficient to about 10 basis points. Column (8) also adds 
industry dummies to this and shows that the full model explains more than 70% of the cross-
                                                     
18 Similarly, using hierarchical (nested) regressions in unreported tables, we find statistically significant 
increments in R2 when agency costs are added to credit risk variables. These increments are larger than 
those observed for the addition of liquidity, market condition or control variables.  
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sectional variation in spreads and lowers the private placement coefficient to less than 5 basis 
points. 
We thus conclude that, next to credit risk variables, the main driver of the difference in 
spreads between private and public bonds is covenant intensity and its squared value - which 
reduce the difference in spreads from a sizable and significant 46 basis points to an insignificant 
13 basis points. Market conditions and liquidity measures, together with control variables and 
industry dummies all help in explaining the cross-sectional variation in spreads, but only industry 
dummies lower the difference in excess spreads a bit further to 5 basis points. 
 
Interpreting the regression coefficients 
Looking at the full regression model in Column (8), we see that the (partial) effect of an 
increase in rating score19 increases the spread on (both public and private) bonds by about 26 
basis points. Since the maximum rating score (lowest rating) is 18, this implies that differences in 
credit risk can explain up to 465 basis points in spread according to the  regression model. 
For market conditions, although stock market volatility, the benchmark yield, and GDP-growth 
are statistically significant different from zero, the economic effect of changes in these variables 
on the spreads is very minor, less than one basis point for any normal change in them. 
The liquidity variables have both statistically and economically meaningful effects on the 
spread. For instance, two otherwise equal issues that differ in size by a factor ten, the estimated 
coefficient for (log) issue size implies that they would differ in spread by about 22 basis points. 
Although liquidity variables show up significantly and help in explaining the cross-sectional 
variation in spreads as witnessed by the increase in R2  from 51% to 56%, somewhat surprisingly, 
the average excess spread of PPBs over PUBs appears to be unaffected by the liquidity variables. 
Bond pairs with the same credit risk but different liquidity should be priced differently (see, for 
example, Ejsing et al., 2012; Helwege et al., 2014; Longstaff, 2004). Also, privately placed bonds 
                                                     
19 Recall that an increase in score is equivalent to an increase in credit risk. 
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are typically only traded among qualified institutional investors and subject to holding periods of 
six to twelve months subsequent to their issuance. After controlling for credit risk and market 
conditions, one could therefore expect that liquidity explains some if not all of the excess spread 
of private over public placement bonds. However, it appears there are other meaningful 
differences between private and public placements bonds beyond liquidity, i.e. covenant intensity 
and its squared value. 
The fact that both covenant intensity and its squared value show up significantly, implies that 
the effect of covenant intensity on the spread is indeed non-linear, as suggested by the findings 
of Reisel (2014) and our conjecture that there may be marginally decreasing effects from the use 
of covenants. The coefficients for covenant intensity (squared) in specification (8) imply that the 
first covenant reduces the spread by about 30 basis points, and that the maximum decrease 
occurs at six covenants, which leads to a 96 basis points lower spread. The quadratic form implies 
that beyond six covenants, the effect on spreads start to increase, with even positive effects on 
the spread when there are 12 or more covenants. With a maximum number of covenants of 18, 
the spread would be 305 basis points higher. The variation in covenant intensity therefore can 
explain a difference of about 400 basis points in spread, similar in magnitude as the 465 basis 
points due to credit risk. In the next section we will analyze the effect of covenants on the spread 
in more detail. 
The remaining coefficients in specification (8) that are statistically different from zero, are also 
economically meaningful. For instance, the coefficient for (log) age, which also proxies for agency 
costs, implies that a firm that is ten times older than an otherwise equal firm, would pay 39 basis 
points less. Similarly, for the control variables, an otherwise equal firm that is ten times bigger in 
terms of total assets, would have a spread that is about 42 basis points lower. Each percentage 
point increase in profitability lowers the spread with 1.2 basis points and being listed lowers the 
spread by 67 basis points. For the bond specific controls, the results imply that each additional 
year to maturity adds one 1.3 basis points to the spread. 
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4.2 The role of covenants 
The results in Table 4 suggest that covenants play an important role in explaining the difference 
in excess spreads between private and public bonds, and that the effect of covenant intensity on 
spreads takes the form of a U-shape, initially lowering the spread, but then increasing it as the 
number of covenants goes beyond six.  
Using covenant intensity only looks at the number of covenants, not whether there is a 
difference in economic meaning and effect between the various covenants. Table 5 shows the 
unconditional and conditional frequencies of the 12 most often used covenants. As the first line 
of Table 5 shows, the first eight covenants occur in more than 50% of the bonds, the next four in 
more than 25% of the bonds. The remaining six covenants, which are excluded from the table, 
occur in less than 25% of the bonds, four of them in even less than 10%. 
To better understand the role of covenants in explaining excess spreads, we use factor 
analysis and see whether the variation in the covenants can be captured by a limited number of 
factors. The results of the factor analysis, presented in Appendix D, show that the first two factors 
have eigenvalues of 6.3 and 3.4 respectively, whereas the remaining factors all have eigenvalues 
below 1.0. The second and third row of Table 5 show the factor loadings of these two factors. As 
can be seen, the first eight covenants - which have the highest frequency - coincide with loadings 
on the first factor being higher than 0.5. Likewise, the last four covenants - with frequencies 
between 25% and 50% - coincide with loadings on the second factor being higher than 0.5. There 
is some overlap for covenants six through nine that have loadings on both factors, but they then 
have loadings below 0.5 for either factor. 
Nikolaev (2010) categorizes (restrictive) covenants into three sub-groups: i) investment-
related restrictions, ii) payout-related restrictions, and iii) financing-related restrictions. 
Covenants one and nine in Table 5 do not adhere to these types of restrictions, but merely 
indicate the presence of certain financial indicators. Apart from this, the first eight covenants in 
Table 5, reflecting the first factor, are a combination of investment-related and payout-related 
restrictions. The last four covenants, reflecting the second factor, are a combination of financing-
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related and one payout-related restrictions. We therefore tentatively coin the first factor as 
investment factor and the second as financing factor. Broadly speaking, the covenants in the 
investment factor limit the firm in making additional investments and selling its assets. The 
covenants in the financing factor limit the firm in obtaining additional debt and making 
distributions to shareholders or junior debt, thus preventing the firm from increasing its leverage.  
The remaining part of Table 5 shows the conditional frequencies of the covenants, which 
further confirms the distinction in the two sets of covenants, as well as a logical ordering in them. 
First, excluding covenants one and nine, which are not really restrictions but indicate the presence 
of financial information, we see that whenever one of the investment factor covenants is present, 
at least in 80% of these bonds the other investment factor covenants are present as well. On the 
other hand, the financing factor covenants show up in less than 50% these bonds. Thus, the first 
eight covenants indeed reflect one largely common factor. 
Next, focusing on the conditional frequencies for the financing factor covenants, we see that 
these are all above 85%, with the exception of covenant nine again. These are much higher than 
the frequencies conditional on the investment factor covenants, confirming that they also present 
one common factor. 
Finally, except for covenant nine, whenever one of the financing factor covenants is present, 
in at least 92% of these bonds investment factor covenants are present as well. This suggests that 
there is a logical order in the covenants: first the investment factor covenants are included in the 
bond issue, and next - in roughly half of the issues - financing factor covenants are added to them 
as well. 
 
Using the covenant factors to explain excess spreads 
Having identified the investment and financing factors to capture most of the variation in the 
covenants, we next include them in our regression (2) to analyze their effect on the excess 
spreads. The last column (9) of Table 4 shows the results, which can be compared to specification 
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(8) in Table 4, that contains all categories of variables and controls, and uses covenant intensity 
and its squared value. 
Using the investment and financing factors instead of covenant intensity, gives a slight 
improvement in explaining spreads: relative to specification (8), the R2 increases a bit from 71% 
to 73%, and the difference in excess spreads between private and public bonds decreases by 
about one third from an insignificant 4.6 basis points to 2.9 basis points. 
More importantly, the investment and financing factors both show up significantly, with the 
investment factor having a negative effect on spread and the financing factor a positive. The 
finding that the spread decreases due to the inclusion of investment factor covenants and 
increases due to financing factor covenants, combined with the fact that there appears to be a 
logical order to first include the investment factor covenants before adding financing factor 
covenants, is in line with the U-shaped pattern of the effect of covenant intensity on spread: 
Initially the investment factor leads to an increase in covenant intensity and an accompanying 
decrease in spread. Subsequently, the financing factor further increases covenant intensity with 
an accompanying increase in spread. We postpone the discussion of these results as we first aim 
to evaluate these findings in more detail in the next paragraph. 
 
Using covenant dummy variables instead of covenant intensity or covenant factors  
If spread is negatively (positively) related to the investment (financing) factors, then we may 
expect that the covenants defining these factors have a negative (positive) sign if used individually 
as dummy variables in an OLS regression. To test this, the covenants described in Appendix C are 
used as dummy variables taking the value of one if attached to a bond issue and zero otherwise. 
Covenants nine and fourteen turn out to be collinear in the regression analysis. Both are 
investment covenants. We keep covenant fourteen in the regression specification.20  The results 
                                                     
20 We also run the regression keeping covenant nine. Both covenants turn out to be insignificant. 
Additionally, to control for potential effects from not including covenant nine in our measure of covenant 
intensity or our factors, we reconstruct “covscore” and our investment and financing factor and exclude 
covenant nine. The regression results presented earlier do not change in material ways.  
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of the OLS regression using covenant dummy variables are shown in Table 6, specification (2). The 
expected sign for the financing covenants (number one, two, seven and seventeen) is positive, 
for the investment covenants (number three, six, eight, ten, eleven, fourteen and fifteen) the 
expected sign is negative. Specification 1 is the baseline regression as in Table 4, specification 8, 
used for comparison. Columns (3) and (4) show the frequency of covenants attached to private 
and public placements bonds respectively.  
As for the financing covenants, they all show the expected sign. The distribution covenant 
(cov1) and the limit of indebtedness covenant (cov7) are statistically significant at the 1% level 
and increase spread by a substantial 64.6 and 79.7 basis points respectively if attached to a bond, 
on average. Turning to frequencies in columns (3) and (4), financing covenants are attached more 
often to private placement bonds than to their public counterparts. For example, the distribution 
(limit of indebtedness) covenant is attached to private bonds in 29% (32%), whereas it is only 
observed approximately half as many times in public bonds (14% and 16%). Generally speaking, 
firms issuing private placement bonds appear to be more restricted in financing activities than 
firms issuing public placement bonds.  
Turning to investment covenants, the sale of assets covenant (cov10) and activity restrictions 
(cov11) are statistically significant at the 1% level and with the expected negative sign. Measured 
by relative frequency, the sale of asset covenant is observed more (69%) in public than in private 
(58%) bonds, this difference significant at the 1% level, whereas the difference in the frequency 
of covenant 11 (activity restrictions) appears to be statistically insignificant. Other than expected, 
merger restrictions (cov15) are positively related to spread and significant at the 1% level. 
Interestingly, the use of merger restriction covenants is more often observed with the placement 
of public (67%) than that of private (58%) bonds. Although not statistically significant in the OLS 
regression, there is a significant difference in the use of cross default covenants. These are 
attached to 67% (58%) of the private (public) bonds in the sample. Generally speaking, firms 
issuing private placement bonds appear to be less restricted in investment activities than firms 
issuing public placement bonds. 
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Turning to other covenants, sale and leaseback restrictions (cov16) are more frequent in 
public (44%) than private (24%) bonds, the coefficient of those restrictions negative as expected 
and significant at the 5% level. Finally, privately placed bonds have a covenant attached that 
allows a majority of bondholders to change bond terms ex post in approximately one third (33%) 
of all cases, whereas publicly placed bonds have this covenant attached in only 14% of all bond 
issues, this difference significant at the 1% level.  
Firms issuing private placement bonds appear to be more restricted in financing activities but 
less restricted in investment activities than firms issuing public placement bonds. These 
restrictions do in fact play an important role in explaining the excess spread of PPBs over PUBs. 
Restrictions related to financing activities appear to increase spread, those related to investment 
activities decrease spread. While firms that place bonds privately are more restricted in making 
distributions or placing additional debt, they are less restricted in the sale of assets, merger 
activities and sale and leaseback activities. Second, firms issuing private placement bonds are 
more subject to flexible debt renegotiation: the respective covenant (cov18) allows a 
supermajority of bondholders to consent to changes in the fundamental terms of the bond in 33% 
of all private bonds issued. Flexible debt renegotiation is, however, observed to a much lesser 
extent and only in 14% of all public bond issues.  
 
4.3 Discussion 
We have used covenant intensity, covenant factors and covenant dummy variables 
individually to explain the pricing differences between private and public placement bonds. 
Including the use of covenants in modelling bond spreads explains the pricing difference between 
the two placement channels. Moreover, the use of covenants also explains an important part of 
the variation in spreads of public bond placements.  
 Our findings are consistent with agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Myers, 1977; Myers 
& Majluf, 1984) on the one side and incomplete contracting theory (Aghion & Bolton, 1992) on 
the other side. Consistent with the moral hazard hypothesis described earlier (see page 18) and 
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the notion that firms that place bonds privately are more opaque (Krishnaswami et al., 1999), we 
find that covenants may lower spread by resolving agency problems.21  Interestingly, while 
reducing the spread, given the difference in investment covenant frequencies, firms issuing 
private placement bonds appear to be less restricted in investment activities (that is the sale of 
assets and merger restrictions) than firms issuing public placement bonds. Leaning more on the 
debt renegotiation hypothesis and the results from our analysis using a binary choice model 
(Section 3) we find that firms place bonds privately in times of higher uncertainty. Private lenders 
request more restrictive covenants to manage events of adverse contingencies (Arena & Howe, 
2009) when flexible ex post renegotiation and less damaging intervention in distress is focal 
(Detragiache, 1994; Cantillo and Wright, 2000). Increased monitoring and renegotiation efforts 
when contracting under higher uncertainty may lead investors to request compensation for these 
efforts. The observed ex ante restrictions related to financing are more frequently observed in 
private as opposed to public bond issues.  The data suggests these restrictions related to 
distributions and additional debt are costly and increase spread.  
Of course, there are likely other explanations explaining why financing covenants increase 
spread. For example, financing factor covenants may induce costs as they restrict managerial 
flexibility, as found by Kahan & Yermack (1998). The financing factor covenants may prevent the 
firm from making positive NPV investments, as these prevent it from taking on new debt. In 
addition, the financing factor covenants may induce costs because they may prevent firms to 
adjust their leverage to trade-off the costs and benefits of debt and obtain an optimal capital 
structure. As evidenced by Deangelo & Roll (2015), firms have different optimal leverage levels at 
different times, adjusting them regularly to maximize firm value. Devos et al. (2017) find that the 
presence of covenants significantly lowers the speed of capital structure adjustment. Using a 
covenant index, they find that - on average - firms with the highest index values take 26-31 
                                                     
21 Underinvestment problems (Myers, 1977), asset substitution (Jensen & Meckling, 1976), or agency 
problems based on information asymmetries (Myers & Majluf, 1984). 
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months longer to adjust their capital structure than firms with no covenants. The effect of such 
other explanations, however, is left for future research. 
 
5. Further Analysis and Robustness Tests 
This section provides some further analysis of the main findings in Sections 3 and 4, as well as 
a number of robustness checks. 
 
5.1 Covenants and economic uncertainty 
Debt renegotiation is frequent in private credit agreements (Roberts and Sufi, 2009; Roberts, 
2015). Our previous findings suggest that firms place bonds privately in times of higher 
uncertainty. In such times, lenders may request more covenants (Demerijan, 2017) to manage 
events of adverse contingencies, which in turn may accelerate the onset of debt renegotiation 
(Roberts, 2015) and increase the odds of renegotiating a debt contract (Nikolaev, 2017). 
Simultaneously, credit-supply frictions may influence the type and strictness of covenants in debt 
contracts (Christensen et al., 2019). As we find that the use of covenants and their impact on 
spread cannot be completely explained by either the issuer’s economic fundamentals or the 
moral hazard hypothesis, we have proposed above that debt renegotiation and especially 
financing restrictions explain excess spread of private over public bonds. In line with Demerijan 
(2017), we suggest by our debt renegotiation hypothesis that the use of covenants is related to 
the state of economic uncertainty. Despite the fact that ex post debt renegotiation is typically 
dominated by investors, it frequently leads to covenant waivers, not covenant tightening, ex post 
(Garleanu & Zwiebel, 2009). We posit that  investors may anticipate increased monitoring and 
renegotiation efforts when contracting under higher uncertainty and based on incomplete 
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contracting theory.22 As a consequence, investors may request compensation for their increased 
efforts ex ante, that is, they may require an increase in the yield spread.  
As we have illustrated earlier, private placement bonds have more and different covenants 
attached than public placement bonds.  We find that the private (public) bonds in our sample 
offer a supermajority of bondholders the ability to consent to changes in the fundamental terms 
of the bond in 33.4% (14.1%) of all issues, this difference being significant at the 1% level. 
Specifically, lenders appear to request more (less) restrictive financing covenants for firms issuing 
private (public) bonds. Financing covenants are observed in 31.9% (15.8%) of all private (public) 
bonds, this difference also significant at the 1% level.  
We run additional OLS regressions to evaluate how bond spreads are affected by economic 
uncertainty. Our sample period comprises both the Global Financial Crisis (GFC; 4/2007-9/2009) 
and the subsequent European Debt Crisis (EDC; 3/2010-3/2012), allowing us to test for the effects 
of high economic uncertainty. We define the time of high economic uncertainty to be that 
following the onset of the GFC or the EDC. The time of low economic uncertainty is that for the 
periods twelve months prior to the onset of these two crises. Table 7 shows the results of our 
regressions using covenant intensity and the investment and financing factors. The regressions 
are specified as in Table 4, columns (8) and (9). For brevity, we only show the results with regards 
to covenant intensity and the use of the investment and financing factor in this additional analysis. 
We find strong support for the debt renegotiation hypothesis.  
As illustrated earlier, financing covenants are only included after investment covenants and 
the upward sloping part of the U-shaped relationship between spread and covenant intensity is 
thus largely explained by financing covenants. These financing covenants explain our variable 
“covenant score squared” in specifications (1) through (4) and the financing factor used in 
specifications (5) through (7). The data suggests that covenant score squared is always significant 
at the 1% or five percent level in specifications (1) through (4). Importantly, discriminating 
                                                     
22 see Grossman and Hart (1986),  Hart and Moore (1988), Aghion and Bolton (1992) and Hart and 
Moore (1998) for a more complete review of the incomplete contracting theory and how mechanisms for 
revising the terms of trade ex post are structured.   
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between private and public bonds as in specifications (3) and (4), the effect of adding financing 
covenants in times of high uncertainty largely affects the pricing of private bonds, while it appears 
not to affect the pricing of public bonds. The interaction variable is statistically significant both 
for the linear and squared covenant score. The data suggests that firms issuing private (public) 
bonds in times of high uncertainty but with low covenant intensity experience higher (lower) 
effects from attaching covenants. However, the spread increases substantially when bonds with 
high covenant intensity are placed privately, whereas this is not priced in public bonds. For 
example, placing a bond privately (publicly) in high uncertainty but with average covenant 
intensity (7.5 covenants), the effect from the use of covenants is a spread reduction of 
approximately 112 (88) basis points.23 Firms placing bonds privately experience a cost of debt that 
is lower by approximately -24 basis points, as compared to firms issuing public bonds. This 
favorable effect decreases monotonically in the number of covenants until approximately 12 
covenants, as calculated from specifications (3) and (4) in Table 7. After this tipping point, the cost 
advantage turns into a cost disadvantage amounting to approximately 7, 17 and 28 basis points 
with 13, 14 and 15 covenants attached to a bond. The bond pricing difference between private 
and public bonds with an average (7.5) and a high (15) number of covenants attached thus 
amounts to approximately 52 basis points. This difference is also observed when using the 
financing factor in specification (6), for which the spread increasing effect is 52 basis points, 
significant at the 5% level.  
This analysis provides additional evidence that, ceteris paribus, the use of covenants explains 
the excess spread of private over public bonds. Private bonds with only few covenants attached 
can be placed at a cost of debt that is lower than that of public bonds, on average. While the 
moral hazard hypothesis based on agency theory explains how the use of covenants reduces the 
cost of debt, we find that the debt renegotiation hypothesis, based on incomplete contracting 
                                                     
23 For privately placed bonds and based on the coefficients in specification 3, the total spread given 7.5 
covenants amounts to [7.5*-16.4] + [7.5*7.5*1.26] + [7.5*-25.2] + [7.5*7.5*2.29] = -112.3 basis points. For 
publicly placed bonds and based on the coefficients in specification 4, the total spread amounts to [7.5*-
33.14] + [7.5*7.5*2.86] = -87.7 basis points.  
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theory, explains how the use of covenants may also increase the cost of debt. Investors may 
consciously accept increased monitoring and renegotiation efforts when contracting under high 
uncertainty and request compensation for these efforts. This appears to affect yield spreads 
accordingly.  
 
5.2 Differences in the pricing of private versus public placement bonds 
Section 4 shows that credit risk, liquidity, market conditions, and covenant use, together with 
control variables, jointly explain about 70% of the variation in spreads, and that the difference in 
spread between private and public bonds is importantly driven by the use of covenants. To 
analyze whether the effects of these variables are different for private and public placement 
bonds, we next include interaction terms for all variables with the placement dummy. 
Table 8 shows the results. Columns one and three repeat the two final regressions from Table 
4 with all variables included, using covenant score (squared) and the two covenant factors 
respectively. Columns two and four show the same regressions as in column one and three 
respectively, but with interaction terms for the placement dummy included. To save space, we 
only report coefficients for the interaction terms that are significantly different from zero. 
Overall, the coefficients for the non-interaction terms do not change much when the 
interaction terms are included. Five interaction terms show significant coefficients for both 
specifications (with covenant score (squared) and with the covenant factors respectively), 
although in many cases only marginally so. First, whereas leverage has a small and insignificant 
effect on the spread for public placements, adding the interaction with placement indicates that 
there is a significant negative effect of leverage on the spread of private placement bonds. 
Second, the market volatility as measured by the VIX, appears to have a small and insignificant 
effect for public placement bonds, but a significant positive effect for private placement bonds - 
each percentage point increase in volatility being associated with about four basis points increase 
in the spread. Third, whereas returns on the own industry MSCI index for half a year preceding a 
bond issue does not affect public placement bonds, a one percent higher return on the own 
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industry index leads to about a significant two basis points increase on the spread for private 
bonds. Fourth, whereas for public bonds, firms that are ten times bigger in assets would have a 
spread that is about 53 basis points lower than for otherwise comparable firms, for private bonds 
the spread would be a smaller 30-33 basis points lower (depending on specifications (2) versus 
(4)). Finally, whereas for public placements each percentage point increase in profitability lowers 
the spread by about 240 basis points, for private placement bonds, the lowering of the spread is 
only 55-85 basis points. 
Three other variables - bond market liquidity, yield curve slope, and financing covenants - 
show up (marginally) significantly in only one of the two specifications when interacted with the 
placement dummy. Whereas the presence of finance covenants lead to an increase in spread of 
28 basis points for public placements, an additional 43 basis points are added for private 
placements. This indicates that these covenants have stronger pricing effects. 
Overall, we conclude that the most variables affect the spread in a similar way for public and 
private placement bonds. Private placement bond spreads are slightly more sensitive to bond 
market liquidity and the slope of the yield curve, and are more strongly affected by financing 
covenants. 
 
5.3 The pricing of private placement bonds during financial crises 
As our sample period comprises both the Global Financial Crisis (GFC;  4/2007-9/2009) and the 
subsequent European Debt Crisis (EDC; 3/2010-3/2012), in this section we check whether the 
pricing of private versus public placement bonds is different during periods of crisis. Friewald et 
al. (2012) and Dick-Nielsen et al. (2012) for example, find that the GFC led to a deterioration of 
market liquidity and our results so far indicate that spread also depends on liquidity. Additionally, 
Longstaff et al. (2011) show that in periods of crisis, credit spreads seem to depend more on a 
common set of global factors such as the volatility risk premium embedded in the VIX index. Thus, 
the pricing of public and private bonds may indeed be different during crises. 
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To analyze the effect of different crisis periods on the spreads, we use dummy variables to 
identify different subperiods. The dummies indicate the periods i) before the onset of the GFC, ii) 
during the GFC, iii) after the GFC, iv) during the EDC, and v) after the EDC. For these different 
subperiods we run regression (9) as in Table 3, with the period dummy and the period dummy 
interacted with the private placement dummy added. The results are reported in Table 9. 
First, looking at the credit, liquidity, market conditions, agency costs, and control variables, 
we see that the estimates are very similar across the different specifications, and also to the 
estimates for the benchmark specification (9) in Table 4. Next, looking at the periods before, 
during, and after the GFC (specifications (1), (2), and (3) in Table 9, we first see that average excess 
spreads are a significant 82 basis points lower before the GFC as witnessed by the large and highly 
significant pre-GFC dummy in specification (1). During the crisis, the crisis-dummy in specification 
(2) implies that spreads were on average 47 basis points higher compared to the periods before 
and after the GFC. After the GFC, as can be seen from specification (3), spreads are not different 
from the period before the end of the GFC, controlling for all other factors in our regression 
model. 
The fact that in all three of these specifications the interaction term between the three 
periods and the placement dummy does not show any significant effect, implies that the lower 
spreads before the GFC and the higher spreads during the GFC apply to both public and private 
bonds. The effect of the GFC does not affect public and private bond spreads in different ways. 
Specifications (4) and (5) show that this is different for the periods during and after the EDC. 
These period-dummies show significant effects only when interacted with the placement dummy. 
Thus, the EDC appears to affect especially private bond spreads, not public bond spreads. During 
the EDC, private bond spreads were about 53 basis points higher than public bond spreads, 
controlling for all other factors. Contrary, after the EDC, private bond spreads were about 60 basis 
points lower than public bond spreads. 
Thus, although our findings for the entire sample suggest that credit risk, liquidity, market 
conditions, and agency costs together with a set of control variables can explain the difference in 
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spreads between private and public debt, for the periods during and after the EDC we still find 
differences in pricing to the two types of bonds. 
 
5.4 Out-of-sample test 
Next, we conduct an out-of-sample test on 1,865 Euro denominated publicly placed corporate 
bonds to evaluate the ability of the model developed above to fit market prices. As in Eom et al. 
( 2004) we consider the error in spread to be the most informative measure of model 
performance. 24  
First, we compare the predicted bond spreads from our model to the observed bond spreads. 
Estimating spreads using the empirical model developed and shown in specification 7 of Table 4, 
the model predicts an average spread of 210 basis points (with a standard deviation of 174 basis 
points). The observed spread is 221 basis points (with a standard deviation of 237 basis points). 
The model thus slightly under-predicts spreads by 11 basis points or -4.7% (observed minus 
predicted spread scaled by observed spread). This result compares to Eom, Helwege, & Huang 
(2004), who empirically test five well-known bond pricing models (see Table 3, column 5 in their 
paper). In particular, they analyse the models of Merton (1974), Geske (1977), Longstaff and 
Schwartz (1995), Leland an Toft (1996), and Collin-Dufresne and Goldstein (2001). Their carefully 
calibrated models predict bond spreads with errors between -53% and 270%, with the lowest 
prediction error rendering an underprediction of -6.6% and the second best prediction error 
rendering an overprediction of 43%. These results compare to the underprediction of 4.7% using 
our model. The spread prediction error of our model including covenant use appears to be 
markedly lower than that from the models tested in Eom et al. (2004). We also find that the out-
of-sample R2 of the model is a relatively high 29% and the correlation between the out-of-sample 
excess spreads and the model-predicted spreads is 0.56. 
                                                     
24 We are now using the maturity matched German government bond to calculate spreads. 
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Next, we evaluate if and how the reliability of the model is affected by the inclusion of the 
covenant factors. We re-run the same prediction, this time excluding covenant intensity. Once 
covenant intensity is excluded from the prediction, the model predicts a spread of 268 basis 
points (with a standard deviation of 150 basis points). The spread prediction error thus jumps to 
a level of -47 basis points or -21%.  
Overall, while the aforementioned five structural bond pricing models tested in Eom et al. 
(2004) appear to have difficulty in accurately predicting credit spreads, our results suggests that 
a model including covenant factors predicts spreads with more accuracy. 
 
5.5 Robustness tests 
As a final part of our analysis, we address a number of econometric issues and robustness tests. 
First, as Bradley & Roberts (2015) find that covenant structure and yields on corporate loans are 
determined simultaneously, this may also be the case for our sample of bonds. Therefore, 
following Demiroglu & James (2010), we use Instrumental Variables for covenant score (squared), 
using an investment grade dummy, leverage, EBITDA divided by revenues, age, bond maturity, 
and the ratio of issue amount to total assets as instruments. The two-stage least squares 
estimates for the Instrumental Variables regressions are reported in Table 10, specification (2) 
and (3).25 Specification (2) uses covenant score (squared), whereas specification (3) uses the two 
covenant factors. The results show that we cannot reject the hypothesis that covenant score 
(squared) is exogenous and the estimated coefficients are very close to those reported in Table 4 
with an adjusted R2 that is only a bit lower than the one in the baseline model (8) in Table 4 (62% 
versus 71%) and likewise in the baseline model (9) in Table 3 (66% versus 73%). This suggests that 
our earlier results do not arise from a significant endogeneity bias. 
Second, next to the covenant structure, bond characteristics like maturity, issue amount, and 
(top tier) bank involvement may be subject to simultaneity bias as well. As noted by Prilmeier 
                                                     
25 To avoid multicollinearity problems, we exclude variables that are used as instruments, such as 
leverage, as independent variables in the regression. 
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(2017) and Demiroglu & James (2010), it is difficult to identify exogenous variables to instrument 
for these contract terms. We therefore follow Demerjian (2017) and Reisel (2014), and check the 
robustness of our findings by excluding bond characteristics maturity, (log) amount, and top tier 
bank involvement, that are potentially subject to a simultaneity bias. The results, reported in 
Table 10, specification (4), show that excluding these variables does not change our main findings. 
Third, in our main analysis, for bond issues without covenant information, we set the covenant 
value to zero. This contrasts to, e.g., Hollander & Verriest (2016), who exclude contracts with no 
covenant information. We rerun regression (8) from Table 4, excluding bond issues without 
covenant information, thereby lowering our sample size from 685 to 600 issues. Specification (5) 
in Table 10 shows the results for this smaller sample. Although unlike in Table 4, the coefficients 
for issue amount and profitability now become insignificant, we still find that the difference in 
spread between private and public placement bonds is small and insignificant, and that the effect 
of the covenant factors does not change from the results in Table 4. 
Fourth, as our volatility measure, VIX, is from the U.S. stock market, whereas the bonds in our 
sample are all issues by European companies, we rerun regression (8) from Table 4 using two 
European volatility indices: VSTOXX, an index jointly developed by the German Stock Exchange 
and Goldman Sachs that measures Eurozone stock market volatility based on Euro STOXX 50 index 
options and VDAX, which is the German equivalent of the VIX index, also used by e.g. Acharya et 
al. (2014). Specifications (6) and (7) in Table 10 show the results using these two indices, which 
are very similar to Table 4. This suggests that a global component in stock market volatility is the 
most relevant one for the pricing of bonds. 
Fifth, as previous studies distinguish between 144A registered bonds (Fenn, 2000, Chaplinsky 
& Ramchand, 2010, Arena, 2011) and non-144A (Kwan & Carleton, 2010, Arena, 2011), we add a 
dummy for whether a bond is 144A registered or not. 144A registration allows a private bond to 
become registered (public) at a later stage. Specification (8) in Table 10 shows, the 144A-dummy 
is insignificant, indicating that 144A registered bonds are not priced differently than non-144A 
registered bonds. 
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Sixth, one may argue that firms issuing PPBs that are stock-listed face less agency problems 
given higher disclosure and reporting requirements. To test this, we run  specification (9) in Table 
10 using only stock-listed bond issuers. The restricted sample amounts to 614 issues. The results 
remain mainly unchanged and the coefficients on the linear (squared) covenant factor of the 
regression are -25.82 (55.67), both significant at the 1% level, the placement variable insignificant 
(t=0.17). 
Seventh, Kwan and Carleton (2010) find that pricing differences disappear for issuers that use 
both private and public placements, which they call switchers. We therefore analyze bond issues 
of switchers only. 382 bonds are issued by switchers. As is shown in specification (10) in Table 10, 
the coefficients on the investment and financing factors remain almost unchanged, the placement 
variable again being insignificant (t=0.08). Controlling for switchers appears to leave the results 
unchanged.  
Eighth, we include year fixed effects in the regression. In specification (11) in Table 10, the 
coefficients for the covenant factors are very similar to the ones in Table 3 and the difference in 
spread between private and public placement bonds is an insignificant two basis points - implying 
that our main results still hold. The inclusion of year fixed effects does impact some of the other 
variables though. In particular, the effects of both stock and bond market liquidity become 
insignificant. 
Finally, better accounting quality may ameliorate information asymmetry between a firm and 
investors (Ball, 2001), reduce uncertainty about credit risk (Akins, 2018) and excert influence on 
a bond issuer’s choice of private versus public debt (Bharath et al., 2008). Accounting quality may 
thus affect both the choice for or against issuing a bond privately and its pricing. We control for 
the effects of accounting quality, which in general involves the use of stricter standards for 
recognizing bad news as losses than for recognizing good news as gains (Lafond & Roychowdhury, 
2008). First, we are interested whether accounting quality affects the choice of a firm for private 
versus public bonds placements in our sample, potentially causing concerns related to 
endogeneity. Second, we test whether the observed excess spread is not simply a result of 
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differences in accounting quality between firms issuing public versus private bonds. Based on the 
findings of  Lin et al. (2012) and Barth et al. (2006), we assume accounting quality is higher for 
firms applying US Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (US GAAP) than for firms applying 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) or other International Accounting Standards 
(IAS), such as various European GAAP standards.26  We proxy for accounting quality using a 
dummy variable taking the value of one if an issuer applies US GAAP, IFRS or IAS, zero otherwise.27 
We use the binary choice model (Table 3) and the regression model (Table 4) presented earlier 
and add these proxies for accounting quality. The expectation is that better accounting quality as 
proxied by the use of US GAAP decreases the odds of placing a bond privately, while it should 
increase for firms using inferior accounting quality as proxied by the use of IFRS or IAS. The results 
are presented in Table 11. Using our choice model, the dummy variables in specifications (1) 
through (3) are not significant. Looking at the odds ratios, the likelihood that a bond is placed 
privately increases (ratio is > 1) for firms using IFRS or IAS and decreases (ratio is < 1) for those 
using US GAAP. So while the odds ratio is in line with our predictions, we find no statistically 
significant influence of accounting quality on the choice for private versus public debt. Next, we 
verify whether accounting quality affects spreads and the pricing difference between private over 
public bonds. We include the same dummy variables in specifications (4) through (6). Accounting 
quality appears to affect spreads in an economically important and meaningful way. Better 
                                                     
26 Lin et al. (2012) find that the application of US GAAP generally results in higher accounting quality 
than the application of IFRS. According to them, accounting numbers under IFRS generally exhibit more 
earnings management, less timely loss recognition, and less value relevance compared to those under US 
GAAP. Barth et al. (2006) find that IAS firms, compared to US firms applying US GAAP, exhibit lower 
accounting quality in terms of earnings smoothing, the correlation between accruals and cash-flows, timely 
loss recognition, and the association between accounting amounts and share price.  
 
27 Direct measures of accounting quality, for example the sensitivity of earnings per share of bad relative 
to the sensitivity of good news, the explanatory power (R2) of bad relative to that of good news, the time-
series skewness of earnings deflated by that of cash-flows or accumulated non-operating accruals deflated 
by total assets, as used for example in Zhang (2008), could provide better proxies for accounting quality. 
Bharath et al. (2008) proxies accounting quality using deviations from expected operating accruals. More 
recently Kraft (2015) or Akins (2018) use rating agency adjustments to firms’ reported GAAP financial 
statement or the explanatory power of changes in reported earnings on rating downgrades, respectively, to 
proxy for financial statement or reporting quality. The application of such measures, however, is beyond the 
scope of this study.  
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accounting quality (US GAAP) reduces spread by a significant 29 basis points, while worse 
accounting quality (IFRS) increases spread by approximately 40 basis points, the results significant 
at the 1% and 5% level. The dummy variable for the use of IAS, that is national GAAPs, is 
statistically not significant. Importantly, our findings related to covenant intensity remain almost 
unaffected by the inclusion of the accounting quality proxies. The coefficients of covenant 
intensity and its squared value, compared to Table 4, specification (8), remain almost unchanged. 
Also, the placement variable remains insignificant. However, running an untabulated regression 
including the accounting quality variables but excluding covenant intensity (and its squared 
value), the excess spread of private over public bonds remains at a significant 27 basis points. This 
compares to specification (3) in Table 4 and 42 basis points of excess spread prior to controlling 
for the use of covenants. We therefore conclude accounting quality further explains the excess 
spread of private over public bonds. However, it is only when we include covenant intensity that 
the excess spread becomes insignificant. Covenant intensity and its squared value remain highly 
statistically significant and the observed non-linear relationship between covenant intensity and 
spread remains unaffected.  
Overall, these results imply that our main findings are robust in various dimensions. 
 
6. Conclusions 
This paper analyzes the effect of covenant use on bond pricing using primary market bond 
data of 690 private placement bonds versus 527 public placement bonds, issued by 310 different 
European companies in the years 2002 to 2015. We find that on average private placement bonds 
have an excess spread over public placement bonds (both spreads calculated from the maturity 
matched government bond) of 116 basis points. 
We find that firms place bonds privately in times of higher uncertainty about future economic 
events.  In such times, private debt provides an option for flexible debt restructuring ex post. 
Avoiding premature and costly liquidation observed with public debt, investors appear to require 
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and private debt issuers appear to accept more covenants and an ex ante increase in the cost of 
debt to buy an option for flexible debt restructuring ex post.  
In line with this conjecture, only about 50% in the variation in spreads on both private and 
public placement bond spreads can be explained by credit risk variables. Including covenant use 
increases the R2 more than including liquidity or market condition variables, implying that the use 
of covenants can explain as much of the variation in spreads as liquidity and market conditions 
together. Adding liquidity, market conditions, and control variables, more than 70% of the 
variation in spreads can be explained. Importantly, the data suggests the difference in spreads 
between private and public placement bonds can only be fully explained once covenant use is 
considered.  
We find that, broadly speaking, there are two groups of covenants - investment and financing 
covenants - which are mainly added to bonds in that order. Investment covenants restrict a firm 
from making investment decisions and selling its assets. Their presence reduces the spread on 
bonds as they alleviate moral hazard problems. Financing covenants are typically added on top of 
investment covenants, the relationship between the spread and covenant intensity (i.e., the 
number of covenants used) is U-shaped. The different use of covenants in private versus public 
placement bonds explains an important part of the difference in spread witnessed by these two 
types of bonds. 
With only a few exceptions, most of our variables have a similar effect on public and private 
placement bond spreads. Most notably, we find that the pricing of private placement bonds are 
more sensitive to stock market volatility, recent stock market returns for the own industry, and 
for the use of investment covenants. Also, whereas otherwise comparable bigger firms pay lower 
spreads, this effect is smaller for private than for public placement bonds. 
During the global financial crisis spreads were higher on both public and private placement 
bonds, but there was no notable difference in the pricing of the two types. During the European 
debt crisis on the other hand, spreads on private placement bonds were more strongly affected 
than spreads on public placement bonds. 
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Most importantly, we find that the observed difference in credit risk amounts to a difference 
in spreads of 465 basis points, whereas the observed difference in covenant use amounts to about 
400 basis points: the use of covenants is therefore equally relevant in explaining spreads as is 
credit risk. The fact that the price difference between private and public placement bonds are 
only explained once covenant use is controlled for. Also, the finding that the use of covenants 
together with liquidity, market conditions, and added control variables, explain a large part of the 
variation in spreads, appear to be robust in many dimensions.  
Using an out-of-sample test and predicting spreads of Euro denominated primary market 
bond issues, the predictions errors from a model including (excluding) the use of covenants are 
substantially lower (higher), suggesting covenant use is an important factor in explaining bond 
pricing.  
There are likely other explanations explaining why financing covenants increase spread. 
Candidates for future research include the analysis of financing factor covenants and their costs 
related to the restriction of managerial flexibility (see Kahan & Yermack, 1998) and  their costs 
related to them preventing firms to adjust to optimal leverage levels (see Deangelo & Roll, 2015). 
Devos et al. (2017), for example, find that the presence of covenants significantly lowers the 
speed of capital structure adjustment. Using a covenant index, they find that, on average, firms 
with the highest index values take 26-31 months longer to adjust their capital structure than firms 
with no covenants. Additionally, it would be interesting to learn more about the information 
disclosure hypothesis (see footnote 13). The effect of such other explanations, however, is left 
for future research. 
We have controlled for the potential endogeneity of the use of covenants and yield spread 
using a 2SLS estimation procedure. Of course, there may be other elements of the contracting 
process (e.g. the choice of a top tier arranger or bond maturity) that may be endogenous or 
simultaneously determined. The effect of such additional complications is, however, left for 
future research.  
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics on Private over Public Placement Bonds 
This table presents descriptive statistics for private and public placement bonds issued in Europe from 2002 through 2015 for those bond characteristics (Panel A), firm characteristics 
(Panel B) and market conditions (Panel C) used as variables in this study and as defined in Appendix A.  Δ is the difference between PPB over PUB . Two tailed statistical significance is 
denoted ***, ** , and *  at the 1 %, 5 % and 10 % level respectively. 
 











        




median    n mean median    n Δ, t-value 
spread 402.05 396.59 676 285.75 199.88 514 116.3*** 
 (242.01)   (299.28)    
maturity 8.95 8.01 690 9.16 6.98 527 -0.21   
 (5.86)   (7.40)    
amount 508.03 389.00 663 469.80 366.00 517 38.23   
 (441.80)   (484.76)    
top_tier 0.49 0.00 690 0.39 0.00 527 0.10 ***  
 (0.50)   (0.49)    
covscore 7.42 9.00 690 6.63 8.00 527 0.79 ***  
 (5.26)   (4.23)    
options 0.80 1.00 690 0.76 1.00 527 0.04* 
 (0.40)   (0.42)    
        




median    n mean median n Δ, t-value 
        
age 56.00 35.00 521 46.83 34.00 467 9.17*** 
 (53.64)   (43.76)    
assets 28320 8057 523 43442 17710 427 15121.67*** 
 (55951)   (57589)    
revenues 14020 3956 521 21413 10935 423 -7392.25*** 
 (23077)   (26095)    
leverage 0.34 0.27 510 0.29 0.23 415 0.05*** 
 (0.23)   (0.21)    
listed 0.55 1.00 690 0.66 1.00 527 -0.12*** 
 (0.50)   (0.47)    
profitability 0.15 0.15 522 0.15 0.17 421 0.01 
 (0.18)   (0.21)    
rating score 9.48 9.00 503 8.57 8.00 403 0.91*** 
 (2.61)   (3.48)    
        





median    n mean median n Δ, t-value 
        
gdp_360 -0.14 -0.20 690 -0.09 -0.10 527 -0.05* 
 (0.40)   (0.46)    
mscii_180 6.27 6.66 690 4.29 6.43 527 1.98** 
 (14.31)   (16.93)    
msciitot_180 4.48 6.94 690 4.15 7.87 527 0.33 
 (12.81)   (16.00)    
slope 1.78 1.74 690 1.62 1.83 527 0.15*** 
 (0.69)   (0.90)    
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics on Private over Public Placement Bonds (continued) 
 
        
        
benchmark 2.43 2.18 690 2.95 3.03 527 -0.53*** 
 (1.20)   (1.41)    
refcorp liquidity 0.53 0.49 690 0.52 0.47 527 0.01 
 (0.24)   (0.31)    
stock market liq. -0.02 0.00 690 -0.02 -0.01 527 0.00 
 (0.07)   (0.07)    
VIX 17.89 15.73 685 19.38 16.86 525 -1.49*** 
 (6.72)   (8.48)    
rolscore 8.29 8.53 690 8.32 8.48 527 -0.03 
 (0.70)   (0.63)    




























Table 3: Binary Choice Model 
Estimates from multinomial logistic regressions predicting the source of 684 primary market bond issues 
during 2002–2015. The binary choice consists of privately placed bonds (1) versus publicly placed bonds 
(0). In column (1), we use all bond issues. In columns (2), we restrict the sample to bond issues of firms 
that use both the private and the public market. We call these issuers switchers. In column (3), we restrict 
the sample to those bond issues of firms that place either in the public or in the private market. We call 
these issuers nonswitchers. Odds ratios indicate the likelihood of a firm placing bonds privately versus 
publicly. The percentage change in odds for a standard deviation increase in the used variables is indicated 
in brackets. The pseudo-R2 is from McFadden (1974). Two tailed statistical significance is denoted ***, 
**  and * indicating the 1 %, 5 % and 10 % significance level respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Odds Ratio 
(% change in odds for 











rating_score 0.940 0.908 1.157 
 (-17.2) (-26.9) (48.5) 
leverage 0.882 0.361 2.444 
 (-2.1) (-15.6) (15.8) 
issue amount (log) 2.337*** 1.931*** 4.192*** 
 (103.2) (60.2) (290.7) 
stock market liquidity 0.0632** 0.0452 0.265 
 (-18.3) (-21.1) (-8.6) 
refcorp liquidity 0.831 0.371 3.991 
 (-5.2) (-26.3) (42.8) 
VIX 0.973 0.885*** 1.106*** 
 (-19.3) (-63.3) (107.5) 
top tier arranger 2.099*** 3.066*** 1.475 
 (109.9)1 (206.6)1 (47.5)1 
age (log) 1.855*** 1.438 2.197** 
 (35.2) (14.9) (55.4) 
benchmark interest rate 1.093 1.660*** 0.776 
 (11.4) (81.4) (-27.5) 
yield curve slope 1.325** 1.628** 1.307 
 (21.1) (37.7) (20.7) 
GDP growth (360d) 0.688 1.116 0.486* 
 (-14.5) (4.6) (-26.7) 
MSCI industry return (180d) 0.998 0.960*** 1.047*** 
 (-2.23) (-48.0) (90.7) 
rule of law 0.561*** 0.544** 0.727 
 (-32.2) (-31.5) (-20.8) 
assets (log) 0.691*** 0.734** 0.550*** 
 (-46.6) (-40.2) (-64.5) 
profitability 0.307 0.274 0.173 
 (-17) (-19.8) (-21.9) 
maturity 0.999 0.970 1.029 
 (-0.8) (-20.1) (24.7) 
stock listing 0.673 1.887 0.306** 
 (-11.3) (18.7) (-33.1) 
rating_score*time 1.018*** 1.026*** 1.008 
 (105.5) (174.9) (42.7) 
constant 4.838 9.826 0.0168 
 (11.58) (38.05) (0.0514) 
Observations 684 382 302 
pseudo-R2 15.63 19.36 27.62 
1 «top-tier» is a binary variable indicating whether a top-tier bank was involved in a bond placement. The percent change in odds in 
brackets does therefore not indicate the change for a one standard deviation but for a top-tier bank being involved (1) or not (0).  
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Table 4: Empirical Model of Excess Spread 
This table reports the estimates from the cross-sectional regressions of spread on a set of proxies for 
credit risk (1), liquidity (2), market conditions (3) and firm controls (7) as well as the placement dummy 
variable as defined in equation (1). The placement variable indicates the excess spread of PPBs over 
PUBs. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are in parenthesis. Covenant score with (without) the 
quadratic term is used in specification 4 (5). In specification (9), the investment covenant and the 
financing covenant factor are used. The data consists of public and private placement primary market 
bond issues over the period January 2002 to December 2015. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
Coefficients significant at the 1%, 5% or 10% level are market with three, two or one asterisks, 
respectively. (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1) 
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 Table 6: Empirical Model of Excess Spread using Covenant Dummy Variables 
This table reports the estimates from the cross-sectional regressions of spread on a set of covenant dummy 
variables, the covenants as described in Appendix C, and additional variables as in Table 4. The placement 
variable indicates the excess spread of PPBs over PUBs. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are in 
parenthesis. Covenant score with (without) the quadratic term is used in specification (1), the baseline 
regression as in Table 4, specification 8. In specification (2), covenant dummies are used. Columns (3) and (4) 
indicate the frequency of covenants used for private and public bond placements respectively, together with 
the test for the difference between the two placement channels as measured by the ranksum test (z). The data 
consists of public and private placement primary market bond issues over the period January 2002 to December 
2015. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Coefficients significant at the 1%, 5% or 10% level are market 
with three, two or one asterisks, respectively. (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 





PPB in % 
Frequency 
PUB in % 
(z) 
     
Financing covenants (+)     
cov1 distributions  64.64** 29.02 13.76*** 
 







  (114.29)   
cov7 limit of indebtedness    79.71*** 31.87 15.77*** 
  (32.62)   
cov17 subsidiary debt         20.89 31.87 12.08*** 
  (34.92)   
Investment covenants (-) 







  (24.40)   
cov6 negative pledge          49.54* 72.02 71.81 
  (26.21)   
cov8 cross default             4.013 68.65 58.39*** 
  (13.47)   
cov10 sale of assets           -131.3*** 58.29 68.79*** 
  (31.18)   
cov11 activity restrictions     -114.9*** 72.54 77.85 
  (40.26)   
cov14 restrictive covenant     1.630 71.24 73.15 
  (31.51)   
cov15 merger restrictions      120.1*** 58.03 67.45** 
  (27.87)   
Other covenants 







  (16.56)   
cov5 adverse change  172.0*** 0.51 1 
  (45.53)   
cov12 coverage ratio  -15.56 0.25 1.68** 
  (61.42)   
cov13 fcf to debt service  -10.59 0.51 0.34 
  (79.69)   
cov16 sale and leaseback  -29.05** 23.58 44.30*** 
  (13.94)   
cov18 change of bond terms  -4.213 33.42 14.09*** 
  (11.89)   
     
Table continued on next page     
     









Table 6 (continued): 
Empirical Model of Excess Spread using Covenant Dummy Variables 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Baseline  
with covscore 
Covenants used as 
dummies 
Frequency 
PPB in % 
Frequency 
PUB in % 
(z) 
 
covscore -32.52***    
 (4.473)    
covscore2 2.749***    








 (4.050) (4.101)   
leverage -64.07 -66.84   
 (46.99) (48.60)   
issue amount (log) 21.91** 31.91***   
 (8.545) (8.552)   
stock market liquidity -192.9*** -142.8**   
 (68.43) (70.78)   
refcorp liquidity -111.2*** -114.8***   
 (23.90) (25.54)   
VIX 2.491** 2.582**   
 (1.012) (1.069)   
benchmark interest rate -22.77*** -27.56***   
 (6.502) (6.569)   
yield curve slope -3.857 -4.063   
 (8.074) (8.178)   
GDP growth (360d) -27.73** -26.55**   
 (11.88) (12.04)   
MSCI industry return (180d) -0.0998 0.135   
 (0.491) (0.484)   
rule of law -24.72*** -23.78***   
 (8.371) (8.004)   
top tier arranger 1.226 -5.791   
 (9.772) (9.749)   
age (log) -39.34*** -35.62***   
 (13.07) (13.52)   
assets (log) -41.64*** -48.09***   
 (6.654) (6.760)   
profitability -118.2*** -120.5***   
 (32.28) (33.12)   
bond maturity 1.262** 2.022***   
 (0.553) (0.584)   
stock listing -67.34*** -57.79***   
 (22.18) (21.49)   
rating_score * time -0.235 -0.351   
 (0.271) (0.294)   
placement 4.615 -2.570   
 (11.63) (11.44)   
Constant 671.0*** 707.0***   
 (106.7) (104.9)   
     
Observations 684 684 684 684 
Adjusted R-squared 0.714 0.737   
Benchmark industry Industrials Industrials   










Table 7: Use of Covenants and Spread  
in States of High (Low) Economic Uncertainty 
 
This table reports the estimates from the cross-sectional regressions of spread on a set of variables as reported earlier for the full 
sample in specification (1), a period of high economic uncertainty in specifications (2) through (7) and for private and public bonds. 
The data consists of public and private placement primary market bond issues over the period January 2002 to December 2015. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Coefficients significant at the 1%, 5% or 10% level are market with three, two or one asterisks, 




(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 






factors factors factors 















Panel A all bonds all bonds PPB PUB all bonds PPB PUB 
        
covenant score  -32.52*** -22.00*** -16.40** -33.14** -9.923 -11.55 -6.871 
[factors in (5)-(7)] (4.473) (5.445) (6.955) (14.13) (19.29) (31.87) (24.62) 
        
covenant score squared 2.749*** 1.756*** 1.262*** 2.866** 41.37*** 27.39 37.87 
[factors in (5)-(7)] (0.362) (0.400) (0.446) (1.348) (15.71) (22.24) (25.19) 
        
covscoreXhighuncertainty  -12.99** -25.21*** 2.399 -10.77 -9.592 -24.38 
[factors in (5)-(7)]  (5.429) (7.172) (12.61) (19.90) (32.03) (26.59) 
        
covscore2Xhighuncertainty  1.229*** 2.290*** -0.407 25.20 52.06** 8.720 
[factors in (5)-(7)]  (0.470) (0.553) (1.322) (16.51) (23.37) (25.95) 
        
Observations 684 684 386 298 684 386 298 
Adjusted R-squared 0.714 0.715 0.703 0.750 0.731 0.731 0.757 
Benchmark industry Industrials Industrials Industrials Industrials Industrials Industrials Industrials 
All other controls as in Table 4, 
specification (8) 




























Table 8: Pricing Differences between Private (PPB) and Public  
               Placement Bonds (PUB) 
This table reports the estimates from the cross-sectional regressions of spread on a set of proxies for credit risk, liquidity, market 
conditions and firm controls as well as the placement dummy variable as defined in equation (1). The placement variable indicates 
the excess spread of PPBs over PUBs. The baseline without interaction variables is in specification (1) and uses covscore. 
Specification (2) adds interactions. Investment and financing factors instead of covscore are used in specification (3),  extended 
by interactions in specification (4). Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are in parenthesis. The data consists of public and 
private placement primary market bond issues over the period January 2002 to December 2015. Coefficients significant at the 






(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
constant 671.0*** 722.3*** 663.9*** 657.6*** place*MISCI industry return (180d) 1.943* 2.294**
(106.7) (151.4) (99.78) (157.1) (1.033) (1.096)
placement 4.615 -166 2.931 -129.3 rule of law -24.72*** -11.54 -23.60*** -13.83
(11.63) (208.3) (11.19) (208.9) (8.371) (13.17) (7.617) (13.1)
rating score 25.86*** 19.31*** 20.96*** 19.60*** covenant score -32.52*** -33.36*** -21.14*** -35.89***
(4.05) (4.691) (3.855) (4.822) (3: investment covenants) (4.473) (8.761) (5.755) (11.92)
leverage -64.07 -7.325 -62.57 1.996 covenant score squared 2.749*** 2.710*** 62.81*** 28.01**
(46.99) (52.25) (46.16) (51.66) (3: financing covenants) (0.362) -0.729 (7.636) (13.54)
place*leverage -29.68* -29.91* place*investment covenants 0.451 43.46***
(15.18) (15.51) (0.84) (16.44)
issue amount (log) 21.91** 26.04*** 25.57*** 25.94*** top tier arranger 1.226 -10.98 -4.318 -8.177
(8.545) (9.919) (8.072) (10) (9.772) -13.59 (9.432) (13.68)
stock market liquidity -192.9*** -203.8** -168.5** -215.5** age (log) -39.34*** -67.07*** -36.76*** -63.12***
(68.43) (103.5) (67.97) (99.79) (13.07) -20.82 (12.69) (21.79)
Refcorp liquidity -111.2*** -141.5*** -108.3*** -133.2*** assets (log) -41.64*** -52.63*** -44.08*** -52.96***
(23.9) (29.99) (24.43) (31.02) (6.654) (8.288) (6.237) (8.074)
place*Refcorp liquidity 109.2** 46.55 place*assets (log) 23.94** 19.15*
(49.37) (51.88) (11.1) (11.43)
VIX 2.491** 1.063 3.009*** 1.252 profitability -118.2*** -237.3*** -132.0*** -242.5***
(1.012) (1.284) (1.002) (1.24) (32.28) (78.35) (31.89) (81.01)
place*VIX 4.013** 3.911* place*profitability 150.7* 186.5**
(1.997) (2.095) (84.43) (90.47)
benchmark interest rate -22.77*** -21.67** -25.57*** -25.48*** bond maturity 1.262** 1.896** 1.861*** 2.216***
(6.502) (9.196) (6.525) (9.104) (0.553) (0.786) (0.575) (0.789)
yield curve slope -3.857 -11.16 1.058 -4.797 stock listing -67.34*** -35.92 -67.33*** -38.56
(8.074) (10.46) (7.957) (10.44) (22.18) (35.8) (20.84) (35.4)
place*slope 28.12* 23.5 credit score * time -0.235 0.107 -0.172 0.206
(16.46) (16.77) (0.27) (0.34) (0.27) (0.35)
GDP growth (360d) -27.73** -15.11 -25.48** -13.39
(11.88) (16.97) (11.49) (17.1) Observations 684 684
MSCI industry return (180d) -0.0998 -0.742 0.168 -0.533 Adjusted R-squared 0.724 0.728
(0.491) (0.652) (0.482) (0.693) F 39.84 43.36
baseline with cov. 
score
baseline with cov. 
score + 
interaction
baseline with cov. 
factor
baseline with cov. 
factor + 
interaction
baseline with cov. 
score
baseline with cov. 
score + 
interaction
baseline with cov. 
factor









Table 9: Excess Spread of Private Placement Bonds (PPB) in Times of Financial 
Crisis 
This table reports the estimates from the cross-sectional regressions of spread on a set of proxies for credit risk, 
liquidity, market conditions and firm controls as well as the placement dummy variable as defined in equation (1) 
during times of financial crisis as defined in other empirical studies and indicated in the text. Effects of the Global 
Financial Crisis (GFC) and the European Debt Crisis (EDC) using investment and financing factors are measured. The 
placement variable indicates the excess spread of PPBs over PUBs. Interaction terms are indicated by "X_pl".  
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are in parenthesis. The data consists of public and private placement 
primary market bond issues over the period January 2002 to December 2015. Coefficients significant at the 1%, 5% 




(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
prior to GFC During GFC After end of GFC During EDC After end prior to GFC During GFC After end of GFC During EDC After end
of EDC of EDC
04_2007 - 09_2009 10_2009 03_2010 - 03_2012 03_2012 04_2007 - 09_2009 10_2009 03_2010 - 03_2012 03_2012
constant 691.1*** 674.5*** 662.8*** 669.2*** 695.7*** VIX 2.791*** 2.697*** 3.095*** 2.579** 1.957*
(103.30) (100.50) (100.90) (99.16) (105.40) (1.02) (1.02) (1.01) (1.01) (1.14)
placement -7.935 4.328 26.4 -9.72 29.28* benchmark interest rate -23.75*** -32.64*** -30.48*** -25.34*** -33.72***
(11.82) (11.98) (18.59) (11.85) (14.96) (6.38) (7.44) (7.64) (6.55) (7.75)
gfc_prior -82.14*** yield curve slope -6.481 4.415 4.286 -1.343 -2.974
(26.39) (8.48) (8.05) (9.03) (8.28) (7.99)
gfcprior_pl 49.41 GDP growth (360d) -25.35** -23.38** -25.39** -18.03 -16.77
(30.18) (11.89) (11.70) (11.39) (12.55) (11.71)
gfc_during 46.75** MSCI industry return (180d)0.335 0.395 0.304 0.118 0.134
(19.34) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.48) (0.49)
gfcduring_pl -2.564 rule of law -23.01*** -24.16*** -23.51*** -22.18*** -21.57***
(23.75) (7.92) (7.59) (7.72) (7.75) (7.82)
gfc_after -8.907 investment covenants -22.86*** -20.83*** -20.72*** -22.00*** -22.37***
(24.46) (5.76) (5.79) (5.75) (5.76) (5.67)
gfcafter_pl -33.8 financing covenants 65.08*** 63.98*** 64.83*** 60.00*** 62.59***
(21.32) (7.56) (7.60) (7.68) (7.59) (7.49)
edc_during -12.56 top tier arranger -3.32 -6.24 -5.825 -0.882 -1.203
(19.89) (9.40) (9.50) (9.45) (9.57) (9.32)
edcduring_pl 52.57** age (log) -39.63*** -38.98*** -37.11*** -36.18*** -38.34***
(24.16) (12.69) (12.62) (12.63) (12.82) (12.65)
edc_after -4.879 assets (log) -42.45*** -42.40*** -43.11*** -45.60*** -45.79***
(21.41) (6.31) (6.47) (6.35) (6.34) (6.22)
edcafter_pl -59.85*** profitability -139.8*** -131.1*** -129.5*** -138.0*** -140.6***
(18.32) (31.95) (31.87) (32.10) (32.07) (32.16)
credit score 25.54*** 22.47*** 20.53*** 20.31*** 19.45*** bond maturity 1.646*** 2.338*** 2.174*** 1.808*** 2.299***
(4.34) (3.98) (3.86) (3.94) (4.00) (0.57) (0.62) (0.63) (0.58) (0.63)
leverage -56.73 -53.33 -60.79 -61 -53.77 stock listing -65.40*** -68.70*** -67.59*** -71.10*** -67.83***
(46.41) (46.27) (46.28) (45.83) (45.87) (20.82) (20.75) (20.76) (21.26) (20.71)
issue amount (log) 24.46*** 24.96*** 26.10*** 27.78*** 29.53*** credit rating * time -0.648* -0.285 -0.0545 -0.145 -0.0359
(8.06) (8.03) (8.03) (8.02) (7.95) (0.35) (0.27) (0.29) (0.27) (0.28)
stock market liquidity -181.4*** -150.6** -141.9** -182.1*** -161.2**
(64.82) (68.67) (70.06) (68.20) (66.24) Observations 684 684 684 684 684
refcorp liquidity -94.52*** -88.29*** -100.8*** -116.0*** -115.2*** ≈ 0.746 0.745 0.744 0.745 0.748
(24.13) (24.28) (25.42) (24.71) (24.68)
Continued
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Table 10: Robustness Tests 
This table reports a set of robustness tests. Specification (1) is the baseline regression (Table 4, specification 9). 
Specifications (2) and (3) include 2SLS estimations using instruments assumed to determine covenant intensity in 
Demiroglu & James (2010). Specification (4) controls for potential endogeneity of bond level controls by excluding 
them from the used variables. Specification (5) controls for the effect of only including bond contracts for which no 
covenant information is missing. Specifications (6) and (7) test the impact of exchangeing VIX by other indicators of 
equity market volatility (VSTOXX, VDAX). Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are in parenthesis. The data 
consists of public and private placement primary market bond issues over the period January 2002 to December 
2015. Coefficients significant at the 1%, 5% or 10% level are market with three, two or one asterisks, respectively. 
(*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 












        
rating score 20.96*** 18.11*** 17.16** 18.94*** 20.86*** 20.24*** 20.15*** 
 (3.855) (5.511) (7.289) (3.619) (4.312) (3.960) (4.050) 
leverage -62.57   -63.11 -68.35 -56.98 -57.19 
 (46.16)   (47.46) (51.67) (45.83) (45.86) 
issue amount (log) 25.57*** 53.40*** 59.04***  16.30* 23.85*** 23.77*** 
 (8.072) (9.380) (9.069)  (8.362) (8.157) (8.142) 
stock market liquidity -168.5** -112.1 -96.04 -181.1*** -163.6** -167.7** -170.1** 
 (67.97) (91.76) (89.63) (67.42) (68.33) (68.03) (68.05) 
refcorp liquidity -108.3*** -121.6*** -136.8*** -117.7*** -117.4*** -121.3*** -126.4*** 
 (24.43) (33.68) (33.35) (24.63) (24.91) (23.43) (23.36) 
VIX (VSTOXX, VDAX) 3.009*** 1.882 2.319* 2.877*** 2.775*** 2.413*** 2.348** 
 (1.002) (1.206) (1.200) (1.003) (1.025) (0.860) (0.952) 
benchmark interest rate -25.57*** -15.23** -15.10** -14.95*** -26.18*** -22.44*** -23.35*** 
 (6.525) (6.743) (6.843) (4.850) (6.863) (6.756) (6.776) 
yield curve slope 1.058 5.313 18.75* 0.796 -2.821 0.0817 1.169 
 (7.957) (10.92) (10.34) (7.818) (8.078) (7.972) (7.974) 
GDP growth (360d) -25.48** -27.11* -19.80 -23.45** -21.96* -25.66** -27.40** 
 (11.49) (15.57) (15.84) (11.76) (11.67) (11.55) (11.64) 
MSCI ind. return (180d) 0.168 -0.732 -0.284 0.247 0.0883 0.155 0.117 
 (0.482) (0.537) (0.500) (0.485) (0.490) (0.457) (0.448) 
rule of law -23.60*** -40.42*** -34.31*** -24.41*** -19.01** -22.89*** -22.99*** 
 (7.617) (9.915) (9.523) (7.491) (8.271) (7.587) (7.573) 
investment covenants -21.14*** -74.25*** -31.61 -19.58*** -17.40** -20.87*** -21.08*** 
 (5.755) (25.04) (45.38) (5.735) (8.686) (5.747) (5.755) 
financing covenants 62.81*** 5.711*** 54.40** 61.78*** 70.03*** 62.47*** 62.65*** 
 (7.636) (1.725) (24.13) (7.358) (8.994) (7.631) (7.678) 
top_tier arranger -4.318 7.603 -1.804  -1.279 -1.936 -2.437 
 (9.432) (14.58) (13.69)  (9.963) (9.384) (9.427) 
age (log) -36.76***   -41.92*** -43.62*** -35.69*** -35.70*** 
 (12.69)   (12.43) (15.61) (12.83) (12.91) 
assets (log) -44.08*** -43.01*** -53.02*** -34.85*** -35.32*** -44.04*** -43.85*** 
 (6.237) (9.588) (7.868) (5.282) (6.535) (6.289) (6.280) 
profitability -132.0*** -139.5*** -113.8*** -129.1*** -49.44 -133.9*** -133.3*** 
 (31.89) (39.80) (37.09) (32.53) (33.86) (31.90) (32.05) 
bond maturity 1.861***    2.070*** 1.721*** 1.790*** 
 (0.575)    (0.587) (0.588) (0.586) 
stock listing -67.33*** -26.18 -43.53** -63.87*** -93.12*** -69.76*** -68.84*** 
 (20.84) (23.30) (21.75) (21.27) (25.39) (20.73) (20.77) 
credit rating*time -0.172 0.172 0.312 0.0729 -0.192 -0.131 -0.118 
 (0.266) (0.302) (0.349) (0.246) (0.310) (0.276) (0.283) 
placement 2.931 -11.37 12.75 9.267 5.347 3.000 2.839 
 (11.19) (20.32) (18.48) (10.87) (11.76) (11.14) (11.15) 
        
Constant 663.9*** 618.9*** 478.8*** 719.6*** 629.0*** 656.5*** 660.1*** 
 (99.78) (161.5) (120.4) (99.71) (107.3) (99.36) (99.45) 
Observations 684 747 747 690 600 685 685 









Table 10: Robustness tests (continued) 
This table reports a set of robustness tests. Specification (8) includes a dummy variable for 144A 
registered bonds, specification (9) shows the results when using only stock listed issuers. In 
specification (10), accounting conservatism as proxied by the use of General Accepted Accounting 
Principles (GAAP) of the issuer is included.  Specification (11) includes only issuers that use both 
private and public placements, which we call “switchers”. Finally, in specification (12), year fixed 
effects are used. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are in parenthesis. The data consists 
of public and private placement primary market bond issues over the period January 2002 to 
December 2015. Coefficients significant at the 1%, 5% or 10% level are market with three, two or 
one asterisks, respectively. (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1) 
 
 (8) (9) (10) (11) 
VARIABLES A144 listed issuer switchers year fixed effects 
     
rating score 20.80*** 25.29*** 20.66*** 22.46*** 
 (3.984) (4.920) (4.525) (5.307) 
leverage -72.51 -52.40 -10.69 -36.88 
 (47.93) (53.00) (50.02) (45.10) 
issue amount (log) 25.39*** 17.95** 17.58* 25.13*** 
 (8.276) (8.680) (10.42) (8.295) 
stock market liquidity -143.6** -124.2* -252.6*** -123.2* 
 (70.78) (74.55) (84.37) (72.25) 
refcorp liquidity -113.2*** -131.1*** -101.6*** -61.89 
 (25.34) (23.82) (29.31) (47.64) 
VIX (VSTOXX, VDAX) 3.295*** 2.301** 2.147* 1.616 
 (1.052) (1.021) (1.278) (1.261) 
benchmark interest rate -25.82*** -19.19*** -14.29* -40.24*** 
 (6.739) (6.602) (7.266) (10.49) 
yield curve slope -1.188 -4.779 27.46*** 9.463 
 (8.211) (8.274) (7.987) (18.13) 
GDP growth (360d) -25.43** -22.04* -16.62 -56.73*** 
 (11.85) (11.87) (14.35) (15.24) 
MSCI ind. return (180d) 0.294 0.0289 0.322 0.0252 
 (0.491) (0.502) (0.697) (0.516) 
rule of law -23.52*** -18.80* -7.607 -27.33*** 
 (8.015) (10.70) (8.562) (8.077) 
investment covenants -22.71*** -25.82*** -29.64*** -20.23*** 
 (7.332) (6.243) (6.888) (5.593) 
financing covenants 62.83*** 55.67*** 62.51*** 67.66*** 
 (8.366) (8.644) (7.803) (7.379) 
top_tier arranger -7.127 4.039 -5.214 7.615 
 (9.818) (9.187) (10.45) (10.24) 
age (log) -44.19*** -50.44*** -72.80*** -35.49*** 
 (15.02) (14.08) (20.95) (12.41) 
assets (log) -43.05*** -36.30*** -23.11*** -48.46*** 
 (6.409) (8.083) (8.406) (6.618) 
profitability -112.9*** -109.7*** -114.8*** -133.8*** 
 (35.55) (30.28) (29.25) (31.99) 
bond maturity 2.052*** 1.556*** 1.276* 2.867*** 
 (0.599) (0.568) (0.739) (0.789) 
stock listing -71.61***  -53.72** -50.89** 
 (23.84)  (25.68) (21.22) 
credit rating*time -0.141 -0.193 -0.234 -0.635 
 (0.281) (0.302) (0.306) (0.512) 
placement 6.387 1.949 0.958 -1.718 
 (13.33) (11.61) (11.69) (11.07) 
a144 -4.971    
 (12.11)    
Constant 666.8*** 496.8*** 391.5*** 796.1*** 
 (103.1) (148.1) (123.4) (115.4) 
     
Observations 637 614 382 684 









Table 11: Accounting Quality and Conservatism 
This table reports the results using the binary choice model as in Table 3 (switcher model) in specifications (1) through 
(3). The specifications additionally include proxies for accounting quality and conservatism as measured by the use 
of a specific accounting standard by the issuer (using a dummy variable) such as International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRS), US Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) and International Accounting Standards (IAS). 
The latter includes different European GAAPs, but not IFRS or US GAAP. Based on the findings of Lin et al. (2012) and 
Barth et al. (2006), US GAAP is considered to proxy for higher accounting quality relative to IFRS and IAS. 
Specifications (4) through (6) include the baseline regression as in Table 4, specification (8) and using the proxies for 
accounting quality.  The percentage change in odds for a SD increase in X are in parenthesis in specifications (1) 
through (3). Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are in parenthesis in specifications (4) through (6). The data 
consists of public and private placement primary market bond issues over the period January 2002 to December 
2015. Coefficients significant at the 1%, 5% or 10% level are market with three, two or one asterisks, respectively. 
(*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1) 
 































       
IFRS / US GAAP 1.167 0.599 1.411 39.66*** -29.34** 12.81 
 (0.314) (0.204) (0.539) (9.954) (13.89) (24.07) 
rating score 0.906 0.888 0.899 27.28*** 25.77*** 25.62*** 
 (0.0747) (0.0753) (0.0752) (4.076) (4.094) (4.090) 
leverage 0.394 0.524 0.382 -57.62 -58.39 -65.05 
 (0.403) (0.560) (0.388) (47.16) (47.61) (47.34) 
issue amount (log) 1.957*** 2.042*** 1.947*** 23.80*** 23.13*** 21.80** 
 (0.421) (0.448) (0.417) (8.328) (8.429) (8.508) 
stock market liquidity 0.0426 0.0367* 0.0444 -216.2*** -188.4*** -188.5*** 
 (0.0841) (0.0725) (0.0873) (68.59) (68.89) (69.36) 
refcorp liquidity 0.388 0.415 0.361 -103.8*** -112.2*** -113.1*** 
 (0.248) (0.267) (0.230) (24.20) (24.20) (23.70) 
VIX (VSTOXX, VDAX) 0.886*** 0.891*** 0.888*** 2.329** 2.499** 2.524** 
 (0.0248) (0.0247) (0.0253) (1.000) (1.012) (1.013) 
benchmark interest rte        1.643*** 1.611** 1.665*** -24.27*** -22.51*** -22.58*** 
 (0.312) (0.311) (0.312) (6.471) (6.579) (6.577) 
yield curve slope 1.670** 1.695** 1.580** 0.495 -3.530 -4.608 
 (0.367) (0.364) (0.342) (8.138) (8.029) (8.233) 
GDP growth (360d) 1.127 1.098 1.080 -26.32** -27.21** -27.54** 
 (0.371) (0.356) (0.362) (11.80) (11.89) (11.85) 
MSCI ind. return (180d) 0.960*** 0.964*** 0.962*** -0.0438 -0.0439 -0.0810 
 (0.0118) (0.0121) (0.0120) (0.489) (0.487) (0.489) 
rule of law 0.543** 0.543* 0.546** -23.47*** -25.51*** -24.67*** 
 (0.169) (0.171) (0.164) (8.430) (8.379) (8.342) 
covenant score    -31.97*** -32.25*** -32.14*** 
    (4.460) (4.458) (4.484) 
covenant score squared    2.670*** 2.729*** 2.724*** 
    (0.360) (0.361) (0.362) 
top_tier arranger 3.043*** 3.006*** 3.076*** 2.863 2.515 1.141 
 (0.795) (0.787) (0.800) (9.694) (9.758) (9.790) 
age (log) 1.506 1.576 1.381 -42.03*** -41.05*** -39.47*** 
 (0.571) (0.601) (0.525) (12.80) (12.93) (13.05) 
assets (log) 0.721** 0.687** 0.732** -42.46*** -42.87*** -41.64*** 
 (0.115) (0.115) (0.112) (6.617) (6.626) (6.634) 
profitability 0.282 0.525 0.398 -127.8*** -115.8*** -114.3*** 
 (0.391) (0.689) (0.568) (33.16) (32.52) (32.96) 
bond maturity 0.971 0.972 0.971 1.277** 1.309** 1.267** 
 (0.0203) (0.0205) (0.0205) (0.556) (0.552) (0.552) 
stock listing 1.856 1.827 1.920 -65.29*** -64.54*** -66.46*** 
 (1.030) (1.032) (1.061) (21.77) (22.13) (22.49) 
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 Table 11 (continued) 
       
credit rating*time 1.026*** 1.026*** 1.027*** -0.387 -0.228 -0.195 
 (0.00605) (0.00610) (0.00626) (0.266) (0.275) (0.291) 
placement    3.709 1.426 4.992 
    (11.43) (11.61) (11.67) 
Constant 9.734 12.25 8.181 645.0*** 688.8*** 666.8*** 
 (38.19) (48.96) (31.23) (107.1) (107.3) (106.3) 
       
Observations 382 382 382 684 684 684 












































Appendix Table I: Correlation Matrix1 
  spread maturity amount top_tier covscore log_age logsize_assets 
spread 1       
maturity -0.2042 1      
amount -0.1892 0.1407 1     
top_tier -0.0546 -0.0344 0.1134 1    
covscore 0.1238 0.013 0.1167 0.1349 1   
log_age -0.3319 0.1587 0.0885 0.1209 -0.0745 1  
logsize_assets -0.5955 0.2059 0.3985 0.0972 -0.1214 0.4181 1 
logsize_revenues -0.5872 0.2185 0.374 0.088 -0.0717 0.4784 0.9189 
leverage 0.3005 -0.106 -0.0225 0.0368 0.0772 -0.2702 -0.3103 
listed -0.3334 0.1386 0.1945 0.1048 0.1143 0.2381 0.3392 
profit -0.188 0.0329 0.1187 0.0627 0.0439 0.1038 0.1409 
rating_score 0.6717 -0.203 -0.272 -0.0831 0.0548 -0.4012 -0.7432 
gdp_360 -0.0298 -0.029 0.0756 -0.0312 -0.0657 -0.0831 0.0207 
mscii_180 -0.034 -0.045 0.034 0.028 0.1399 -0.157 -0.151 
msciitot_180 0.0187 -0.0908 -0.0072 0.0048 0.1362 -0.258 -0.1954 
slope 0.1634 -0.0382 -0.0302 -0.0128 0.106 0.0599 0.0788 
benchmark -0.2109 0.3984 -0.0056 -0.0941 -0.0908 -0.0304 -0.093 
bml_refcorp -0.1414 -0.0614 -0.0325 0.018 0.0045 -0.1604 -0.2 
eml -0.0112 -0.0466 0.0062 0.0245 0.1348 -0.0856 -0.0827 
vix 0.0597 0.0779 -0.0015 -0.0265 -0.0869 0.1488 0.1663 
rolscore -0.0724 -0.0167 0.0312 0.1191 -0.0329 -0.0241 -0.0392 
  logsize_revenues leverage listed profit rating_score gdp_360 mscii_180 
logsize_r 1       
leverage -0.3951 1      
listed_com~d 0.3284 -0.2968 1     
profitw 0.1903 0.0336 -0.0589 1    
rating_score -0.7451 0.5088 -0.2526 -0.2846 1   
gdp_360 -0.0508 -0.0107 -0.0478 -0.0576 0.0446 1  
mscii_180 -0.1647 0.0738 -0.0274 -0.0537 0.1403 0.1308 1 
msciitot_180 -0.2126 0.1332 -0.0797 -0.049 0.1856 0.2521 0.7944 
slope 0.02 0.0386 0.0949 -0.0142 0.0133 -0.0306 -0.0644 
benchmark -0.0699 -0.0339 -0.068 -0.0557 0.0422 0.0519 0.0428 
bml_refcorp -0.1835 0.0938 -0.111 -0.043 0.1714 0.2179 0.3898 
eml -0.0729 0.039 0.0544 0.0241 0.0361 -0.0758 0.3351 
vix 0.1747 -0.1127 0.1082 0.0023 -0.1375 -0.164 -0.58 
rolscore 0.0235 0.0108 -0.02 -0.031 -0.0887 -0.0103 0.083 
  msciitot_180 slope benchmark bml_refcorp eml vix rolscore 
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Appendix Table I (continuted)  
msciitot_180 1       
slope -0.0582 1      
benchmark 0.0008 -0.3877 1     
bml_refcorp 0.4986 -0.4367 0.2529 1    
eml 0.4044 -0.0279 -0.0945 0.2516 1   
vix -0.6986 0.2627 -0.0088 -0.7049 -0.3798 1  
rolscore 0.0547 -0.0482 -0.0246 0.0364 0.0106 -0.0424 1 
































Appendix Table 2: Riskadjusted Excess Spreads 
 of Private Placement Bonds (PPB) by Issuer Domicile 
 
This table presents risk adjusted spreads (residuals) from the postestimation of an OLS regression of spread on credit 
risk. Bivariate comparisons of observed and estimated riskadjusted spreads of private bonds and pubilc bonds from 2002 
through 2015, sorted by the main issuer domiciles observed in the sample, that is for domiciles with at least 20 PPB 
observations. Regressing spread on rating score renders an adjusted R2 of 40.35% with t = 43.4, p<0.001 for rating score 
and a constant of -160.85 (t=-14.77). The coefficient is 49.06 and indicates the increase in spread per one unit change in 
rating score (with min. = 1 and max. = 18). The mean residuals values of PPB (r_ppb) and PUB (r_pub) indicate excess 
spread after correcting for credit risk as measured by credit score. The difference between r_ppb over r_pub is indicated 
in the row "Δ mean residuals" together with Wilcoxon rank sum test results. T-values from a student t-test are in the next 









By Issuer Domicile 
 All  Private Placement Bonds (PPB) Public Placement Bonds (PUB)  PPB vs. PUB  
 n  n Observed Mean  n Observed Mean  Δ mean  
 Bonds  Bonds Spread Residuals  Bonds Spread Residuals  Residuals t-value 
    (s_ppb) (r_ppb)   (s_pub) (r_pub)  (r_ppb - r_pub)  
France 135  90 283.81 -23.39  45 283.13 -28.75  5.37 0.23 
Ireland 97  41 245.47 -40.96  56 173.85 -59.73  18.76* 0.86 
Luxembourg 85  54 491.30 65.09  31 473.38 51.23  13.85 0.38 
Netherlands 60  44 419.23 -33.64  16 340.18 -5.05  -28.58 0.63 
United Kingdom 240  152 374.51 28.75  88 225.90 -74.66  103.41*** 5.20 
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Appendix A   Creditmodel™ Corporates 2.6 of S&P Global Market Intelligence 
The following description of CreditmodelTM Corporates 2.6 (CM) is based on the S&P Global 
Market Intelligence technical note describing the short form credit scoring model (August 2016). 
A more comprehensive unpublished technical reference guide is available from S&P Global 
Market Intelligence.  
Overview: [CM is] a statistical model trained on credit ratings from S&P Global Ratings. [CM] is a 
widely used statistical tool that facilitates [the] evaluation of a company’s credit quality by 
generating rating scores [from aaa, with a numerical value of 1, to ccc or lower, with a numercal 
value of 18] for both public and private corporates globally. [It] utilizes both financial data from 
corporates and the most relevant macroeconomic data, to generate a quantitative rating score 
that statistically matches a credit rating issued by S&P Global Ratings. S&P Global Ratings does 
not contribute to or participate in the creation of rating scores generated by S&P Global Market 
Intelligence. Lowercase nomenclature is used to differentiate S&P Global Market Intelligence PD 
credit model scores from the credit ratings issued by S&P Global Ratings. [CM] covers both 
privately held and publicly listed corporates. The model’s primary output is a lower-case letter 
grade score. [It provides users] with access to estimates of creditworthiness for more than 
48,0003 non-financial corporations globally, spanning more than 10 years, based upon S&P 
Capital IQ’s database of public and private company fundamentals. 
Trained on S&P Global Ratings credit ratings and S&P Capital IQ Platform’s Financial Data: [CM] 
uses more than 10 years of S&P Global Ratings’ historical ratings for corporate companies. [CM] 
uses standalone credit profiles (SACP) where available, or strippes any group or parental support 
from the final rating if the standalone credit profile is unavailable, in order to obtain the credit 
profile of a company prior to any extraordinary support considerations. [CM] uses more than 
52,000 observations globally [and more than 8‘500 for Europe] for corporates, that [were] 
complemented with internal standalone assessments generated for companies operating in 
emerging markets to enrich [the] training dataset. [S&P] collected all relevant financial items for 
the same companies, from the S&P Capital IQ Platform standardized fundamentals. 
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Appendix A   Creditmodel™ Corporates 2.6 of S&P Global Market Intelligence (continued) 
Systemic Risk Data: [Context was considered when developing the] model [by considering] credit 
ratings by S&P Global Ratings via the Corporate Industry and Country Risk Assessment (CICRA). A 
CICRA is a combination of country risk and industry risk. Country risk refers to the risk associated 
with investing in a country. It is a broad and general term that represents risks linked to changes 
in the business environment that may adversely affect operating profits or the value of assets in 
a specific country. This type of risk affects all companies operating within a particular country and 
is a blend of monetary factors (e.g., currency control), political factors (e.g., civil war), and 
operating factors (e.g., corruption). For Country Risk, S&P Global Market Intelligence has 
developed a quantitative model that generates Country Risk Scores that closely align with S&P 
Global Ratings’ assessments, and expands the coverage to 247 countries worldwide by 
establishing a “proxy mechanism” based on geographic proximity considerations, regional 
influences, independence (or not ) of the central banks, the degree and evolution of a count ry’s 
economic development and financial regulatory environment and its type of political system. 
Industry risk is usually determined by elements such as barrier to entry, ease of conversion, level 
of competition, market fragmentation, etc. This is implicitly captured in CM2.6 by training 
industry-specific sub-models or adding dummy variables to reflect differences in specific industry 
sectors. 
Variable Selection Process:  [CM tested] more than 100 alternative financial and non-financial 
items, in order to investigate the most predictive variables for modelling purposes [and] applied 
a vigorous, cutting-edge procedure for the variable selection process that helps to prescreen what 
could be included as an input for the model. In order to select the final set of inputs and variables 
we used both statistical analysis and business judgment to weight the following considerations: 
[a.] Availability of Factors: All factors included in the model must be widely available on a 
consistent basis over time for companies in each sector. Some factors have a high predictive 
power but are seldom reported by companies (e.g. some cash flow items of private corporates); 
while these factors may help boost a model’s performance, such a model would be irrelevant for  
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Appendix A   Creditmodel™ Corporates 2.6 of S&P Global Market Intelligence (continued) 
firms that do not report similar information. [b.] Correlation: Highly correlated factors do not 
provide additional insights and could distort model performance. [CM] used correlation analysis 
to identify and remove correlated variables. [c.] Representation of All Relevant Risk Dimensions: 
In order to capture the variety of factors that influence the creditworthiness of corporates, [CM] 
referred to the list of “risk dimensions” that S&P Global Ratings uses for the analysis of corporate 
firms, and classified each candidate variable into its corresponding risk dimension, using expert 
judgement. Then, [CM] selected the variables that would comprise these risk dimensions from a 
range of categories, including financial information, as well as economic and industry-based risk 
indicators to ensure a proper balance of microeconomic and macroeconomic factors, similar to 
how a credit analyst would analyze a corporate company. [CM controls for] potential differences 
in the explanatory power of factors in different industries, where relevant [and] early warning 
signals such as low values of Debt / Capital. [According to the technical reference guide, p. 33, CM 
applies the following variables for European corporates: total assets to represent the company 
size effect, return on capital to reflect profitability, cash from operations interest coverage to 
account for debt service capability, asset turnover to reflect efficiency, debt / debt + equity to 
represent gearing, free operating cash flow / debt to calculate debt service capability, operating 
income before depreciation and amortisation to reflect profitability and long term liability / equity 
to again reflect gearing.] 
Regional and Sector Segmentation: In order to achieve optimal model performance and stability 
of the results, CM2.6 was trained using a regional/sector segmentation based on similarities of 
available financials and rating distributions, as well as taking into account data availability and 
other macroeconomic considerations. Europe was trained with 10 sub-regions based on the 
ratings distribution [and] 19 industry sector dummy variables. Finally, the airlines industry was 
treated as a separate, global model due to the globalized nature of this industry. More details can 
be found in the technical reference guide. 
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Appendix A   Creditmodel™ Corporates 2.6 of S&P Global Market Intelligence (continued) 
Methodology Most of the models available in the market only employ simple logistic regression 
techniques. [The CM] model employs an advanced generalization of the logistic regressions, 
based on the family of Exponential Density Functions. It uses the prior distribution of all S&P 
Global Ratings credit ratings in the training dataset as an “anchor distribution”, and modifies it in 
proportion to how much the financials of a specific company deviate from those of companies 
used in the anchor distribution. The process of variable selection considers both linear terms and 
terms of higher order, and selects the final variables according to k-fold Greedy Forward 
Approach, a widely-used statistical method that ensures a good fit out-of-sample and out-of-time. 
The model uses a number of techniques, including variable t ransformations, which minimize the 
impact of extreme values. It also uses various constraints, which avoid risk of model over-fitting 
without any loss of data as well as a more accurate estimation of the parameters and final output. 
The model maximizes the maximum likelihood function within a Maximum Expected Utility, 
adapted to a multi-state case (the rating categories, on which the model is trained, are not binary, 
but 18 in total), and uses the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) to limit the maximum number of 
variables that are included (model parsimony). This optimization process ensures the model 
exhibits greater stability and out-of-time performance. Monotonicity constraints are applied to 
ensure that the model produces outputs that follow economic intuition. 
Annual Model Validation Since the release of CM2.6 in 2013, S&P Global Market Intelligence has 
conducted a detailed performance evaluation annually, based on the actual performance data 
and provided the results of the validation to users. If a significant deterioration in model 
performance is observed, S&P Global Market Intelligence will consider a recalibration of the 
parameters or a review of the risk drivers. [The CM performance is measured in percent of exact 
matches, +/- 1 notch, +/- 2 notches and +/- 3 notches deviation from the S&P Global Ratings. The 
last available validation was done in July 2016 and has resulted in 22% exact matches, 56 % 
matches within 1 notch, 78 % within 2 notches and 88 % within 3 notches.] 
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Appendix B Variable definitions 
Dependent variable 
 
spread is the dependent variable calculated as the difference between the yield on a 
corporate fixed coupon bond calculated as internal rate of return (IRR) and the 
yield of the riskless maturity matched government bond on the issue date. 
Benchmark bonds are the Constant maturity treasuries.  
 
Credit risk proxies 
 
rating score is a score with a numerical value of 1 (AAA) to 18 (CCC) proxying for credit rating 
with credit model 2.6 of S&P Global Market Intelligence (Standard & Poors, 2016). 
The score represents a company’s standalone credit risk and is based on a 
statistical tool trained on S&P Global Ratings for assessing credit risk of corporates. 
See more detailed description Appendix A. 
  
leverage is book leverage calculated as the ratio of total long-term debt to total assets of 
the issuer. Most recent financial data preceding the bond issue from S&P is used. 





issue    is the issue amount of a bond / logarithm of the issue amount. Data is 
amount from S&P and verified with Bloomberg.  
 
refcorp  Bond market liquidity measures the yield to maturity spread between the 
liquidity 7 year riskless Refcorp agency bonds (Resolution Funding Corporation, a US 
government agency) versus the 7 year yield to maturity on the benchmark bonds 
as defined in Appendix B for USD denominated bonds at the issue date.  
 
stock market is the monthly aggregate liquidity measure of  
liquidity Pástor & Stambaugh (2003). It provides a monthly cross-sectional average of 
individual stock liquidity measures and indicates volume-related return reversals 
arising from liquidity effects. The aggregate average market liquidity of the month 
prior to the bond issue is matched with each issue date. Data are from Wharton 










Appendix B Variable definitions (continued) 
 
 
Agency cost proxies 
 
covenant  measures the covenant intensity and describes the number of  
score covenants included in a bond. The score is the sum of eighteen single covenants, 
takes a minimum value of 0 and a maximum value of 18. A detailed description of 
these 18 covenants is in Appendix C. Data are from Bloomberg. 
 
 
investment is a combination of covenants, based on factor analysis that mainly 
covenants consist of covenants restricting investments and asset sales. 
 
 
financing is a combination of covenants, based on factor analysis that mainly  
covenants consist of covenants restricting the obtaining of new financing. 
 
 
top tier indicates whether a bond issue was placed by a top tier arranger, being a bank or 
securities dealer. If one of the three biggest European arrangers in the calendar 
year prior to a bond issue, measured by it’s annual placement volume, was a 
member of the syndicate, this dummy variable takes the value of one, zero 
otherwise. Data are from Bloomberg.  
 




Market condition proxies 
 
gdp  is the real GDP growth rate for a period of 360 (“gdp_360”) calendar days prior to 
a bond issue. Data is from European GDP data from Eurostat 
(http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/national-accounts/data/main-tables adjusted 
for inflation given by the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) oft he Euro 
area compiled by Eurostat and the national statistical institutes. Details can be 
retreived from http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/hicp/data/database. 
 
yield curve  is the difference between the 10-year and 2-year benchmark  
slope rates are used to account for the level and the slope of the yield curve. 
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Appendix B Variable definitions (continued) 
 
benchmark is the risk-free rate (benchmark interest rate) as described in Appendix A to 
account for the level of the risk-free-rate.  
 
vix are the CBOE VIX-index values. They correspond to a weighted average of eight 
implied volatilities of near-the-money options on the OEX (S&P 100–Index). Data 
are from Bloomberg. As a second indicator of aggregate equity market volatility 
We consider VSTOXX (“vstoxx”), an index jointly developed by the German Stock 
Exchange and Goldman Sachs to measure volatility in the Eurozone. VSTOXX is 
based on the EURO STOXX 50 Index options traded on Eurex. It measures the 
implied volatility on options with a rolling 30 day expiry. We also use VDAX-Index 
(“vdax”), which is the German counterpart to the VIX index for the S&P 500. Data 
are from Bloomberg.  
 
MSCI is used to measure the return of the index representing the issuer’s industry. We 
use the Morgan Stanley Capital Index (MSCI) Europe Index family and its industry 
specific derivatives matched by GICS-codes to calculate these returns for a period 
of 180 days preceding a bond issue. Data are from Bloomberg. It is also used to 
measure the Morgan Stanley Capital Index (MSCI) overall index return (not industry 
specific) over the past 180 or 360 days prior to a bond issue. We use Europe wide 
stock returns. 
 
rule of law is the rule of law score developed by Kaufmann et al. (2010). It measures the 
enforcement environment in the issuer domicile country. Higher scores equate to 
a higher quality enforcement environment. Rule of Law is one of six dimensions 
measured within the Worldwide Governance Indicators project of the World Bank, 
covering 200 countries since 1996. The six governance indicators are based on 
different data sources including commercial business information providers, public 
sector data providers as well as non-governmental organization data providers and 





assets measure the size of an issuer firm measured by (the logarithm of) total assets or 
the total  
 
revenues revenues of the issuer. The data are from S&P.  
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Appendix B Variable definitions (continued) 
 
maturity is a bond’s years to maturity. The data are from S&P.  
 
stock listing  is a dummy variable indicating whether the issuer or its parent company is a listed 
company.  A firm is considered to be listed if Bloomberg indicates a market 




profitability is the profitability of a firm gauged by the ratio of EBIT to revenues. The data is 
from S&P. Profit is winsorised at the 1%-level to correct for extreme outlier values 
in the data set. 
 
industry is a dummy variable taking the value of one, if an issuer is affiliated to a certain 
industry defined by the Global Industry Classification Standards (GICS) codes, zero 
otherwise. The benchmark industry is “industrials”. The data is from S&P. 
 
country  is a dummy variable for issuer domicile, taking the value of one if an issuer has it’s 
domicile in a specific country, zero otherwise, the UK being the benchmark issuer 
domicile. The data is from S&P.  
 
time is a time index dummy variable, equal to 0 in 2002 and increasing by 1 every year 
thereafter to control for potential structural changes over time. 
 
A144 indicates whether a bond is registered under SEC Rule 144A or not. A dummy 
variable taking the value of 1, zero otherwise, is used. 
 
 Embedded options 
 
 
options is a dummy variable taking the value of one, zero otherwise, if a call, whole call, 
put, control put or rating related put (all options described below) is attached to a 
bond issue 
 
call indicates whether a bond is subject to early redemption through a call provision 










Appendix B Variable definitions (continued) 
 
call_whole indicates a provision that allows a borrower to prepay the remaining fixed rate 
term, making an additional payment that is derived from a formula based on the 
net present value of future debt payments. 
 
put  indicates a standard put option and identifies a bond that is putable. 
 
put_control indicates a rating trigger provision, giving the bondholder the right to execute a 
put, if the bond falls below a designated credit rating, usually investment grade. 
 
put_rating indicated a provision which allows for the redemption of the bonds in the event 






















Appendix C     Description of Debt Covenants 
The following table provides an overview of all covenant variables and their Bloomberg 
definitions. 





Indicates a negative or restrictive covenant that limits an 
issuer's ability to make distributions, whether in the form of 
cash, assets or securities to shareholders, to redeem 





Indicates the existence of an affirmative or restrictive covenant 







Indicates whether covenant/default information is available. 
cov4 
 
Force Majeure  Indicates a clause that allows the underwriter to cancel the 






Indicates a covenant or clause in the loan documentation which 
is triggered by an event, condition or change which materially 
and adversely affects, or could reasonably be expected to 
materially and adversely affect, a company's financial results, 





Indicates a covenant in the credit agreement whereby the 






Indicates a negative or restrictive covenant that places 
limitations on the amount of debt that the issuer can incur. This 




Cross Default  Indicates a stipulation stating that if an issuer is in default on 
other borrowings, such non-payment is also considered default 






Indicates a restrictive bond clause intended to prevent a 
corporation from giving benefits to the shareholders at the 
expense of the bondholders. 
cov10 
 
Sales of Assets 
Restriction  
Indicates a negative or restrictive covenant that limits the ability 





Indicates a negative covenant that can apply to any restrictions 
on the business activities of the issuer. 
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Coverage Ratio  
Indicates cash available for debt service/total or senior debt 
service. In corporate finance, it is the amount of cash flow 
available to meet annual interest and principal payments on 
debt, including sinking fund payments.  
cov13 
 
Free Cash Flow 
to Debt Service  
Indicates if the issuer has supplied specific ratios and has 







Indicates any pledge made by the issuer to refrain from an 







Indicates a negative or restrictive covenant placed on the issuer 
which states that the issuer may not merge or consolidate with 







Indicates a restrictive or negative covenant that prevents the 
issuer from selling assets (or removing them from the balance 
sheet for accounting purposes) then leasing them back from the 




Subsidiary Debt  
Indicates a negative or restrictive covenant that places 
limitations on the amount of debt that the issuer's subsidiaries 
can incur. This can be expressed a as percentage of assets or in 





Indicates an additional covenant clause designed to give a 
supermajority of bondholders (usually 66.66% or 75%) the 















Appendix D Factor Analysis 
This Appendix shows the results of the factor analysis using the covenants described in Appendix 
C. Panel A depicts the principal factors and their eigenvalues. Panel B includes the rotated factor 
loadings, unique variances together with the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy.  
 
Panel A Principal Factors and Eigenvalues 
Factor analysis/correlation                       Number of obs    =      1,220 
Method: principal factors                       Retained factors =              2 
Rotation: orthogonal varimax (Kaiser off)      Number of params =       35 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
         Factor   |     Eigenvalue   Difference        Proportion   Cumulative 
-----------------+----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
        Factor1  |      6.28119      2.85744             0.5754          0.5754 
        Factor2  |      3.42375            .                     0.3136          0.8890 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
    LR test: independent vs. saturated: chi2(153) = 2.3e+04 Prob>chi2 = 0.0000 
 












     (blanks represent abs(loading)<.3)
                                                     
           cov18     0.3080                  0.8533  
           cov17               0.8808        0.1660  
           cov16     0.4368                  0.8079  
           cov15     0.7705    0.3814        0.2609  
           cov14     0.9490                  0.0825  
           cov13                             0.9923  
           cov12                             0.9864  
           cov11     0.9457                  0.0626  
           cov10     0.7747    0.4040        0.2367  
            cov9     0.9483                  0.0838  
            cov8     0.6816    0.3213        0.4322  
            cov7               0.9195        0.1014  
            cov6     0.8817                  0.1759  
            cov5                             0.9879  
            cov4                             0.9416  
            cov3     0.6672                  0.5327  
            cov2     0.4729    0.5751        0.4456  
            cov1               0.8932        0.1455  
                                                     
        Variable    Factor1   Factor2     Uniqueness 
                                                     
                           
         Overall    0.8901 
                       
         cov18    0.9218 
         cov17    0.8762 
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This study examines how the use of restrictive covenants impacts shareholder 
wealth ex ante and in the context of issuing privately placed bonds. I identify a specific 
channel, namely the use of restrictive covenants, through which firm value is affected ex 
ante. Stock price effects appear to be driven by the use of covenants rather than by the 
type of security sold to investors. For an event window of -10;+30 days around the 
announcement of issuing privately placed bonds, the cross-sectional abnormal return 
increases with the number of restrictive covenants attached to bonds. For firms issuing 
private placement bonds with average covenant intensity, the abnormal return amounts 
to a mean (median) of -5.3% (-4.3%) or 44% of the new funds raised. Negative abnormal 
returns become even larger when limiting a firm’s flexibility to raise additional debt in the 
future, i.e. for bond issues with additional debt covenants attached. In contrast, abnormal 
returns are statistically insignificant for firms issuing publicly or privately placed bonds 
with low covenant intensity or bonds with no additional debt covenants attached.  
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1  Introduction         
A private placement bond (hereafter PPB)29 is a corporate bond sold directly to large, 
mostly institutional investors (Fenn, 2000), not involving any public offering,30 and with 
concentrated ownership in a few investors (Houston & James, 1996). In times of decreasing 
importance of public capital markets, paired with fewer company listings (Gaoet al., 2013), PPBs 
have become more important, especially in the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC).31 It 
appears that structural changes in the credit markets have brought private bonds into the capital 
markets arena. They follow the expansion of the market for collateralized debt obligations of the 
2004 to 2007 period, which was fuelled by the interest of institutional investors and characterized 
by a decrease in spreads of leveraged buyout (LBO) loans (Shivdasani & Wang, 2011). The increase 
in the supply of debt by institutional investors and reduced spreads, below that demanded by 
banks for loans to otherwise identical firms (Ivashina & Sun, 2011), appears to make the issuance 
of PPBs appealing to issuers. However, it is yet unclear whether the use of PPBs impacts firm value 
ex ante and if so, whether it increases or decreases firm value. Event-study driven research has 
                                                     
29 Throughout this paper I will use the terminology “private placements bonds”, “private placements”, and 
“private bonds” interchangeably, and likewise for “public placement bonds”, “public placements” and “public 
bonds”.  
 
30 An alternative, more formal definition would refer to the exemption of section 4(2) of the Securities Act of 
1933, which exempts from registration transactions not involving any public offering. Primary offerings using 
this exemption are often referred to as private placements. However, since European companies are not 
subject to US legislation, there are primary offerings without exemption from registration in their home 
country that are nevertheless private placements.  
 
31 Debt funding is the primary source of external funds for firms after their establishment, for which they are 
equity financed. It accounts for approximately 95% of total new external finance (Whited, 1992). Private debt 
from non-bank funding sources has gained in importance (Kraemer-Eis et al., 2014) in the aftermath of the 
Global Financial Crisis. The market share of PPB issues within primary market bond issues in the Euro Area 
(EA), one important source of non-bank funding, has more than doubled. It has grown from approximately 
14% in 2008 to 30% in 2015  (Böni & Rietmann, 2016), yet little is known about the valuation effect of issuing 
PPBs.  Together with PUBs, PPBs appear to substitute bank loans (Kraemer-Eis et al., 2014), especially in 
times of tight bank lending and poor bank performance across European banks (Becker & Ivashina, 2014). 
Public debt markets appear to not fully mitigate the effects of bank distress, especially during financial crisis 
(Carvalho et al., 2016). It is expected that market-based funding is continuing it’s growth (Cour-Thimann & 
Winkler, 2013), for example through the issuance of PPBs.  
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resulted in a consensus that bank loans are unique relative to other financial contracts, with 
announcements of them resulting in positive abnormal returns. In contrast, announcing public 
bonds appear to generate no significant abnormal returns and those of stock issues yield negative 
abnormal returns. Given the concentrated ownership of PPBs in a few institutional investors, it is 
therefore an empirical question whether PPBs resemble more bank loans or public bonds and 
whether they create positive or negative stock price reactions when announced.  
Prior literature (Mikkelson & Partch, 1986; James, 1987; Harvey et al., 2004)32 is 
ambiguous and provides inconclusive evidence related to the stock price reactions to the 
announcement of private debt. These studies generally adhere to the asymmetric information 
approach presented in Myers & Majluf (1984) and posit that bank debt, for example, can be seen 
as a form of inside debt (Fama, 1985), providing information about the value of the firm’s growth 
prospects (James, 1987). Stock price reactions are rationalized based on moral hazard models 
provided by classical agency theory.  It is proposed that shareholders of levered firms may have 
incentives to engage in actions that are damaging to debtholders. They may engage in risky 
projects, asset substitution or forgo positive net present value projects leading to 
underinvestment (Galai & Masulis, 1976; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Myers, 1977). Covenants are 
found to be effective instruments in mitigating such agency problems in bond contract design 
(Smith & Warner, 1979) and provide important ex ante instruments in optimal financial 
contracting. Since these restrictions imposed by the use of covenants are costly to the firm, they 
must confer some offsetting benefit (Smith & Warner, 1979). The benefit of using covenants is 
the reduction in agency costs, which translates into a lower cost of debt. Consistent with this 
prediction, Bradley & Roberts (2015) find that the inclusion of covenants in loan agreements 
reduces the cost of debt. Reisel (2014) likewise finds that covenants reduce the cost of debt for 
public bonds. However, she also finds that covenants restricting a firm’s financing lead to a 
                                                     
32 Mikkelson and Partch (1986) and James (1987) find a positive stock response to the announcement of 
bank loans but no abnormal returns to the announcement of private placements of debt (Mikkelson & Partch, 
1986) or marginally negative abnormal returns to the issuance of private placement bonds to insurance 
companies (James, 1987). Harvey et al. (2004) find an average abnormal return to privately placed domestic 
bond issues of -1.04%, however, only marginally significant.  
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marginally significant increase in the cost of debt. This indicates that the effect of covenants may 
under certain circumstances be increasing the cost of debt. For example, Böni et al. (2019) find 
that financing covenants are used to facilitate debt renegotiation, resulting in higher ex ante 
spreads as investors request a compensation for contracting under higher uncertainty. Leaning 
on incomplete contracting theory, they suggest that firms may prefer private debt markets as 
they seek the benefits of flexible debt renegotiation at the expense of financing limitations. 
This study controls for the ex ante effects of using covenants in PPBs as compared to public 
bonds.  Prior studies find the announcement of covenant violations  negatively affects stock prices 
(Beneish & Press, 1995; Chava & Roberts, 2008 and more recently Nini et al., 2012)33.  Also, Core 
and Schrand (1999) have shown that covenants convey information to investors when earnings 
announcements are made. According to them, the stock market reaction is related to the 
informativeness of earnings announcements with respect to potential covenant violations. 
Covenants mitigate the effects of agency and information problems based on implicit limitations. 
As shareholders value compliance with monitored covenants (Harvey et al. 2004), covenant use 
may therefore also convey information ex ante. To the best of my knowledge, no empirical study 
has yet directly addressed this question. The issuance of PPBs provides an interesting setting to 
examine it. I empirically test whether the use of covenants affects firm valuation ex ante, that is 
at the announcement of the issuance of PPBs. Moreover, this study examines whether  higher 
covenant intensity increases or decreases ex ante stock price effect and how these effects can be 
explained.  
This paper examines 325 corporate bond issues by 147 firms and includes 188 public 
placement and 137 private placement bond issues in the years 2002 through 2015. It provides 
direct evidence that, on average, restrictive covenants in private debt contracts affect 
shareholder value ex ante. I find that issuing PPBs with below average covenant intensity results 
                                                     
33
 According to Beneish and Press (1995) announcements of technical default are associated with 
significant stock price declines. Higher costs of borrowing as a consequence of new restrictions on firms' 
opportunities following the renegotiation of contracts impose wealth losses of 1.4% on shareholders. 
Declining investments following a covenant violation are evidenced by Chava and Roberts (2008) or Nini et 
al. (2012). 
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in statistically insignificant abnormal returns. In contrast, average covenant intensity results in 
negative and statistically and economically significant abnormal returns. The data suggests that 
the negative abnormal returns increase in covenant intensity and are affected by financing 
covenants. Also, it is evidenced that the issuance of PPBs is valued differently by the stock market 
than that of issuing publicly bonds (PUBs), for which no significant abnormal returns are detected. 
I hypothesize and show that these abnormal returns are related to uncertainty about the credit 
risk of an issuer. To make this study comparable to previous work, I calculate and present the 
cross-sectional t-test as proposed by Brown and Warner (1980) together with the standardized 
residual test developed by Patell (1976). Additionally, to account for potential event day 
clustering, the parametric standardized cross-sectional test of Boehmer et al. (1991) and the 
nonparametric test proposed by Kolari and Pynnonen (2011) are employed. Moreover, to account 
for potential event day clustering in an alternative way, I drop PPB issues with overlapping 
calendar day announcement dates and find that abnormal returns are not affected. Additionally, 
a comprehensive set of confounding events such as earnings, dividends, merger and other 
financing announcements as well as analyst recommendations in the event window is evaluated. 
Given that negative abnormal stock market reactions persist when there are no confounding 
events and when there are confounding events, I conclude that these events do not invalidate 
the findings.  
Using the market model34 to estimate normal returns, this study provides evidence for a 
mean (median) cumulative average abnormal return (CAAR) for an event window -10;+30 in the 
magnitude of –5.3% (-4.3%) for firms issuing PPBs with average covenant intensity and -6.8% (-
7.4%) for firms issuing PPBs with financing covenants attached. The CAAR turns more negative by 
-1.5% (-3.1%) when financing covenants are attached to PPBs. Abnormal returns for firms issuing 
PPBs with such restrictions appear to convey more negative information than those with high 
covenant intensity but no financing restrictions. This result contrasts the CAAR for firms issuing 
                                                     
34 The CAAR is also calculated using the constant mean return model. The results are of comparable 
magnitude and shall be reported later in this paper.  
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PUBs, which is between –0.19% and –0.28% and statistically not different from zero. To put this 
number in perspective, for the average market capitalization of firms issuing PPBs of € 11.7 billion, 
the mean CAAR represents approximately € 620 million to € 795 million in abnormal firm value 
reduction. Compared to the average issue amount of € 1.6 billion, the valuation effect of issuing 
PPBs appears to be substantial. On average, 44% of the funds raised in the form of debt are lost 
in firm value.  
Other than with public bonds (PUBs), the detailed bond indentures for PPBs are only 
communicated to the market a few days after the bond announcement date and the CAAR turns 
statistically significant only after this information has reached the market. This finding provides 
further evidence that not the type of security, here a PPB, drives abnormal returns, but that these 
returns are primarily related to the use of restrictive covenants and especially financing 
covenants. In line with this, I find that the CAAR for firms issuing bonds with few restrictive 
covenants or no financing covenants attached are not different from zero.  
Moreover, in line with the costly contracting hypothesis of Smith and Warner (1979), I find 
an inverted U-shape35 for the relationship between the CAAR and covenant intensity for firms 
issuing PPBs, allowing to contrast empirically the benefits of including restrictive covenants with 
the cost of doing so. The CAAR starts to decrease (becomes negative) at an average of 
approximately 7 covenants attached to a PPB. The cost to shareholders of limiting managerial 
discretion appears to outweight the benefits after this level. 66% (52%) of firms issuing PPBs 
(PUBs) overshoot this level of covenants attached to a bond. Additionally, 42% (18%) of firms 
issuing PPBs (PUBs) accept financing covenants. The 24 percentage-point difference in the mean 
number of firms accepting financing covenants is highly statistically significant at the 1% level.  
I test a set of alternative explanations for abnormal returns using OLS regressions. A 
placement dummy variable indicating if a bond placement is private is negative and highly 
statistically significant in all specifications. Interacting it with covenant intensity, it is insignificant 
                                                     
35 The inverted U-shape is tested following the test proposed by Lind and Mehlum (2010) and 
additional guidance provided by Haans et al. (2016). 
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for PUBs but significant for PPBs, confirming the use of covenants affects firm value ex ante and 
if PPBs are issued. All else equal, having the right to retire a bond prior to its maturity renders the 
CAAR less negative by 4.4%. The data suggests that firms having the option to free themselves 
from the embrace of covenant restrictions experience less negative returns. Next, I find a positive 
coefficient for the 144A registration variable36, significant at the 10% level. It appears that, ceteris 
paribus, issuing registered PPBs results in a CAAR less negative by 4.7%, on average. In line with 
prior research (Fenn, 2000; Arena, 2011; Chaplinsky & Ramchand, 2004) I conclude that a 
distinction between 144A-registered bonds and unregistered bonds must be made.  Equity 
market volatility (VIX) is positively related to abnormal returns, significant at the 5% level. The 
MSCI index return over a 180 days period (MSCI) is negatively related to abnormal returns, 
significant at the 10% level. A one standard deviation increase in VIX reduces the CAAR by 5%, 
whilst a +/- 5% return on the index creates a -/+ 0.7% change in the CAAR. A set of robustness 
tests, such as the assessment of potential inferences from event date clustering or the testing of 
a comprehensive set of confounding events do not change the findings in any material way.  
I hypothesize uncertainty about credit risk, and especially bankruptcy risk, may explain the 
relatively large abnormal returns.  I use two proxies to test this hypothesis. First, as in Morgan 
(2002) or Akins (2018), I employ the pattern of disagreement between credit rating agencies 
(CRAs) and include this factor in the OLS regression specifications. Second, Altman’s (1977) Z-
score is likewise used as an indicator for an issuer’s bankruptcy risk. The two tests do not change 
the results in material ways but provide further evidence that covenants are priced in private but 
not in public bonds.  
                                                     
36 The Securities Act provides that no securities may be offered or sold in the US unless the securities 
are registered with the SEC or an exemption from registration is available. Registration with the SEC is an 
expensive and time-consuming process and many international securities issues are structured to qualify 
for an exemptions from SEC registration. A commonly used exemption is Rule 144A., It allows companies 
to market debt directly to private institutional investors rather than going through a more time-consuming 
public securities issuance process. Rule 144A was adopted in April 1990 and established conditions under 
which private placements can be traded among qualified institutional buyers'. As Fenn (2000, p. 385) shows, 
firms use Rule 144A to facilitate speedy issuance of public-like securities, not to issue securities that are 
structurally different from public securities”.  
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This paper contributes to the literature in various dimensions: First, while previous 
research has shown that the presence of covenants is motivated and rationalized by their ability 
to mitigate agency problems (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Smith & Warner, 1979; Tirole, 2006) and 
that covenant violations impact firm investment activities ex post (Beneish & Press, 1995; Chava 
& Roberts, 2008 and more recently Nini et al., 2012)), it has been less clear whether the inclusion 
of restrictive covenants impacts firm value ex ante. This paper adds to the literature on the choice 
between private and public debt and provides direct empirical evidence for a relationship 
between covenants and firm valuation ex ante. Covenant provisions announced to the market in 
the process of issuing PPBs appear to transmit new information. If stock price effects were solely 
driven by the type of security sold to investors (Mikkelson and Partch, 1986), then abnormal 
returns should be observed immediately upon the announcement of a private placement and 
cease to be observed after a short event window. However, I find evidence that the negative 
CAAR for firms issuing PPBs is only detected for longer event windows, that is after the full 
disclosure of the covenants attached to a bond and communicated in the bond indentures. For 
PPBs, these indentures are released to the market only a few days after a successful bond 
placement. Second, it provides evidence that firms accepting sub-optimal restrictions of future 
debt issuance (Smith & Warner, 1979) might be subject to increased bankruptcy risk. It appears 
that the marginal benefit of covenant intensity to shareholders decreases with increasing 
covenant intensity and turns negative from a tipping point. Mitigating classical agency costs up to 
a certain level (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Smith & Warner, 1979), beyond that tipping point, the 
use of covenants appears to be related to managing bankruptcy costs and flexible debt 
renegotiation. Third, this paper contributes to the literature that suggests that bond covenants, 
unlike loan covenants, are written loosely37 and that raises concerns about the effectiveness of 
                                                     
37 A recent example of such loosely written covenants in public bonds and related investor push against 
bond rules used by Walmart. As described in the Financial Times (FT, 2018), the retailer used legal 
language as part of a large $ 16 billion debt fundraising related to an acquisiton. It would allow Walmart to 
execute a make-whole-call and buy back a $ 8.5 billion portion of the debt at a value below an agreed 101% 
of face value if it does not complete the planned acquisition. This buy back option created some investor push 
back since it is standard practice to pay investors for deal delays. Investors requested Walmart to rewrite these bond rules.    
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bond covenants in mitigating agency problems (Beneish & Press, 1995; Chen & Wei, 1993; Nini et 
al., 2009). While this strand of literature suggests that bond issuers put little effort into financial 
contracting in terms of mitigating agency problems, I find that the inclusion of covenants 
significantly and importantly affects the stock price of firms issuing private bonds. If this is the 
case, it appears to be unreasonable to assume that bond covenants on PPBs are written loosely. 
This finding is in line with Reisel’s (2014) observations with regard to public bonds. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next Section provides a review of related 
literature. Section 3 contains a description of the data and methodology and presents descriptive 
statistics. In Section 4, I estimate the magnitude of the wealth effects of issuing PPBs to 
stockholders and present the empirical results. In Section 5, a set of potential other explanations 
for the observed wealth effects are explored. Section 6 contains robustness tests such as for 
example the assessement of potential inferences from event date clustering, the testing of a 
comprehensive set of confounding events. In Section 7 I test whether uncertainty about credit 
risk explains abnormal returns. A brief conclusion is provided in Section 8. 
 
2  Related Literature  
2.1  Capital Structure Theory, Agency Theory and the Use of Covenants 
Capital Structure Theory. Different theories related to the capital structure choice exist. 
Following Barclay and Smith (2005), they can be grouped into three broad categories: (1) taxes, 
(2) contracting costs and (3) information costs. 
First, the extent to which a company profits from interest tax shields may have an impact 
on firm value. The value of a debt financed company equals that of a fully equity financed firm 
plus the present value if its interest tax shields from debt financing. Adding debt to the balance 
sheet creates a tax advantage in the magnitude of the company’s marginal tax rate, multiplied by 
the interest paid to debt providers. Increasing leverage, rather than increasing equity, thus 
increases the value of the firm since tax can be deducted from interest payments but not 
dividends. However, these tax benefits must be compared to higher contracting costs.  
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Second, contracting costs describe the costs of financial distress and bankruptcy costs. The 
optimal debt structure is when marginal bankruptcy costs associated with debt are equated with 
marginal tax benefits. This trade-off is described in trade-off theory in Leland (1994).  
Third, information costs are related to the fact that often managers have better 
information about the value of the firm than outside investors. The problem of asymmetric 
information has led to three distinct theories of financing decisions: (a) market timing, (b) 
signaling and (c) the pecking order. Market timing is related to issuing overpriced securities and 
to avoid issuing underpriced ones. Many studies have shown that investors mark down the share 
prices within seasoned equity offerings given the fact that they understand management’s 
incentives to time the markets. These studies are summarized in the next Section. Signaling 
theory, like market timing, is based on the assumption that management disposes of insider 
information. Here, financing decisions are designed primarily to communicate confidence of the 
management regarding the prospects of the firm. As has been described in Ross (1977), adding 
more debt can serve as a signal of higher expected future cash flows.38 Finally, the pecking order 
theory presented by Myers and Majluf (1984) proclaims that management seeks for the cheapest 
available source of funds and therefore prefer internal financing (retained earnings) to external 
funds. If external funds, then debt is preferred to equity because of the lower information costs 
associated with debt. Issuing equity is seen as the last resort of financing and only used when 
debt capacity has been exhausted.  
Agency Theory. With agency relationships as described in Jensen and Meckling (1976) or 
Smith and Warner (1979), the information asymmetries between managers and investors may 
lead to situations in which managers will not always act in the best interest of the principal. As 
Billett et al. (2007, p. 697) put it: “One of the most important costs of debt financing is the 
potential for conflicts between stockholders and bondholders over the investment and financing 
                                                     
38 In the context of debt choice, it is assumed that firms with proprietary information that is likely to be 
valuable to competitors will prefer private over public debt as private lenders have the ability to keep 
sensitive information confidential ( Campbell, 1979). Proprietary information may, for example, consist of 
R&D informational advantages over competitors (Bhattacharya & Ritter, 1983). Krishnaswami et al. (1999) 
show that firms with higher unexpected earnings rely more on private debt than other firms.  
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policies of the firm.” Several debtholder-shareholder agency conflicts must be considered in this 
context, namely conflicts over dividends, claim dilution, asset substitution and underinvestment. 
The asset substitution problem according to Jensen and Meckling (1976) arises from the incentive 
of shareholders to substitute existing assets with riskier assets because they have unbounded 
upside potential and limited liability. Galai and Masulis (1976) explain the motivation for asset 
substitution by modelling the equity of a levered firm as a call option on the firm’s assets. 
Shareholders have an incentive to increase the volatility of firm assets to increase the value of 
their call option. The underinvestment problem is explained in Myers (1977): Levered firms’ 
shareholders receive cash flows that remain after paying off debt. This incentivizes them to accept 
only projects with a net present value (NPV) exceeding the face value of debt. As a result, 
managers forego some positive NPV projects. Too much debt can lead to underinvestment. 
However, as is described by Jensen (1986), too little debt can lead to overinvestment. Here, 
managers of mature firms with few profitable projects use excess cash to sustain growth by 
overinvesting in their core business or diversification into unfamiliar businesses, for example 
through acquisitions.39  
Covenants. The costly contracting hypothesis offered by Smith and Warner (1979) is that 
efficient control of stockholder bondholder conflicts can increase the value of the firm and that 
(p.121) “there is a unique optimal set of financial contracts which maximizes the value of the 
firm.” Covenants are written into debt contracts to control agency problems (Berlin and Mester, 
1992). The main concerns may arise from information asymmetries leading to asset substitution 
where shareholders invest in risky projects given bounded (limited) liability but unlimited benefits 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Galai and Masulis, 1976). Myers (1977) shows that moral hazard may 
lead to underinvestment problems as firms with risky debt forgo positive net present value 
projects when cash flows primarily flow towards debt repayments. Rational investors, in this 
moral hazard argumentation, will ask higher returns or intensify monitoring of such borrowers.  
                                                     
39 For a more in-depth review of overinvestment problems such as for example empire building and 
empire preservation see Stein (2003). 
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Extending the moral hazard view, in their incomplete contracts approach, Aghion and 
Bolton (1992) find that (p. 490) “not all potential conflicts of interest between the entrepreneur 
and the investor can be resolved through ex ante contracting”. According to them, rather than ex 
ante contracting, a state contingent (re-)allocation of control rights over assets ex ante minimizes 
agency problems. Based on incomplete contracting theory, Rajan and Winton (1995) propose to 
design contracts that strengthen the monitoring incentives and suggest this is done by exercising 
control rights contingent on the monitoring outcome. According to them, incentives to monitor 
are improved by relying on covenants written on verifiable information.40 Rajan and Winton 
(1995) predict that higher risk and high information asymmetries are associated with greater 
control allocations and incentives to monitor. Covenants assign control to creditors by giving 
them strong decision rights providing protection against information asymmetry (Garleanu & 
Zwiebel, 2009). Lenders receive an option to renegotiate loan terms by threatening default 
following a decline in economic performance (Aghion & Bolton, 1992; Dewatripont & Tirole, 1994; 
Garleanu & Zwiebel, 2009) or accelerate debt contracts (Roberts & Sufi, 2009;  Denis & Wang, 
2014; Prilmeier, 2017). Recent research has shed more light on the use of covenants. Focusing on 
debt renegotiation, Demerjian (2017) examines the use of financial covenants when contracting 
for debt under uncertainty. He finds that a lack of information about future economic events and 
their consequences for the borrower’s creditworthiness are positively related to covenant 
intensity. Nikolaev (2017) studies whether the demand for monitoring explains the score for 
renegotiation in private debt contracts. He finds that monitoring mechanisms, such as the use of 
covenants, are positively related to renegotiation intensity.  
                                                     
40 Early accounting literature has contributed to this topic. For example, Leftwich (1983, p.27) noted: 
“Just as it is in the interest of stockholders to negotiate restrictions on a firm’s financing and investment 
decisions, it is also in their interest to negotiate accounting measurement rules that reduce management’s 
ability to circumvent the restrictions by a judicious choice of accounting methods.” According to (Watts, 
2003), to cite an important contributor in the field of accounting conservatism, high financial reporting quality 
reduces borrower opacity and, under the agency perspective, the agency cost of debt. In a more recent 
study, Christensen et al. (2016) discuss how the use of accounting information in contracts enhances 
contracting efficiency. They provide a comprehensive literature review with regards to accounting 
conservatism. I do not include this stream of large accounting literature since the level of analysis is focussed 
towards the existence of restrictions on financing and investment decisions, rather than the quality of 
accounting information related to those restrictions. 
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2.2  Evidence on Private Placement Bonds and Covenants 
Private Placement Bonds. Prior research on PPBs consists of studies focusing on the 
determinants of debt choice (Krishnaswami et al., 1999; Cantillo & Wright, 2000; Denis and 
Mihov, 2003; and Arena, 2011) and on the pricing differences between PPB and PUB (Blackwell & 
Kidwell, 1988; Chaplinsky & Ramchand, 2004; Fenn, 2000; Kwan & Carleton, 2010). There is 
agreement that firms issuing private debt are of lesser credit quality than their public 
counterparts (Blackwell & Kidwell, 1998; Cantillo & Wright, 2000; Denis & Mihov, 2003; Kwan & 
Carleton, 2010). Denis and Mihov (2013), for example, find that the median private borrower is 
smaller, has fewer tangible assets, and has lower credit quality than the median public borrower. 
Thus, default risk may be an obvious explanation for the differences in abnormal returns related 
to the issuance of PPBs. However, as Mikkelson and Partch (1985) and James (1987) evidence, 
announcement effects are, in general, not explained by differences in default risk. 
Another observation in prior studies is that more information asymmetries and agency 
costs must be expected in firms issuing PPBs (Krishnaswami et al., 1999; Cantillo & Wright, 2000). 
Krishnaswami et al. (1999) show that flotation costs and agency costs drive a firm’s debt choice 
and that firms that rely more on private debt operate under greater information asymmetry. 
Consequently, debt covenants are expected to be more restrictive in private placements than in 
public placements (Smith & Warner, 1979) and with increased information asymmetry. This is 
empirically evidenced by Rajan and Winton (1995), Chava and Roberts (2008), Demiroglu and 
James (2010), Skinner (2011), Christensen and Nikolaev (2012) and Hollander and Verriest (2016). 
Also, as shown by El-Gazzar and Pastena (1990), Kwan and Carleton (2010) and Bradley and 
Roberts (2015), private debt contains more covenants than does public debt.   
Covenants. More recent studies provide evidence that covenants reduce the cost of 
borrowing. Examining a large dataset of 4267 public bond issues, Reisel (2014) finds that such 
cost reductions can be as high as 75 basis points. Using a large database of private loans, Bradley 
and Roberts (2015) find a negative relation between yields on corporate debt and the presence 
of covenants. The presence of covenants reduces the cost of borrowing. Böni et al. (2019) find 
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that the inclusion of restrictive covenants in private bonds explains much of the excess spread of 
private bonds over public bonds and that the relationship between spread and covenant intensity 
is described by a convex pattern. They find that considering this optimum a firm can reduce the 
cost of debt by an economically significant 96 basis points. On the other hand, they evidence that 
the cost reduction decreases with increasing covenant intensity and suggest that the costs of 
using restrictive covenants may exceed the benefits after an optimum. 
Other previous studies identify a link between covenants and firm value (Beneish & Press, 
1995; Core & Schrand, 1999, Harvey et al., 2004; Kahan & Tuckman, 1993; ). Beneish and Press 
(1995) analyze 87 announcements of technical defaults41 in lending agreements and show that 
they are associated with significant stock price declines, imposing wealth losses of 1.4% on 
stockholders. In this vein, Core and Schrand investigate the effect of earnings announcements of 
233 financial institutions. They find that covenants convey information to investors when earnings 
announcements are made. According to them, the stock market reaction is related to the 
informativeness of earnings announcements with respect to potential covenant violations and 
greatest for firms near violation. Kahan and Tuckman (1993) document the wealth effects of 
covenant modifications related to 42 bonds of 29 listed firms going through the process of 
consent solicitation and find positive abnormal returns in the amount of 9.5%. Harvey et al. (2004) 
investigate announcement returns of syndicated bank debt, public bonds and private placement 
of bonds. Whilst their study is focussed on syndicated bank debt, for which they look at 658 term-
loans and 185 credit agreements, they also analyze the announcement returns for 121 
international privately placed bonds and 95 privately placed domestic bonds. They find an 
abnormal return for the domestic private bonds of – 1.04%, significant at the 10% level. According 
to them, bond issues of firms with high agency problems, measured by above-median percent 
tangible assets, as opposed to bond issues of firms with less agency problems, measured by 
below-median percent tangible assets, result in negative / positive abnormal returns in the 
                                                     
41 They define technical default as the violation of accounting-based covenants in lending agreements 
and do not regard firms that default on debt service as technical defaulters. 
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amount of – 0.43% / 0.27%. Whilst they take a firm’s assets in place and future growth options 
into account, Harvey et al. (2004) do not assess the impact of covenants on announcement 
returns.  
 
2.3  Evidence on Abnormal Returns related to Security Issues: What we know from 
Event Studies 
 Event studies dominate the empirical research in the area of corporate finance 
(MacKinlay, 1997). The short-horizon event study is considered a workhorse of corporate finance 
(Harrington & Shrider, 2007) and dates back to the seminal work of Fama et al. (1969), who 
examines the process by which stock prices adjust to the information that is implicit in a stock 
split, and other early studies discussed (for example, Manne, 1965) and assessed the price effects 
of mergers (Eckbo, 1983).42  
Event studies related to the financing of firms followed.43  These studies generally find that 
offerings of common stock (SEOs) result in negative abnormal returns (Mikkelson & Partch, 1986; 
Asquith & Mullins, 1986; Masulis & Korwar, 1986; Carlson et al., 2006; Lyandres et al. , 2008 or 
Johnson et al., 2018), whilst  the announcement of the public issuance of straight debt appears 
to result in average abnormal returns close to zero (Eckbo, 1986; Mikkelson and Partch, 1986 or 
James, 1987).44   
Both, Mikkelson and Partch (1986) and James (1987), evidence a positive and statistically 
significant response to the announcement of bank loans in the amount of + 0.9% and + 1.93%, 
respectively.  
In explaining the difference in announcement effects between SEOs,  straight debt issues 
and bank loans, these studies generally adhere to the asymmetric information approach 
                                                     
42 For a survey of this early work related to mergers, see Jensen and Ruback (1983) or Jarrell et al. 
(1988). 
 
43 For a comprehensive review of event studies of financing decisions, see Smith (1986). 
 
44 Smith (1986) provides additional empirical evidence for this. 
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presented in Myers & Majluf (1984). Managers, according to their approach, profit from an 
information advantage compared to outsiders regarding the prospects of a firm’s business or 
regarding the correct pricing of firm assets. Managers have an incentive to issue equity when they 
think shares are overpriced and investors, perceiving this conflict of interest, revalue the stock at 
a new and lower price. Referred to as the “pecking order” theory of financing, managers rely on 
internal sources of funds and prefer debt over equity financing to finance new investments. 
Information asymmetries between managers and investors are also used to explain positive 
announcement effects of bank loan issues. Fama (1985) has argued that bank debt can be seen 
as a form of inside debt. Banks are considered to have inside information about the value of the 
firm’s growth prospects (James, 1987) and act as delegated monitors (Gorton & Winton, 2003) 
with high incentives to monitor (R. Rajan & Winton, 1995). Thus, banks have information about 
the borrower that public security holders don’t, avoiding some important agency problems. 
 Whilst the announcement effects of SEOs, straight debt and bank debt are well researched 
and explained, only very few studies include private placements of debt into their study design. 
Additionally, the results of these few studies are mixed. Mikkelson and Partch (1986), for 
example, find no statistically significant abnormal returns for 80 private placements of debt and 
do not offer a discussion related to this finding. They focus more on public offerings and do not 
explore differences in the stock price response associated with PUBs and PPBs. In contrast, James 
(1987) shows marginally statistically significant negative announcement effects in the amount of 
– 0.91% for 37 private debt securities placed with insurance companies. This finding contrasts his 
argument that private placements are similar to bank loans given the information advantage of 
private buyers over public security buyers. The inside debt argument as presented by Fama (1985) 
and used in James (1987) to explain positive stock price reactions associated with bank loans 
suggests that announcements of PPBs should result in a non-negative stock price response. 
However, prior studies either find no statistically significant or negative abnormal returns. Various 
researchers replicate James’ (1987) paper and confirm his findings, often with qualification. For 
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example, they show positive stock price reactions for lenders with high reputation (Billett et al., 
1995) or syndicates with few lenders (Preece & Mullineaux, 1996). 
 As Leary and Roberts (2010) propose, the pecking order hypothesis of Myers and Majluf 
(1984) may not accurately describe financing decisions.45 Whilst it is based on information 
asymmetries between managers and investors and posits that a preference ranking over financing 
sources exists, it appears not to explain the negative announcement returns of PPBs that I find. 
Private placements have many of the same features as bank loan agreements (James, 1987) and 
one would expect increased monitoring and positive, rather than negative, announcement 
returns for firms issuing PPBs. Also, evidence from private equity placements (Wruck, 1989, 
Hertzel et al., 2002) and convertible debt private placements (Fields & Mais, 1991) contrast with 
the pecking order hypothesis. In contrast to public equity placements (SEOs), empirical research 
related to the announcement of private equity placements shows significant positive returns for 
firms issuing it. Wruck (1989), for example, finds statistically significant abnormal returns of 4.4% 
for firms issuing equity privately. He attributes the positive announcement effect to a better 
alignment of interest and value-enhancing monitoring following an ownership concentration 
related to private equity issues. Hertzel and Smith (1993) argue that anticipated monitoring 
benefits from private sales of equity causes the positive abnormal returns. Hertzel et al. (2002) 
find a positive announcement period return of 2.4% associated with private equity issues. Given 
that they find long-term negative returns for the issuing firms, they conclude that investors might 
be overoptimistic about the prospects of firms issuing private equity. 
It appears that the nature of a security issue (public vs. private) may contain different 
information. As with private equity, private placements of convertible debt appear to result in 
abnormal returns different from public placements. For example, Fields and Mais (1991) find 
significant positive average abnormal returns of 1.8% to announcements of 61 private placements 
of convertible debt. They conclude that privately placed convertible debt issues convey 
                                                     
45 Also, they provide an interesting summary of studies scrutinizing the predictions of the pecking order 
hypothesis in their paper introduction (p. 332).  
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favourable information about the firm. Their results contrast those of Dann and Mikkelson (1984), 
who find negative abnormal returns for firms issuing publicly placed convertible debt. Whilst both 
studies on the issuance of convertible debt provide evidence that such issues convey 
(un)favourable information about the issuing firms, the specific nature of such information 
remains unidentified. 
I rationalize abnormal returns related to the issuance of PPBs based on agency costs of 
debt as discussed in Jensen and  Meckling (1976) and Myers (1977) and the costly contracting 
hypothesis offered in Smith and Warner (1979). It is suggested that abnormal returns associated 
with the announcement of PPBs are related to the way agency problems between bondholders 
and shareholders are mitigated, i.e. by the use of restrictive covenants. 
  
3  Data and Methodology 
 
3.1 Data  
I collect data from S&P Capital IQ (henceforth S&P) and Bloomberg and consider private 
and public bond issues. The choice of time period is driven by the fact that S&P’s coverage of 
rating scores46 only starts from January 2002. It ends in 2015. The sample observation period 
starts in 2002 following the dot-com bubble and includes the Global Financial Crisis in 2008, 
followed by the European Debt Crisis. This long observation period, which includes complete 
business cycles as well as significant shocks, “can enhance the robustness of the results of the 
empirical investigations” (Chen et al., 2011, p. 980). Debt issues of the years 2002 to 2015 are 
selected by geographic location, offering date, industry classification, security type and security 
                                                     
46 S&P rating scores are not identical to S&P ratings, which would be available before January 2002. 
The rating score is described in more detail below and in Appendix B.  
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features47 from S&P. I select issuers domiciled in Europe under the condition that their ultimate 
parent company is domiciled in Europe. This selection reveals 11,037 public and 1,340 private 
debt issues. Following Chen et al. (2011), Denis & Mihov (2003) and Eom et al. (2004), financial 
firms are eliminated from the sample because they are regulated and because of their balance 
sheet structures being systematically different from non-financial companies.48,49 Furthermore, 
of all private debt issues only 40 issues have been issued in currencies other than US Dollars (USD). 
Following Beber et al. (2009), who analyze liquidity and quality effects on European bond spreads 
in their research and who eliminate bond issues with sparse data, all bond issues in currencies 
other than USD are eliminated.50 As in Chen et al., (2011) or Lin et al. (2011), debt issues must 
have a maturity greater than one year to be considered in the sample. Ten public short-term debt 
issues are therefore eliminated from the sample. Bonds with maturities exceeding 30 years  are 
                                                     
47 Cut-off-date for the issue information is September 5, 2016. The geographic selection excludes issues 
of companies headquartered in locations other than Europe (Africa / Middle East, Asia / Pacific, Latin 
America and Caribbean, USA and Canada). Corporate debentures and offering dates starting January 1, 
2002 and ending December 31, 2015 are considered. Other security types (such as for example agency 
debenture, asset backed securities, bridge loans, convertible bonds, government bonds, LCs etc.) are not 
considered in the selection and therefore excluded. Security features “public placement” and “private 
placement” (including traditional private placements and Regulation 144A private placements) are selected.  
 
48 The Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS) is used to select and eliminate firms from the 
financial services industry from the sample. The primary industry code “finance” is applied. Furthermore, 
visual inspection of the data and the application of keywords is used to control for a correct elimination of 
firms from the financial services industry. Firms with missing industry classification are verified using  
www.moodys.com and www.bloomberg.com as primary sources for this additional check. For some issues, 
company specific internet pages were used.   
 
49 According to Carey et al. (1998) the aggregate equity-to-assets ratio at the end of 1995 was 11.1% for 
finance companies and 8.3% for commercial banks. As confirmed by the Basel III introduction and the 
debate on Basel IV, the leverage in the banking industry with a minimum tier 1 capital ratio (core equity 
capital value compared to the total of risk-weighted assets) of 4% is significantly higher than that of 
corporates. Also the introduction of a leverage ratio of 33,3 times tier 1 capital, planned for 2018, 
demonstrates that banks are not comparable to corporates. 
   
50 Consequently, public debt issues with currencies other than USD are eliminated from the sample. 
These include EUR (3,193), GPB (645), NOK (576), SEK (451), JPY (159), ARS (1), AUD (30), BGN (1), 
BRL (1), CAD (7), CNY (9), CZK (33), DKK (20), HKD (21), HRK (2), HUF (10), ISK (13), MXN (1), MYR 









likewise eliminated from the sample.51 Almost all of the eliminations, with the exception of low 
maturity and currency eliminations, are related to financial firms. From the remaining 1,217 
corporate bond issues, 490 are of unlisted issuers and not providing the opportunity to assess any 
valuation effects. Eliminating these from the sample, results in 727 corporate bond issues of stock 
listed firms. For some bond issues a package of securities is offered from one issuer at the 
announcement date. In order to avoid the overweighting of multiple events of the same firm, 
issues of the same issuer with the same announcement date are consolidated into one portfolio 
and treated as one event.  Issue amounts are aggregated and maturity and covenant intensity are 
adjusted on a value weighted basis. If in the portfolio one bond has a financing covenant attached 
then the entire portfolio is considered to have a financing covenant attached.52 For a security to 
be included in the sample, it must have no missing return data in the event window and at least 
200 daily returns in the entire 270 day observation period. Reduced by bond issues aggregated 
into a portfolio and those events that do not provide sufficient stock return data, the final sample 
consists of 325 bond issue events, being 188 public and 137 private bond placements of stock 
listed firms in the European Area (EA).  
 
3.2 Methodology 
 I follow the short-horizon event study methodology as described in MacKinlay (1997) and 
Kothari and Warner (2007). For each security, I use a maximum of 280 daily return observations 
for the period around the PPB issue announcement, starting at day – 249 and ending at day + 30 
relative to the event. Normal returns are estimated using 239 daily returns over event days –249 
                                                     
51 At the expense of rigour with the benefit of keeping important data in the sample, the upper maturity 
boundary is set to 30.31 years since this reduces the number of PPB eliminations by 41 issues that have a 
maturity of in between 30 and 30.31.   
 
52 This suggestion appears reasonable since private debt issues contain more and tighter covenants in 
light of relatively lower renegotiation costs (Smith & Warner, 1979, Leftwich, 1983). As is shown in the study 
of Billett et al. (2007), who investigate 15.504 public debt issues, cross-default provisions are the second 
most frequent covenants observed (51%) following asset sale clauses (65%) and merger restrictions (also 
65%). It can be expected that the frequency of cross-default provisions is higher in private debt contracts. 
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to –11. I then calculate abnormal returns over the -10;+30 event period together with a series of 
alternative event periods. The announcement date retrieved from Bloomberg is used to define 
the event date. According to Bloomberg, the announcement date is the earliest known date a 
security issue is publicized to the market. To test the costly contracting hypothesis, the market 
disclosure must include detailed indenture information, especially with regards to covenant 
intensity. Cumulative average abnormal returns are used to account for potential imprecision in 
dating the event and uncertainty as to when the full indenture information is available to the 
market. The use of cumulative rather than daily abnormal returns is justified by a critical 
assessment of the availability of indenture information on the official announcement date 
published on Bloomberg: I verify all available company disclosures, such as for example the 
offering memorandum or the prospectus53 together with information available on Compustat to 
evaluate whether complete information is available to the market on the announcement date. Of 
all private placements, I find conclusive information with regards to full indenture availability for 
49 privately and 99 publicly placed bonds. On average, complete information regarding the 
indentures of a PPB is delayed by 6.3 (mean) to 7 (median) days following the announcement 
date.54 In contrast, of the verifiable PUB issues, full indenture information is available to the public 
approximately one day prior (mean) and exactly at the announcement date (median). The 30 day 
post event-window is used to reflect and observe the effects from this delayed information 
availability. Additionally, this design provides estimators for the parameters of the normal return 
model unbiased by the returns around the event (Campbell et al., 1997). Also, the used event 
                                                     
53 Typically bond issues sold in the US-market have filings pursuant to Rule 424(b)(3) and other forms 
(such as for example forms 20-F or 6-K) available. 
 
54 Disclosure of debt covenants may be required for several reasons (GAAP, stock exchange regulation, 
SEC regulations etc.). However, bond issuers or intermediaries may choose not to report on covenants in 
private debt agreements (see Press & Weintrop, 1992, for a related analysis) or do so only with delay, for 
example within their annual reports. As defined in the market guide of the  International Capital Market 
Association (2016) for European corporate debt private placements, disclosure provisions are typically 
determined on a case-by-case basis and depending on particular investors’ and arranger’s requirements 
and the borrower’s situation.  
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window allows examining whether the market may have acquired information about a security 
offering prior to the actual event date, since this might be a concern with private placements.  
The market model and the constant mean return model55  are used to examine the 
valuation effect of private (PPB) and public (PUB) bond offerings and to investigate the nature of 
information inferred by investors from such offering announcements. The abnormal return of 
firm i and event date t is the difference of the realized return and the expected return given the 
absence of an event. The market model assumes a constant and linear relation between individual 
asset returns and the return of a market index, here the S&P 500 equal weighted index plus the 
value weighted counterpart as well as the MSCI Europe. For every security, the abnormal return 
in the event period using the procedure as described in Brown and Warner (1985) is estimated by 
ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions based on estimation-window observations:   
 
  Ri,t = αi + βiRm,t + εi,t    (1) 
 
where Ri,t is the observed return for security i at day t and Rm,t is the return on the benchmark 
index (market) for day t, with E[εi,t] = 0 and VAR[εi,t] = σ2εi.  
The constant mean return model is used as the second normal return model. It assumes 
expected stock returns can differ by company, but are constant over time. The model is:  
 
Ri,t = µi + εi,t                                                  (2) 
 
                                                     
55 The market model assumes a constant and linear relation between individual asset returns and the 
return of a market index, here the S&P 500 equal weighted. Ai,t is the abnormal return for security i at day t. 
For every security, the abnormal return in the event period using the procedure as described in Brown and 
Warner (1985) is estimated:  Ai,t = Ri,t - Rm,t, where Ri,t is the observed return for security i at day t and Rm,t 
is the return on the benchmark index (market) for day t. The constant mean return model assumes expected 
stock returns can differ by company, but are constant over time. The model is: Ai,t = Ri,t - ̅Ri,, where ̅Ri is the 
average of security i’s daily returns in the estimation period.  
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where Ri,t is the observed return for security i at day t and µi is the average return of security i 
over the estimation window with E[εi,t] = 0 and VAR[εi,t] = σ2εi. For both methods, abnormal 
returns are cumulated across time and for several event windows for every firm issuing PPBs or 
PUBs, which yields the cumulative abnormal return measure (CAR). The cross-sectional average 
of this measure is the cumulative average abnormal return (CAAR). 
The null hypothesis that the CAAR is equal to zero is tested with a set of tests. The cross-
sectional t-test as proposed by Brown and Warner (1980) together with the standardized residual 
test developed by Patell (1976) are used to make this study comparable to previous research. 
Additionally, to account for potential event day clustering, the parametric standardized cross-
sectional test of Boehmer et al. (1991) and and the nonparametric test by Kolari and Pynnonen 
(2011), being an adjusted version of the Boehmer et al. test (1991), is employed. The test by 
Boehmer et al. (1991) corrects for both an increase in volatility during the event window (time-
series heteroskedasticity) and cross-sectional heteroskedasticity56 and appears to be robust with 
regard to cross-sectional correlation of returns due to event day clustering.57 Since the evidence 
generally suggests that stock returns are fat-tailed relative to a normal distribution (Fama, 1976), 
the nonparametric test of Kolari and Pynnonen (2011), who demonstrate both theoretically and 
empirically that their statistic is reasonably robust to event day clustering, is used. For brevity, 
only the tests of Boehmer et al. (1991) and Kolari and Pynnonen (2011) are mentioned in the text. 
The alternative tests are used to make this study comparable to other research and, if not 
mentioned, the results of these tests do not deviate in material ways from Boehmer et al. (1991) 
and Kolari and Pynnonen (2011). 
                                                     
56 The test is found to be a robust parametric test (Harrington & Shrider, 2007) and can be applied to 
both the average cumulative abnormal return (CAAR) and the average standardized cumulative abnormal 
return (SCAAR) (see Campbell et al. 1997; MacKinlay, 1997). The test statistic is given in Section 4.5 of 
Campbell et al. (1997, p. 169). 
 
57 Boehmer et al. (1991, p. 268) comment their simulation results and conclude that they “are essentially 
unaffected by the presence of event-date clustering.”. 
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I use the S&P 500 equal weighted index throughout the paper to estimate normal returns. 
However, I also use the S&P 500 value weighted index to run a set of robustness tests.58  Of the 
325 events in the sample of this study, 30 issues are announced on the same day as other issues. 
Assuming these concurring announcements to occur randomly, this may reduce the number of 
independent observations. I therefore assess potential inference from event date clustering 
despite the assumed robustness of the used test statistics of Boehmer et al. (1991) and Kolari and 
Pynnonen (2011). As will be shown, event date clustering does not materially affect the results 
and leaves the conclusions unchanged.  
Potentially confounding events are examined in a next step. Additionally, other potential 
explanations for the difference in abnormal returns such as differences in the maturity, borrower 
default risk, borrower size, and purpose of the borrowing etc. are studied. These results are 
presented in Section 5. 
 
3.3 Summary Statistics 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics and univariate t-tests together with Wilcoxon’s 
ranksum tests of differences for those variables used.  
Panel A compares bond characteristics: Maturity and issue amount are skewed to the right 
and on average, PPBs have a maturity shorter by 0.65 years and an issue amount which exceeds 
that of PUBs by almost USD 600 Mio. The difference in maturity between PUBs and PPBs is, 
however, not statistically different from zero. The data suggests that issuers of PPBs use top tier 
banks more than those of PUBs to place their securities, i.e. in 54% compared to 37% of all issues. 
As suggested by theory and prior studies, on average, there are more restrictions on managerial 
                                                     
58 For the largest fraction of the sample, i.e. approximately 34% (31%) of all privately placed bonds 
(publicly placed bonds), the issuers’ main listing is either on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), 
NASDAQ, the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSE) or with PinkSheets LLC (see Table 3). Also,the S&P500 is 
highly correlated with its European counterpart, the MSCI Europe, for which the correlation coefficient with 
the S&P500 equal weighted is 0.7 over the entire observation period. It therefore appears accurate to take 
the S&P500 equal and value weighted indices as the market benchmark. However, the MSCI Europe index 
is used as an additional robustness test. The results do not change materially and shall be reported in the 
footnotes of the following analyses. 
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discretion for firms issuing PPBs as expressed by the number of covenants attached to a bond. On 
average, PPBs have 8.5 covenants attached, whereas PUBs are issued with an average of 7.0 
covenants attached per bond. A detailed overview of the observed frequencies of the 18 
covenants measured in PPBs and PUBs is given in internet appendix I but not published for 
brevity. Also, PPBs have 24% more financing covenants attached than PUBs (41% versus 18%). All 
differences, with the exception of maturity, are statistically significant at the 1% or the 5% level. 
Turning to firm characteristics, as shown in Panel B, firms issuing PPBs are comparable in 
age to those issuing PUBs. Measured by their revenues in million Euros (€) (their size of the 
balance sheet as measured by total assets in million €), firms issuing PPBs are, on average, 41.5% 
(45%) smaller than firms issuing PUBs. Firms issuing PPBs (PUBs) do not differ significantly in 
profitability with mean values of 13% (15%). Their leverage is, however, slightly higher by 3% and 
amounts to 29% (26%) respectively. Their mean rating score is lower by approximately one notch 
on average. Firms issuing PPB have a rating score of 9.659 and a lower rating equal to between 
BBB and BBB-, on average. This compares to a score of 8.6 or a rating equal to between BBB and 
BBB+, on average, for firms issuing PUB. Their equity value is smaller as measured by book value 
(market cap) and amounts to an average of € 7.3 billion (€ 11.7 billion). This compares to firms 
issuing PUBs with an average equity book value (market cap) of € 21.8 billion (€ 27.28 billion). To 
gauge a firm’s growth opportunities as in Nash et al. (2003) and Barclay et al. (1995), I also 
compare the market to book ratio.60 By this measure, firms issuing PPBs with a ratio of 2.35 
appear to have more growth options than those issuing PUBs with a ratio of 1.99. However, the 
difference of 0.37 in market to book is statistically not significant (t = 1.19, z = 1.15).  
Table 2 provides information on bond issues by firm domicile. Panel A contains 
information on the whole sample, including firms issuing PUBs and PPBs. Panels B and C show the 
                                                     
59 Note that the best score is 1 and the worst is 18, hence higher scores equate to lower ratings.  
 
60 More precisely,  I use this ratio as calculated in Nash et al. (2003, p. 209) and equal to the book 









frequency and domicile of firms issuing PUBs and PPBs respectively. The sample is skewed 
towards firms domiciled in the United Kingdom, who issue approximately one third of all bonds 
in the sample, followed by firms domiciled in France, Ireland, Norway and Luxembourg, which all 
together account for another 40% of all bonds issued or together with the United Kingdom for 
approximately 74%. When differentiating between firms issuing PUBs (Panel B) as opposed to 
that of firms issuing PPBs (Panel C), it appears that firms domiciled in the United Kingdom use the 
private placement channel more often than others.61 These firms represent approximately 39% 
of all PPBs issued. Together with firms domiciled in France and Luxembourg, the firms domiciled 
in these three countries account for approximately 70% of all PPB issues.  
Table 3, Panel A, provides an overview of the issuer’s main stock exchange listings. Issuers 
in the sample are listed on European stock exchanges for about two thirds and on US stock 
exchanges for about one third. 22.7% of issuers are listed on the London Stock Exchange (LSE), 
followed by the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) with 19.7% and Euronext Paris (ENXTPA) with 
17.2% of all issuers in the sample. Together with the Nasdaq Stock Market (Nasdaq) with 6.5% 
and Oslo Stock Exchange (OB) with 8.3% share, these main exchanges account for approximately 
75% of all listings. As depicted in Panels B and C of Table 3, these weights do not differ importantly 
when differentiating between issuers launching PUBs as opposed to PPBs. The exception is the 
Oslo Stock Exchange (OB) which drops to a relative share of 2.9% when looking at firms issuing 
PPBs whereas the Nasdaq Stock Market together with Pink OTC Markets Inc.62 appear to pick up 
the delta.  
Table 4 presents frequency information with regards to the offering year and industry 
affiliation of the issuer firm. Companies are classified according to their principal business activity 
and according to the Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS) as used by S & P. Of the 325 
                                                     
61 The UK is leading across Europe in terms of sourcing deal volume for direct lenders (Deloitte, 2019). 
London’s leading position as a financial centre (see London Stock Exchange, 2019, for a comparison of 
global financial centres) may explain this leading position.  
62 According to their company information, Pink OTC Markets Inc. provides the leading inter-dealer 
electronic quotation and trading system in the over-the-counter (OTC) securities market in the US. 
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placements in the sample, 57.9% are PUBs and 42.1% are PPBs. Turning to the frequencies per 
year, a trend in the increasing number of PPBs in the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) 
is visible. Approximately 72% (52%) of all PPBs (PUBs) have been issued after 2009. The relative 
frequency of bond issues per sector relative to the total number of issues over the entire sample 
period in percent is indicated in the last row of Table 4. Firms from the Energy sector appear to 
issue more bonds than firms from other sectors,  leading to a sample skew towards Energy firms. 
19.7% (27.7%) of all PPB issues (PUB issues) are from firms representing this sector. Likewise, 
firms from the IT sector appear to be underrepresented in this sample, both for the issuance of 
PPBs and PUBs.  
 
 
4  Empirical Results 
 
 4.1  Announcement returns of firms issuing Private Placement Bonds (PPBs) 
versus Public Placement Bonds (PUBs) 
I start by comparing the average CAR (CAAR) for firms issuing PUBs versus PPBs. The 
abnormal performance among 325 announcements of PUBs (n = 188) and PPBs (n = 137) appears 
to differ systematically. The results are shown in Figure 1 and Table 5. Figure 1 depicts the plot of 
the CAAR from event day -10 to +30. I find a negative stock price response associated with the 
announcement of private placement bonds. Using the constant mean return model (market 
model), the CAAR for the event window -10;+30 amounts to – 5.9% (- 5.3%).63 Table 5 indicates 
that the CAAR for firms issuing PPBs increases monotonically from the shorter event windows to 
                                                     
63 Using the MSCI Europe instead of the S&P500 index returns and the market model, the CAAR for 
private placement bonds and for the event window -10;+30 amounts to -5.4%. The test statistics for this 
event window and for Boehmer et al. (1991) and Kolari and Pynnonen (2011) are comparable to those using 
the S&P500 and amount to -4.18 and -3.94. Also, for the issuance of PUBs, no significant CAAR is observed. 
The results using the MSCI Europe index are summarized in Appendix D. 
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the -10;+30 window and remains at a relatively high level thereafter. The test statistics for the 
event window -10;30 of Boehmer et al. (1991) and Kolari and Pynnonen (2011) using the constant 
mean return model show highly significant results for firms issuing PPBs with t = - 4.09 and - 3.85. 
Using the market model and these test statistics, the CAAR remains highly significant with t = -
3.74 and –3.52. Contrary to this and in line with prior research, the announcement of a public 
bond results in a CAAR for the event window -10;+30 statistically not different from zero and 
between -0.19% using the constant mean return model and 0.82% using the market model.  Also, 
the CAAR for firms issuing PPBs is statistically different from those issuing PUBs in a two-tailed t-
test (t = - 3.41) and in a Wilcoxon ranksum test (t = - 3.31). 
The negative CAAR for firms issuing PPBs and for a shorter event window of -10;+1 appears 
to be in line with the finding of James (1987) and is statistically significant at the 5% level using 
the constant mean return model and between the 5% and 10% level using the market model.64 
However, it emerges from Table 5 that the event window should be extended beyond a one or 
two day period following the announcement. The CAAR for PPBs become larger and statistically 
more significant when longer event windows are considered. This can be explained by the delayed 
availability of full indenture information to the market, as mentioned above. As shown in Figure 
1, the CAAR appears to consistently turn negative after approximately 7 days. This appears to 
reflect the fact that full indenture information is, on average, only available after 6.3 days 
following the announcement date.65 As can be taken from Table 5, Panel A, the level of 
                                                     
64 James (1987) found negative announcement effects in the amount of – 0.91% for private debt 
securities placed with insurance companies. He used the market model to obtain estimates of abnormal 
stock returns around the announcement of financing events and for an event window of -1;0. Using the 
same event window and the markt model, I receive a CAAR of – 1.3%, comparable to James (1987), this 
result however statistically not being different from zero.  
 
65 Abnormal returns (for firms issuing PPBs and controlling for the 49 issues for which conclusive full 
indenture release data is available) increase monotonically from an average -1.3% at the event day (n=9) 
to -4.69% for event days 1 and 2 (n=2) to -4.8% for event days 3 and 4 (n=3) to -5.5% for event days 5 and 
6 (n=10) to -6.92% for event days 7 and 8 (n=14) and decrease thereafter to -3.1% for event days 9 and 10 
(n=3), thereafter approaching zero for event days 11 and beyond (n=8).Conclusive information regarding 
the full market release of indenture information is only available for 35.8 
% or 49 out of 137 PPBs. Given the long sample period and the various legislations in which PPBs were 
issued, it appears to be challenging to collect additional information regarding the release date of full 
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significance of the CAAR using Boehmer et al. (1991), for example, jumps from the 5% to the 1% 
level only once longer event windows between -10;+15 and -10;+30 days following the 
announcement are considered. Also, as expressed by the t-test and using the market model, the 
difference between the CAAR of PPBs and PUBs becomes consistently statistically significant only 
for event window -10:+10 and for longer event windows. Analyzing abnormal returns prior to the 
event day for the event window -10;0 as given in Table 5, Panel A, one may conclude from the 
test statistics that abnormal returns are not different from zero for this event window. Using the 
market model, all test statistics with the exception of the generalized sign test of Cowan (1992) 
do not reach the critical values. The generalized sign test of Cowan (1992), however, indicates 
that the ratio of positive abnormal returns over the event window deviates systematically from 
that same ratio over the estimation window (t = - 2.21). The concern that the market may have 
acquired information about a security offering prior to the actual event date, which might be the 
case with private placements, can therefore not be rejected completely. No statistically significant 
CAAR is found for firms issuing PUBs. 
If stock price effects are solely driven by the type of security sold to investors (Mikkelson 
and Partch, 1986), then abnormal returns should be observed immediately upon the 
announcement of a private placement and cease to be observed after a short event window. As 
can be seen in Figures 1 through 3, this is not the case with the stock price performance of issuers 
of PPBs compared to that of issuers of PUBs. The CAAR for firms issuing PPBs increases 
monotonically from the shorter event windows to the -10;+30 window. Compared to other event 
studies, a relatively slow speed of stock price adjustment to the PPB announcement is observed. 
As proposed by Fama (1991, p. 1602) short-horizon tests such as this event study represent the 
“cleanest evidence we have on efficiency”. Low market efficiency could be one potential 
explanation for such a slow reaction of post-event returns. However, as shown in Tables 1 and 3, 
the PPB announcements are made of relatively large firms listed on important stock exchanges 
                                                     
indenture information. As a consequence, rather than allocating new event dates to approximately 36% of 
the PPBs sample, it is proposed the longer event window together with the related significance tests are 
used to control for this potential imprecision in measuring the exact event date for firms issuing PPBs . 
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such as the London Stock Exchange, New York Stock Exchange, Euronext and NASDAQ, to name 
the top four. It is therefore unlikely that low market efficiency offers an explanation for the 
relatively low speed of stock price adjustment. Alternatively, stock price effects might be related 
to the characteristics of security offerings, rather than solely the type of security. If this is the case 
and under the assumption of an efficient market, then stock price adjustments may only be 
expected after the disclosure of such characteristics, hence once the full indenture information 
has been released to the market. As shown in Table 1, PPBs have significantly more covenants 
attached than PUBs, and details on these covenants are communicated within the indenture 
information. It is an empirical question as to whether the degree of the inclusion of restrictive 
covenants in bond contract design impacts abnormal returns. As will be shown in the next two 
sections, these security characteristics in fact drive abnormal returns.  
 
4.2  Covenant intensity and announcement returns 
Differences in covenant intensity and the allocation of control rights may affect a firm’s 
actions or investor rights ex post a bond issue (Aghion & Bolton, 1992). Also, covenant intensity 
is related to the cost of debt (Reisel, 2014; Bradley & Roberts, 2015) and may therefore impact 
firm value. I proceed to the analysis of stock price effects of bond issues with different levels of 
covenant intensity. As described in Table 1, covenant intensity for firms issuing PPBs is different 
from that of firms issuing PUBs. On average, firms issuing PPBs are more restricted than those 
issuing PUBs. This difference leads to the empirical question whether covenant intensity impacts 
abnormal returns. Devos et al. (2017, p.2), for example, suggest that “it is the intensity of 
covenant provisions that matters the most to adjustment speed”. According to them, higher 
intensity lowers the speed of capital structure adjustment. As in Devos et al. (2017) and many 
other studies66, I use covenant intensity (“covscore”) to describe the number of covenants 
                                                     
66 For example in Billett et al. (2007), Bradley and Roberts (2015), Hollander and Verriest (2016), 
Demerjian (2017) or Prilmeier (2017). 
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attached to a bond and gauge the cost of contracting.67  The score is the sum of eighteen single 
covenants68 available on Bloomberg and takes a minimum value of 0 and a maximum value of 18. 
A detailed description of these 18 covenants is in Appendix A. A bond issue is defined to have a 
high number of covenants attached if it is equal to or exceeds the number of 8, which corresponds 
to the sample median of 8 and the rounded up sample mean of 7.7 covenants attached to a bond. 
50% of firms (94 out of 188) issuing PUBs and a higher 61.3% of firms (84 out of 137) issuing PPBs 
have high covenant intensity. The results are given in Figure 2 and Table 6. Figure 2 depicts the 
plot of the CAAR from event day -10 to +30. The negative stock price response associated with 
the announcement of PPBs is stronger for firms issuing bonds with high covenant intensity. As 
shown in Table 6, using the constant mean return model (market model), the CAAR for firms 
issuing PPBs is – 6.6% (– 5.4%).69  As in Section 4.1, announcement returns for firms issuing PPBs 
                                                     
67 In these studies covenant intensity is used in a comparable way and essentially counts covenants 
attached to a debt contract. Other studies that also include a measure of covenant intensity through 
covenant counts or indexing include Demiroglu and James (2010) or Christensen and Nikolaev (2012). 
Alternatively to covenant intensity, the probability of covenant violation is often considered a proxy for 
borrower riskiness or the degree of agency conflicts (Demerjian & Owens, 2016). However, measuring the 
probability of covenant violation includes the measurement of covenant tightness, a concept which exceeds 
the scope of this study and which is more difficult to measure given the lack of standardization (see 
Demerjian & Owens, 2016, for a detailed discussion of measurement error challenges in trying to caputre 
covenant tightness). Additionally, lenders often make adjustments to accounting numbers when defining 
covenants (Leftwich, 1983) and the numbers reported in Compustat may differ from those defined in a 
covenant. This implies that tightness is likely to be measured with error. Demerjian (2017) finds no significant 
differences when conducting robustness tests by exchangeing covenant intensity with a measure of 
covenant slack or tightness. 
 
68 A single covenant is coded 1 if it has an entry in the Bloomberg database and 0 if Bloomberg confirms 
that no covenants are attached to a bond or if Bloomberg entries are missing. I do thus not exclude from my 
sample bond issues with missing Bloomberg entries but put the number to 0 in order to keep the sample 
size sufficiently high. Randomly selected issue documents are controlled for the correctness of covenant 
information, however, and the information is found to be correct. Also, a potential concern over this 
procedure is addressed in the robustness test section at the end oft he paper and the findings of the paper 
do not change in a material way if bond issues with no covenant information are exclueded instead of setting 
the number to zero.  
 
69 Using the MSCI Europe instead of the S&P500 index returns and the market model, the CAAR for 
private placement bonds and for the event window -10;+30 amounts to -5.0%. The test statistics for this 
event window and for Boehmer et al. (1991) and Kolari and Pynnonen (2011) are comparable to those using 
the S&P500 and amount to -3.23 and -3.13. Also, for the issuance of PUBs, no significant CAAR is observed. 
The results using the MSCI Europe index are summarized in Appendix E. 
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are highly statistically significant. The test statistics for the event window -10;30 of Boehmer et 
al. (1991) and Kolari and Pynnonen (2011) are t = - 3.84 / - 3.71  for the constant mean return 
model and t = – 3.11 / - 3.01 for the market model. As before, the CAAR is statistically not different 
from zero for firms issuing PUBs.  Also, the CAAR for firms issuing PPBs is statistically different 
from those issuing PUBs in a two-tailed t-test (t = - 2.58) and in a Wilcoxon ranksum test (t = - 
2.62). Compared to Section 4.1 and using the market model (the constant mean return model), 
the negative CAAR for firms issuing PPBs increases only by a relatively small 0.08% (0.69%) from 
– 5.33% (-5.94%) to – 5.41% (- 6.63%) when covenant intensity is high. Additionally considering 
the normal return calculations using the MSCI Europe and the market model (see footnotes 37 
and 42), the abnormal return becomes less negative and goes from -5.40% to -5.03%. The data 
thus suggests the evidence for higher abnormal returns with high covenant intensity appears to 
be spurious. If abnormal returns are not primarily driven by high covenant intensity, then 
financing covenants might affect the CAAR. This is assessed in the next paragraph. 
  
4.3  Financing covenants and announcement returns 
Financing covenants are observed in 41% of all PPB issues but only in 18% of PUB issues 
(see Table 1). As shown by Böni et al. (2019), financing covenants are generally attached to bonds 
with high covenant intensity and it is very rare that such covenants are found in bonds with low 
covenant intensity. For the used sample, the average covenant intensity for PPBs with financing 
covenants attached amounts to 12.5 (n = 57). PPBs without financing covenants attached have a 
covenant intensity of 5.75 (n = 80), on average. Distinguished by PPBs with (without) financing 
covenants attached, the difference in covenant intensity amounts to 6.7 covenants and this 
difference is highly statistically significant in a student t-test (t = 12.27). This difference in the 
frequency of financing covenants might be an indicator of financing frictions that cause a wealth 
transfer from equity holders to bondholders. As Smith and Warner (1979) find in their analysis on 
this type of  covenants (p. 137): “If, as the firm’s opportunity set evolves over time, new 
investments must be financed by new equity issues or by reduced dividends, then with risky debt 
112 





outstanding part of the gains from the investment goes to bondholders, rather than stockholders. 
Those investments increase the coverage of debt, and reduce the default risk borne by the 
bondholders. […] They result in an increase in the value of outstanding bonds at the expense of 
the stockholders.”  
To assess the wealth transfer hypothesis, I sort on bond issues with financing covenants 
attached to a bond.70 A financing covenant indicates a negative or restrictive covenant that places 
limitations on the amount of debt that the issuer can incur. A dummy variable taking the value of 
one, zero otherwise, is used to measure whether a financing covenant is attached to a bond issue. 
The results are given in Figure 3 and Table 7. Figure 3 plots the cumulative abnormal return for 
placement announcements from event day -10 to event day +30 for public and private placement 
bonds. The abnormal return is again calculated using the market model (constant mean return 
model). The announcement returns decrease remarkably to  –6.8% (– 8.4%).71 The CAAR of firms 
issuing PUBs is statistically not different from zero. The CAAR of firms issuing PPBs and using the 
parametric test of Boehmer et al. (1991) and the nonparametric test of Kolari and Pynnonen 
(2011) is highly significant at the 1% level using the constant mean return model and the market 
model. Using the market model (constant mean return model), the CAAR for the event window -
10;+30 for firms issuing PPBs with a financing covenant attached and compared to Section 4.1 
(Table 5) is higher by a significant 1.44% (2.44%).  As in the previous analysis’, the difference 
between the CAAR of PPBs and PUBs becomes consistently statistically significant only for longer 
event windows. However, using the market model, the 5% significance level is already reached 
for event window -10;+1. These results appear to confirm Smith and Warner’s (1979) claim of a 
                                                     
70 The analysis is based on a limit of indebtedness covenant that limits the issuer. In all but 1 case where 
the issuer is restricted, limitations on the amount of debt that an issuer’s subsidiary can incur is also limited 
and this possibility is thus also captured.  
71 Using the MSCI Europe instead of the S&P500 index returns and the market model, the CAAR for 
private placement bonds and for the event window -10;+30 amounts to -6.07%. The test statistics for this 
event window and for Boehmer et al. (1991) and Kolari and Pynnonen (2011) are comparable to those using 
the S&P500 and both significant at the 1% level. Also, for the issuance of PUBs, no significant CAAR is 
observed. The results using the MSCI Europe index are summarized in the Appendix. 
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wealth transfer taking place when financing covenants are used. There appears to be a strong ex 
ante link between firm value and the use of limit of indebtedness covenants.   
Overall, it appears that restrictive covenants and specifically financing covenants affect 
the firm value of firms issuing PPBs. For issuers of PUBs, no significant abnormal returns that are 
related to the use of covenants are observed. A potential explanation for this difference is a 
difference in covenant tightness between PPBs and PUBs. Measuring covenant tightness, 
however, exceeds the scope of this study and is more difficult to measure given the lack of 
standardization (see Demerjian & Owens, 2016, for a detailed discussion of measurement error 
challenges in trying to caputre covenant tightness). However, the data suggests that previous 
literature which finds that bond covenants, unlike loan covenants, might be written loosely and 
therefore be less effective in mitigating agency problems (Beneish & Press, 1995; Chen & Wei, 
1993; Nini et al., 2009) is possibly not applicable to PPBs. It appears that investors and bond 
issuers put large effort into financial contracting in terms of mitigating agency problems.  
 
4.4  The U-shaped relationship between covenant intensity and stock price 
response 
Smith & Warner (1979, p. 121) propose “there is a unique optimal set of financial contracts 
which maximizes the value of the firm”. One may therefore assume that the effect of covenant 
intensity on CAAR is not described by a linear relationship. To test this, I calculate the prediction 
for the CAAR from a linear regression of the CAAR on covenant intensity (“covscore”) and 
covenant intensity squared (“covscore2”) and plot the resulting curve. The model specification is 
described in equation (3):  
 
𝐶𝐴𝑅[−10;+30]𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽1𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒2𝑖𝑡 + ∈𝑖𝑡 
(3) 
CAR[-10;+30]i,t is the cumulative abnormal return, i is bond issuer, t is the announcement 
date, β1  is the coefficient of the linear and β 2  the coefficient of the quadratic covscore variable, 
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whereas ϵ i t  is the error term. The fitted values for PUBs and PPBs are shown in Figure 4. A concave 
pattern with an optimum level of between 6 and 7 covenants attached to a PPB is observed. Lind 
and Mehlum (2010) propose that significant β’s resulting from the regression of a dependent 
variable on the independent variable and its square are not sufficient to establish a quadratic 
relationship. To provide additional evidence to this inverted U-shape, I follow two additional steps 
as recommended by Lind and Mehlum (2010) and add the results to Figure 4. First, I test for the 
overall presence of an inverted U-shape. Then I assess the significance of the steepness of the 
slopes at both ends of the data range. The segment of the inverted U-shape before the maximum 
(tipping point) should be positive and significant, with the segment beyond that point being 
negative and significant. For firms issuing PPBs, the overall test for the inverted U-shape as well 
as the lower and upper bound slopes are statistically significant. The lower bound slope for 
covscore is 0.02 and the upper bound slope is - 0.03. Next, I calculate the maximum and assess 
whether it falls within the data range. For covscore, the maximum is 6.47, with a 90% interval 
(calculated using Fieller’s theorem) between 3.1 and 8.1, which is well in the covenant score range 
between 0 and 15. The CAAR goes from positive to negative at approximately 6.5 covenants 
attached to a PPB. According to the Lind and Mehlum (2010) test, one can be reasonably sure 
that the data describes an inverted U-shaped curve.  
Next, I run the regression as in equation (3) and add industry and firm fixed effects. The 
result is presented in Table 8. As shown in column 1, the linear (quadratic) independent variables 
“covscore” (“covscore2”) are highly statistically significant at the 1% level. Additionally, as 
recommended by Haans et al. (2016), I perform two additional tests: First, I split the data based 
on the empirically determined turning point of 7.25 an run two linear regressions. These should 
result in slopes consistent with the predicted shape of the curve. The results are given in 
specifications 2 and 3 of Table 8. I find the data range for the high covenant intensity 
(specification 3) above the empirically determined turning point is highly significant and has  a 
higher adjusted R2. Alternatively, conceptually as in Qian et al., ( 2010), I use the mean rather than 
the empirically determined turning point to split the sample (see specifications 4 and 5 in Table 
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8). I observe a negative coefficient significant at the 1% level. For the split sample of PPBs with 
covenant intensity below the mean value (specification 4), the coefficient is statistically not 
significant. Also, using the procedure as in Qian et al. (2010) improves the model fit largely as 
measured by the increasing adjusted R2s of 30.1% for specification 5 as compared to 23.1% for 
specification 3.  The Lind and Mehlum (2010) test results are given below Table 8.  
Overall, the data provides strong support for the inverted U-shape between CAAR and 
covenant intensity.72 It is conceivable that the upward sloping part of the inverted U is related to 
mitigating agency problems between bondholders and stockholders in bond contract design as 
proposed by Smith and Warner (1979). This explanation would be consistent with Reisel (2014) 
or Bradley and Roberts (2015), who find that the use of covenants reduces the cost of debt. 
Moreover, the inverted U-shape is consistent also with Böni et al. (2019) who find that the cost 
of debt for PPBs is reduced by including restrictive covenants but that that the relationship 
between spread and covenant intensity follows a U shape. The latter implies that the cost of debt 
is only reduced up to a certain level of covenant intensity, after which the cost of debt is increasing 
again. The downward sloping part of the inverted U appears to be related to the costs of 
covenants on the issuing firm. This cost-benefit tradeoff is fundamental to Smith and Warner’s 
(1979) costly contracting hypothesis. A major cost is the restriction on managerial flexibility, 
which may outweigh the benefit from reduced agency conflicts. There is evidence that firms base 
their covenant choice on this tradeoff (see, for example, Begley, 1994, or Nash et al., 2003). A 
major cost of covenants is related to investment: Kahan and Yermack (1998) find that covenants 
might limit managerial discretion in the presence of investment opportunities. Anderson (1999) 
suggests that firms in high-growth, high-volatility environments do not accept covenants 
restricting dividend, investment, and financing policies because they are too costly. 
An additional explanation for the downward sloping part of the inverted U can be derived 
from trade off theory: the level of debt impacts firm value by considering taxes and bankruptcy 
                                                     
72 Additional tests of the quadratic relationship are beyond the scope of this paper. Critical issues and 
guidelines related to this topic are found in Haans et al. (2016). 
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costs (Leland, 1994). As evidenced in recent research, corporate capital structure stability is the 
exception and is temporary (Deangelo & Roll, 2015). Firms have different optimal leverage levels 
at different times, adjusting them regularly to maximize firm value. Covenants impact this 
adjustment process. Devos et al. (2017) empirically show that capital covenants significantly 
lower the speed of capital structure adjustment. They find that capital covenants delay the speed 
of adjustment by up to 86%. As in this study, Devos et al. (2017) use a covenant index and find 
that firms readjust their capital structure towards their target significantly slower when they have 
high covenant index values (more covenant restrictions). On average, they find that firms with 
the highest index values take 26 – 31 months longer or with a speed of adjustment that is 40 – 
50% lower compared to firms with no covenants.  
 
5  Other Explanations for Abnormal Returns 
 
5.1  Other Explanations for Abnormal Returns 
 In this section, other potential explanations for abnormal returns of firms issuing PPBs are 
tested. I estimate cross-sectional equations and regress the CAR, as calculated by the constant 
mean return model, on the respective variables described below, using robust standard errors. 
The regression model is given in equation (4),  
 
 
𝐶𝐴𝑅[−10;+30]𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + ∑ 𝛽1𝑗  𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝐾1
𝑗=1






+ ∑ 𝛽4𝑗𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝐾4
𝑗=1
+  ∑ 𝛽5𝑗 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑗𝑡
𝐾5
𝑗=1
   +   𝛽6𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑐𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡   +  ∈𝑖𝑡 
(4) 
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where CAR is the dependent variable, estimated over the event window -10;+30, and  i is 
bond issuer (firm), t is the announcement date. K1 to K5 are the number of independent variables 
within each group 1 through 5 (1: covenant intensity, 2: credit risk, 3: liquidity, 4: market 
conditions, 5: other controls), whereas β 1 j  through β5 j  represent the coefficients for independent 
variable j within category 1 through 5. Placement is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 when 
a placement is a private placement, zero otherwise, and represented by β 6 . Finally, ϵ i t  is the error 
term. I control for year fixed effects and industry fixed effects in all specifications. Additionally, I 
use the entire rather than the split sample and add several interaction terms. The variables are 
as defined previously are described here again for completeness and independence of the 
chapters:  
Credit risk. Smith & Warner (1979) argue that private placements are more likely to be 
issued by riskier firms than is public debt. As is shown in Table 1 and measured by the mean 
(median) leverage ratio, that of firms issuing PPBs is 29% (27%) and is by 3% (5%) higher than that 
of firms issuing PUBs, i.e. 26% (22%). Also, the rating score is worse by approximately one notch. 
It is therefore possible that differences in risk explain the differences in abnormal returns. To 
gauge for this effect, I use a score proxying for firm rating, which is a frequently used measure for 
credit risk in empirical research (see, for example, Campbell & Taksler, 2003; Collin-Dufresne et 
al., 2001; Elton et al., 2001; Longstaff et al., 2005). I use the most recent financial data preceding 
a bond issue73 and calculate a score proxying for the credit rating (“rating_score”) of the issuer 
based on credit model 2.6 (henceforth “CM”) of S&P Global Market Intelligence (Standard & 
Poors, 2016). The model output consists of a letter grade score from AAA (with a numerical value 
of 1) to CCC or lower (with a numerical value of 18) and represents a company’s standalone credit 
risk. CM is a statistical tool estimating S&P Global Ratings to assess the credit risk of corporates. 
A more detailed description of the model is given in Appendix B. Since equity prices are 
                                                     









significantly affected by short-term information, I consider this credit risk proxy to be more 
unbiased than a rating of an agency. The advantage of using this score is that it is based on recent 
financial data and measures the financial condition of a bond issuer whilst traditional ratings 
measure the creditworthiness of a corporation over long investment horizons (Alp, 2013) and 
tend to be updated slowly (Cornaggia & Cornaggia, 2013). The used proxy, however, should not 
be confused with an agency rating as issued by S&P, Moodys or Fitch. CM aims to match the S&P–
rating with a good performance, which is evaluated on an annual basis.74  As in Reisel (2014) I use 
issuer rather than bond ratings because covenants have an impact on bond ratings, but not the 
issuer rating. Since ratings measure credit risk only broadly and since there is some variance of 
credit quality even within a rating category (Helwege and Turner, 1999), I additionally account for 
structural characteristics of debt issuers following the Merton (1974) model and use book 
leverage calculated as the ratio of total long-term debt to total assets of the issuer (“leverage”) 
as second proxy for credit risk. This measure is also used by Harvey et al. (2004), who assume that 
debt mitigates managerial agency costs. As in their study and as argued by Barclay et al., (2006), 
I use book leverage to measure the ratio of debt to a firm’s assets in place.  
Market liquidity. Next, I use two measures of liquidity: (1) a decomposition of sovereign 
bond yields into a credit and a liquidity component and the resulting spread to proxy for bond 
market liquidity (“bml”) and (2) Pástor and Stambaugh’s (2003) measure to proxy for equity 
market liquidity (“eml”). For the first, I decompose bond spreads into credit and liquidity premia. 
This concept is based on a methodology used for bond pairs with equal credit risk but different 
liquidity and was applied also by Longstaff (2004), Ejsing et al. (2012), Monfort and Renne (2014) 
or Helwege et al. (2014). The idea is that credit risk is issuer-specific, whilst liquidity is bond 
specific. I identify liquidity-pricing effects by exploiting the information contained in spreads 
between bonds with the same credit risk but different liquidity. I use the 7 years maturity Refcorp-
                                                     
74 The CM performance is measured in percent of exact rating matches, +/- 1 notch, +/- 2 notches and +/- 
3 notches deviation from the S&P Global Ratings. The last available validation was done in July 2016 and 
has resulted in 22% exact matches, 56% matches within 1 notch, 78% within 2 notches and 88% within 3 
notches.   
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bonds to proxy for market liquidity in USD and use data from Bloomberg. Refcorp (Resolution 
Funding Corporation) is a government agency, fully collateralized by Treasury bonds and full 
payment of coupons is guaranteed by the Treasury. The spread between the yield to maturity on 
bonds issued by Refcorp, a US government agency, and the more liquid US government 
benchmark rate is used. Following Longstaff (2004), I subtract the yields on Refcorp bonds from 
the riskless maturity matched USD rate on the issue date. While the objectives and the core 
businesses of Refcorp are different, both of them have explicit and full debt guarantees from their 
sponsoring state. Thus the bonds issued could default only if the corresponding state itself 
defaults, which means that the credit risk of Refcorp equals the credit risk of the US. To capture 
the market liquidity preceding a bond issue, I calculate a 90-day moving average of the spread 
between the 7 year Refcorp-bond to the respective government bond benchmark for each issue 
date and create a variable to gauge for bond market liquidity (“bml”).  
As evidenced by Huang et al. (2015), a drop in stock liquidity also increases a firm’s credit 
risk by increasing the default boundary. Additionally, Brogaard et al. (2017) evidence a 
relationship between stock liquidity and firm bankruptcy. Abnormal returns could therefore be 
affected by equity market liquidity (“eml”). I therefore include the monthly aggregate liquidity 
measure of Pástor & Stambaugh (2003) to account for stock market liquidity, reported in the 
Wharton research data services (wrds) platform.75 This aggregate liquidity measure provides a 
monthly cross-sectional average of individual stock liquidity measures and indicates volume-
related return reversals arising from liquidity effects.76 The aggregate average market liquidity of 
the month prior to the bond issue is matched with each issue date.  
Market conditions other than liquidity might affect firm values. Managers are able to time 
the markets and issue equity when the stock of the firm is high or overvalued (Baker & Wurgler, 
                                                     
75 https://wrds-web.wharton.upenn.edu/wrds/ 
 
76 The basic idea of Pástor & Stambaugh (2003) is that (p. 647) „orderflow, constructed […] simply as 
volume signed by the contemporanous return on the stock in excess of the market, should be accompanied 
by a return that one expects to be partially reversed in the future if the stock is not perfectly liquid. The 
greater the exprected reversal for a given dollar volume, the lower the liquidity.  
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2002). Hale and Santos (2008) show, for example, that firms time their bond issues to avoid 
recessionary periods and take advantage of favorable market conditions. It is conceivable that 
managers time the markets also when issuing PPBs and that this affects abnormal returns. To 
capture ups and downs in the economy I follow Alp (2013) and use real GDP growth rates77 for a 
period of 360 (“gdp_360”) calendar days prior to the bond issue.78 Furthermore, as in Chen et al. 
(2007) or Campbell and Taksler (2003) I include the risk-free rate of the benchmark bond 
(“benchmark”) and the difference between the 10-year and 2-year Treasury rates to account for 
the level and the slope of the yield curve (“slope”). Like Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001), I interpret 
“slope” as an indicator of the overall state of the economy. Merton (1974) predicts that equity 
volatility impacts the likelihood of reaching boundary conditions for default. To capture changes 
in aggregate equity market volatility, as for example in Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001), I use the 
CBOE VIX-index (“vix”) values. They correspond to a weighted average of eight implied volatilities 
of near-the-money options on the OEX (S&P 100–Index). Additionally, as in Acharya et al. (2007), 
I measure if an industry is distressed by the return of the index representing the issuer’s industry. 
Following Cremers et al. (2008), I calculate the index return over the past 180 days prior to a bond 
issue. I use the MSCI Europe Index family and its industry specific derivatives to calculate this 180 
day return prior to the announcement of a bond issue (“mscii_180”). As proposed in Longstaff 
and Schwartz (1995), Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001) or Campbell and Taskler (2003), index returns 
are interpreted as the overall state of the economy.  
Other controls. As Table 1 indicates, firms issuing PPBs are smaller than firms issuing PUBs. 
Announcing the issue of a PPB might convey information about the inability of a small firm to 
launch a public bond (PUB), eventually explaining the negative abnormal returns. To determine, 
                                                     
77 I use European GDP data from Eurostat (http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/national-
accounts/data/main-tables adjuested for inflation given by the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices 
(HICP) oft he Euro area compiled by Eurostat and the national statistical institutes. Details can be retreived 
from http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/hicp/data/database . 
 
78 A variable capturing 180 days was also tested but found to be statistically insignificant.  
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whether differences in firm size can explain differences in abnormal returns, I control for firm size 
measured by the logarithm of total assets (“logsize_a”). Maturity: According to Carey et al. (1993) 
investors in private debt have strong credit monitoring units and exercise control through 
covenants. Covenants are used to encourage monitoring but are, however, not perfect 
contractual mechanisms for ensuring monitoring and control (Rajan & Winton, 1995). It is 
conceivable that firms with larger information asymmetries issue more short-term debt (Barclay 
& Smith, 1995) to mitigate agency costs and that the maturity of debt impacts abnormal returns. 
A firm may attempt to mitigate agency costs through its choice of maturity of its bonds. This 
reduces the underinvestment problem and the asset substitution problem.79 Top-tier Arranger: 
Moreover, since firms that issue PPBs use top tier banks more than firms issuing PUBs (in 54% 
versus 37% of all events), I investigate whether  the involvement of a top tier arranger (“top_tier”) 
impacts abnormal returns. McCahery and Schwienbacher (2010) find that the reputation of top 
tier arrangers leads to higher spreads in the private debt market, as opposed to public debt issues. 
It is conceivable that the arranger quality conveys information to the market and that higher costs 
of debt lead to negative abnormal returns. I make a distinction between top tier arrangers and 
other arrangers and define a bank as a top tier arranger in a particular year if it was one of the 
three biggest players in the calendar year prior to the issue analyzed. Data are from Bloomberg 
and the market share of all the market participants in the European bond market for each year 
based on their total annual placement volumes is calculated. The variable takes the value of one, 
zero otherwise, if at least one of the arrangers of a bond is on the list of the three biggest 
arrangers in the year before the considered bond issue.80 Firm age. Next, as in James and Wier 
                                                     
79 According to Nash et al. (2003), the underinvestment problem is lessened by shorter maturities 
because the longer maturity of a bond provides a greater period for profitable investments and rejected by 
managers acting in shareholders‘ interest. The asset substitution problem is reduced because increasing 
the variance of asset values is worth less with a shorter term option on these assets.  
 
80 This way of identifying top tier banks is the same as that of Megginson and Weiss (1991) and Asker and 
Ljungqvist (2005). Contrary to them, Fang (2005) applies only one single league table consisting of all deals 
of the complete time period considered, resulting in a constant list of top tier banks. Given the observed 
annual ranking changes and the mergers and acquisitions among banks, I apply an annual table. Megginson 
and Weiss (1991) measure reputation with market shares and do not transform the league tables into a 
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(1990), Helwege and Liang (1996), Krishnaswami et al. (1999) or Maskara and Mullineaux (2011), 
I include the firm’s age, defined as the number of years since inception, to proxy for the degree 
of ex ante information asymmetry. The intuition is that younger firms have limited financial 
histories and a greater degree of information asymmetry. Following Diamond (1991), age proxies 
for the quality of the credit record of a firm and is a predictor of future actions of a borrower. The 
logarithm of firm age is used (“log_age”).  144a-Registration. Prior studies make a distinction 
between 144A registered bonds (Fenn, 2000; Chaplinsky & Ramchand, 2004; Arena, 2011) and 
non-144A registered bonds (Kwan & Carleton, 2010; Arena, 2011). The 144A debt market can be 
used to issue sub-investment grade debt that can be subsequently registered (Fenn, 2000) and 
firms issuing 144A debt are found to be different from those using non-144A, traditional private 
debt (Arena, 2011). I control for a difference in abnormal returns by introducing a dummy variable 
(“a144”) taking the value of 1 if a bond was issued under 144A registration rules, zero otherwise. 
Loan purpose. James (1987) finds a significant decrease in share price for privately placed debt 
used to refinance bank loans. To test for this possibility, the use of proceeds of all bond 
placements is downloaded from Bloomberg and S&P and analyzed. A dummy variable taking the 
value of 1 is used to identify those PPBs that use the proceeds from the bond placement to 
refinance other debt, zero otherwise (“ref”). Of the 137 firms issuing PPBs, 56 or approximately 
41% fall into this category. Growth options: Nash et al. (2003) find that firms with high growth 
opportunities are less likely to include financing covenants in their bond contracts. I gauge an 
issuer’s growth options following Nash et al. (2003) and Barclay and Smith (1995) and use the 
ratio of the market value to the book value of the firm (“mtb”).81 Finally, I include a dummy 
variable equal to 1, if a bond issue has a call option (“call”) attached, zero otherwise.  
                                                     
dummy variable. The advantage of having a continuous variable, which does not impose an arbitrary cutoff 
level, has the drawback that it does not allow to adapt the variable for possible self-selection bias, which 
requires a binary variable.   
 
81 More precisely I use this ratio as calculated in Nash et al. (2003, p. 209) and equal to the book value 
of assets minus the book value of equity plus the market value of equity divided by the book value of assets.  
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Starting with the baseline regression in specification 1, the regression model is extended 
by analyzing how proxies for credit risk (specification 2), market liquidity (specification 3), market 
conditions (specification 4) and other controls (specification 5) impact the CAAR of firms issuing 
PPBs or PUBs. Specification 6 shows the full empirical model as in equation (4). Specification 7 
imposes a restriction on covenant intensity and assumes its impact on public placements is equal 
to zero. Finally, specification 8 uses factor analysis and tests whether a monitoring and a financing 
factor impact the CAAR for firms issuing PPBs or PUBs.  
The results are presented in Table 9. The placement variable is negative and highly 
statistically significant at the 1% level across all eight specifications with the exception of 
specification 5, in which the placement variable is significant at the 5% level. Moreover, whilst 
the use of covenants appears not to affect the CAR of firms issuing PUBs, it does affect the CAR 
of firms issuing PPBs. The linear interaction variable (“covscoreXplacement”) is highly significant 
at the 1 % level in specifications 1 through 4, significant at the 5% level in specification 7 and 
marginally significant at the 10% level in specifications 5 and 6. The quadratic interaction variable 
(“covscore2Xplacement”) is significant at the 5% level in specifications 1, 4 and 7, marginally 
significant in specifications 2 and 3 and not significant in specifications 5 and 6. The limit of 
indebtedness factor (“f2_loi”) in specification 8, however, is not significant. No statistically 
significant relation between the CAAR and credit risk, as proxied by rating_score and leverage 
(specification 2) or liquidity, as proxied by bond- and equity market liquidity (specification 3). is 
found. Bond market liquidity becomes marginally significant in specification 6, however, 
indicating that this market condition might also affect the CAR.  
Specification 5 shows the impact of market conditions on the CAAR. No statistically 
significant relationship between the CAAR and the risk-free (“benchmark”) rate or the slope of 
the yield curve (“slope”) is indicated. Equity market volatility (“vix”) is statistically significant at 
the 5% level and positive, the state of the issuer industry (“mscii180”) is only marginally 
statistically significant at the 10% level and negative. All else equal, a one standard deviation 
change in equity market volatility (s = 8.3) reduces the CAAR by an economically important 5.0%, 
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whilst a +/- 5% return on the index creates a -/+ 0.7% change in the CAAR. It appears somehow 
counter-intuitive that higher aggregate equity market volatility should decrease negative 
abnormal returns, since it increases the likelihood of reaching boundary conditions for default 
(Merton, 1974). However, it is conceivable that idiosyncratic, rather than aggregate, equity 
market volatility impacts abnormal returns differently. A research topic left for further research. 
Of the other controls (specification 5), the variables that affect abnormal returns are the 
option of a firm to retire bonds prior to their maturity (“call”) and the 144A-registration (“a144”). 
The significance and economic importance of the right to retire a bond prior to its maturity 
supports the assumption made in Section 4.4 that high covenant intensity may reduce managerial 
flexibility, exacerbate investment or reduce the speed of capital structure adjustment. A call 
option can, for example, eliminate underinvestment problems in that it grants the shareholders 
the right to retire debt when it encounters positive NPV projects. By execution of the call and 
subsequent investments for which the firm may issue new debt, the value of new investments 
and the related benefits of the incremental project are acquired by the shareholders (Nash et al., 
2003). This argumentation is in line with Smith & Warner (1979), who find that restricting future 
debt issues creates a wealth transfer from stockholders to bondholders: financing new 
investments by new equity issues or by reduced dividends, with risky debt outstanding part of the 
gains from the investment goes to bondholders, rather than stockholders. Such investments 
increase the coverage of debt, and reduce the default risk borne by the bondholders. The 
mentioned distinction between 144A registered bonds and non-144A registered bonds as 
measured by the respective dummy variable is only marginally significant at the 10% level and 
positive. This may indicate that firms issuing 144A debt are in effect different from those using 
non-144A, traditional private debt (Arena, 2011). A firm issuing 144A-registered bonds appears 
to show less negative abnormal returns by 4.7%.  
Turning to specificaton 8 in Table 9, the linear and the squared (X2) covenant intensity 
variables are replaced by two factors and interacted with the placement variable. A monitoring 
factor (“f1_mc”) and a financing factor (“f2_loi”) are used. I refer to Böni et al. (2019) and use the 
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factor analysis methodology described in their paper to create and analyze the dimensions in the 
use of covenants.82 The first factor (monitoring covenants) interacted with placement is 
statistically significant at the 5% level and positive, suggesting that monitoring per se does reduce 
agency costs and abnormal returns. Rather than the mere use of covenants, it appears to be 
covenant intensity that affects abnormal returns negatively. The second factor (financing) is 
negative and has the right sign. However, it is statistically not significant. One might argue that 
the factor analysis as in specification 8 contradicts the results presented earlier in this paper. 
However, as is shown in Böni et al. (2019), it is difficult to separate high covenant intensity from 
financing covenants. They find that if a financing factor (“f2_loi”) is attached to a bond, then for 
96 % of all bonds issued, on average, there is also a monitoring factor (“f1_mc”) attached to such 
bond. Contrary to this, if a monitoring factor (“f1_mc”) is attached to a bond, then, only in 47% 
of all bond issues on average is there a financing factor attached to such bond. In the sample of 
this paper, for bonds with more (less) than the median number of 8 covenants attached to a bond, 
53% (5.8%) have a financing covenant attached. Given this confirmed logical ordering, the results 
shown in specification 8 do therefore fail to support but not necessarily contradict the results 
presented earlier in this paper.  
 
6 Robustness Tests 
6.1 Potential inference from event date clustering 
Boehmer et al. (1991) claim their test is robust to cross-sectional correlation of returns 
due to event day clustering.83 Also, the nonparametric test of Kolari and Pynnonen (2011) is 
                                                     
82 Böni et al. (2019) investigate the pricing of PPBs. Using factor analysis, they find a monitoring and a 
limit of indebtedness dimension in the use of covenants. The first is negatively, the latter positively related 
to spread. It is argued that limit of indebtedness covenants exacerbate flexible firm investment and efficient 
capital structure adjustment and therefore increase spread, whilst the monitoring factor decreases spread 
given an improvement in monitoring and a reduction in agency costs..  
 
83 Boehmer et al. (1991, p. 268) comment their simulation results and conclude that they “are essentially 
unaffected by the presence of event-date clustering.”. 
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considered to be robust to event day clustering. In 30 out of 325 events, the aggregation of 
abnormal returns takes place in overlapping calendar time. 11 of these 30 events are private 
placements. Additionally to the mentioned tests, it is ruled out that the covariances across 
securities affect the presented results in material ways  by dropping events that potentially create 
event date clustering. Of the sample, 11 PPBs and 19 PUBs are issued on identical trade days. 
These observations are dropped from the sample and the results are compared to those reported 
in Section 4.1. Using the market model / the constant mean return model as in 4.1, the CAAR -
10;30 without (with) the clustering observations amounts to 5.22% (5.33%) / 5.54% (5.94%). The 
statistical significance using the Boehmer et al. (1991) test remains highly significant for both 
estimation methods and is t = - 3.77 (- 4.09) / - 3.58 (- 3.74) for the constant mean return model 
/ the market model with (without) dropping clustering events. Using the non-parametric test of 
Kolari and Pynnonen (2011), the test remains highly significant for both estimation methods and 
is t = - 3.62 (- 3.85) / - 3.46 (- 3.52) for the constant mean return model / the market model with 
(without) dropping clustering events. It can be concluded that the abnormal returns do not 
deviate in a material way from those reported earlier and neither does statistical significance of 
the CAAR. Event date clustering appears not to affect the abnormal returns in material ways.  
 
6.2 Controlling for confounding events 
The next robustness test is related to confounding events that may occur within the event 
window. The key development feed of S&P (Compustat) is used to retrieve a structured summary 
of material news and events that may affect the market value of securities.84 I control for 24 
potentially confounding events described in detail in Appendix C and for the three scenarios (all 
                                                     
 
84 This feed monitors over 100 key development types. Sources include newswires, newspapers and 
disclosure wires such as Reuters, Dow Jones, Comtex, Regulatory News Service, The Associated Press, 
Bloomberg Business News, CNN and CBS in addition to content from local providers. 
 
127 





bond issues, bond issues with high covenant intensity and isues with limit of indebtedneses 
covenants attached). The results are presented in Table 10.  
First, following Ball and Brown (1968) I consider the information content of earnings 
announcements. Second, as in Fama et al. (1969), I control for simultaneous dividend increases 
or decreases, since these are expected to impact stock prices (Dhillon & Johnson, 1994). 
Unexpected dividend increases or dividend initiations usually result in a positive stock market 
response explained by a wealth redistribution between stockholders and bondholders or the 
information content of such announcement (Dhillon & Johnson, 1994).85 Additionally, the ex-
dividend date is considered, since dividend payments directly impact the value of a stock 
(Ingersoll, 1977). Third, price effects of merger announcements (Manne, 1965; Jarrell & Paulsen, 
1989; Eckbo, 1983) and, fourth, simultaneous financing announcements such as  for example 
seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) in the event window are also controlled for (Mikkelson and 
Partch, 1986; Asquith and Mullins 1986; Masulis and Korwar, 1986; Carlson et al., 2006; Lyandres 
et al., 2008 or Johnson et al., 2018). Finally, as in Johnson et al. (2017) analyst recommendation 
changes within the event window are used to control for confounding events. Eliminating all bond 
issues with confounding events reduces the number of observations too much. I therefore follow 
Nikolaev (2017) and create a set of dummy variables to control for each event type and verify the 
robustness of the results by dropping observations subject to these confounding events.  
Table 10 contains the results of the analysis, based on the constant mean return model. 
As in Harvey et al., (2004), I verify that the results hold in magnitude and significance when 
confounding events are removed from the analysis. The cross-sectional t-test as in Brown and 
Warner (1980) is used to test the null hypothesis that the CAAR is equal to zero. Panel A shows 
the CAAR for bond issues with no restrictions, Panel B for bond issues with high covenant intensity 
                                                     
85 From an agency theory perspective and according to Jensen and Meckling (1976), the distribution of 
cash reduces empire building and avoids engagement of management in negative NPV projects. Cash 
distribution by paying dividends according to Jensen's (1986) free cash flow theory suggests that 
unexpected dividends should cause a positive reaction in stock markets. From an information signaling 
standpoint, several researchers view unexpected divident changes as a signal sent by the managers about 
a firm’s future profitability (see Kalay, 1980; Miller & Rock, 1985).  For a recent empirical study evidencing 
the positive relationship between dividend announcements and stock returns see Tsai and Wu (2015).   
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and Panel C those with financing covenants attached. As evidenced in Table 10, dropping 
confounding events does not materially affect the abnormal returns presented in prior Sections 
and leaves the conclusions unchanged. In absolute terms, the CAAR remains comparable in 
magnitude and the t-statistics significant in all cases of dropping observations, mostly at the 1% 
and 5% level, for some few observations, the significance drops to the 10% level. However, it 
appears that the estimated CAAR is robust with respect to the tested confounding events and 
that these events do not invalidate the results. 
 
6.3 Other robustness tests 
To make the study comparable to those using the S&P 500 value weighted index instead 
of the equal weighted index when calculating market model abnormal returns, it is examined 
whether the results are sensitive to estimating normal returns with this alternative benchmark. 
Using the S&P 500 value weighted (equal weighted) index results in an almost identical CAAR of - 
5.34% (- 5.33%). Also, statistical significance using the parametric test of Boehmer et al. (1991) / 
Kolari and Pynnonen (2011) remains at the 1% level with t-values of – 3.73 (- 3.74) / - 3.52 (- 3.52) 
. It appears that using the value weighted index instead of the equal weighted version does not 
affect the results of the study. 
Moreover, the study controls for effects from non-synchronous trading. As is explained in 
MacKinlay (1997, p. 35), such effects can “arise when prices are taken to be recorded at time 
intervals of one length when in fact they are recorded at time intervals of other possibly irregular 
lengths”. Since I employ daily closing prices from Bloomberg and since these closing prices 
generally do not occur at the same time each day, they are not equally spaced at 24-hour 
intervals. This nontrading effect can induce biases in the moments and co-moments of returns. I 
apply the method of Scholes and Williams ( 1977) and use their consistent estimator of beta to 
recalculate the market model based on the value weighted version of the S&P 500 index. The 
results are almost unchanged: the CAAR increases slightly to – 5.48%, remaining highly statistically 
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significant at the 1% level with t-values using Boehmer et al. (1991) / Kolari and Pynnonen (2011) 
of – 3.83 / 3.62.  
It is conceivable that pre-event window returns affect issue characteristics, such as for 
example the use of covenants. In order to control for potential endogeneity problems arising from 
this, the CAAR for firms issuing PPBs is estimated using the +1;30 event window as the dependent 
variable. The results do not change in material ways. The CAAR using the market model amounts 
to –4.27%, again highly statistically significant at the 1% level with t-values using Boehmer et al. 
(1991) / Kolari and Pynnonen (2011) of – 3.46 / 3.26. 
 
7 Are Abnormal Returns due to Uncertainty about Credit Risk? 
In the previous analyses, I implicitly assume that debt covenants and specifically those 
attached to PPBs convey information to investors. All other explanations for abnormal returns 
and the following robustness checks were based on firm characteristics and market data.  While 
this may well proxy the information available to investors at or around the event date, from a 
contracting perspective, there may be additional information that explains stock price reactions. 
I therefore employ two additional tests to check on the robustness of the results, i.e. (1) a proxy 
for reporting quality information available to investors at the event date and (2) Altman’s (1977) 
Z-score to proxy for bankruptcy risk.  
First, financial information reporting quality plays a significant role in the determination of 
bond ratings (Kraft, 2015) and covenants in debt contracts are frequently written on this 
information (Leftwich 1983; Smith and Warner 1979). Moreover, research shows that reporting 
quality affects how covenants are used (Costello & Regina, 2011;  Graham et al., 2008). Also, 
reporting quality affects investor decisions and securities pricing (Minnis, 2011). Because 
investors rely on reporting quality, it may affect abnormal returns. Consequently, I argue that a 
proxy for reporting quality that is easily understandable to investors and available at the event 
date may affect stock price reactions. Akins (2018) shows that better reporting quality is directly 
associated with less uncertainty about credit risk as captured by disagreement among the credit 
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rating agencies. As in Morgan (2002) or Akins (2018), I employ the pattern of disagreement 
between credit rating agencies (CRAs) to proxy for reporting quality.86 This disagreement is, in 
part, driven by uncertainty about credit risk (Morgan, 2002). I use the historical credit ratings of 
S&P and Moody’s and their split over the bond issuers to proxy for uncertainty about credit risk. 
The data are from Bloomberg. Of the 325 bond issuers, I can retrieve 222 ratings from S&P and 
65 from Moody’s. This first analysis entails a loss of observations for which I can calculate the 
dispersion in credit ratings. I map the ratings as assigned by the agencies to a numerical scale, a 
lower number representing a higher credit rating (1 = AAA = Aaa, 2 = AA+ = Aa1, etc.). The 
difference in the numerical value (“cr_dispersion”) is interpreted as a proxy for uncertainty about 
credit risk as in Akins (2018). The dispersion for those issuers rated by both CRAs (n=60) amounts 
to an average (median) 6.2 (7) notches, to 5.9 (7) notches for firms issuing private bonds and 6.6 
(7) for those issuing public bonds. This rating disagreement appears to be important. Testing the 
difference in mean abnormal returns in a two-tailed student-t (ranksum) test, t-(z-) values remain 
well below one for the full sample (n=60/309, t=0.26, z=0.51), for firms issuing private (n=30/128, 
t=-0.96, z=-1.00) and firms issuing public bonds (n=30/181, t=0.85, z=1.17). I also use Pearson’s 
chi-squared test to evaluate if the median difference in abnormal returns arose by chance and 
can not reject this for all firms, firms issuing private and firms issuing public bonds with 𝑋2(1) = 
0.70 (p = 0.40), 0.70 (p = 0.40) and 0.59 (p = 0.44). Next, I am interested whether “cr_dispersion” 
affects abnormal returns. I run OLS regressions in the form as in the previous Section. Controlling 
for the dispersion in credit rating between CRAs in specification (2) of Table 11 appears to impact 
the regression results: while the dispersion variable is statistically not significant, the interaction 
with placement (“cr_dispersionXplacement”) is significant at the 5% level. CRA dispersion is 
positively related to abnormal returns. An increase in dispersion (increase in uncertainty about 
                                                     
86 Analyst recommendations and the dispersion in such recommendations may also serve as a 
meaningful control. However, it was not able to retrieve reliable data on the dispersion of analyst 
recommendations for the sample period. Instead, I used the number of analysts covering a bond issuer. In 
a student t-test and in the cross-section, the mean number of analysts for firms issuing PPB (PUB) is 22.65 
(19.10) on average and lower by 3.5 for firms issuing PPBs, this difference statistically significant at the 1% 
level. Including this control into the OLS regression analysis as in Table 11, however, does not reveal any 
significant results, these results therefore remain untabulated for brevity. 
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credit risk) explains parts of the negative abnormal returns and renders it less negative by an 
important 2.5% per notch of rating dispersion and the adjusted R2 for the smaller sample, as 
compared to the baseline in specification (1), increases to 21.3%. However, dispersion does not 
entirely explain abnormal returns, as the placement variable remains significant, and is now larger 
in magnitude when compared to specification (1). Also, covenant intensity (squared), interacted 
with placement, remains statistically significant. However, the data suggests that CRA dispersion, 
or uncertainty about credit risk, does partially explain abnormal returns. However, the effect from 
the use of covenants for a private bond with, for example, ten covenants attached is still 
significantly larger than the effect from CRA dispersion. Estimating the abnormal return from 
specification (2) and an average CRA dispersion of 6.2 notches, this dispersion affects the 
abnormal return by approximately +15% (2.5% X 6.2). The effect given ten covenants attached to 
a private bond is – 133% (12.4% - 1.45%X100). This effect is very large and it is likely the result is 
spurious as additional control variables have been excluded from specification (2) to avoid model 
overspecification.87 Controlling for CRA dispersion, it appears to explain parts of the abnormal 
return. A larger sample would be needed, however, to confirm this finding. 
Next, Altman’s Z-score (“zscore”) index (Altman, 1977) is used as a  proxy for an issuer’s 
bankruptcy risk. 88 It is computed as in Denis and Mihov (2003).89 I include the score in 
specification (3) of Table 11.  Z-score used as an ordinal variable is insignificant. 
In an additional analysis I create an indicator variable equal to one when Altman’s Z-score 
is smaller than the median score of 2.75, that is when the firm is at risk of bankruptcy 
(“zscore_low”). The result is shown in specification (4). The adjusted R2 of 18.8% is higher than 
that of the baseline regression in specification (1). Z-score_low is significant at the 5% level. 
                                                     
87 Adding additional variables that are significant in specification (1) individually or jointly to specification 
(2) does not substantially change this finding.  
 
88 This proxy has been used in numerous studies, for example  for the evaluation of the performance of 
long-run stock returns following issues of public and private debt in Dichev and Piotroski (1999).  
 
89 Z = 1.2 (working capital / assets) + 1.4(retained earnings/assets) + 3.3(ebit/assets) + 0.6(market 
cap/debt)+0.999(revenue/assets). 
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However, high bankruptcy risk appears to explain abnormal returns for all bonds, and not 
specifically for private bonds. The magnitude of the bankruptcy risk measure (+7.35%) compared 
to that of covenant intensity and when using the cross-sectional mean of 7.5 covenants (+26%) 
suggests the use of a covenant based explanation of abnormal returns.  
In specifications (5) and (6), I control for effects when splitting the sample into 
observations for PPBs and PUBs. The adjusted R2 increases to 33% for the private bond sub-
sample in specification (5) and the covscore (squared) variables are significant at the 1% and 5% 
level respectively. Contrary to this, the covscore (squared) variables in the public bond sub-
sample have not much explanatory power with respect to abnormal return and remain 
insignificant with t-values well below one.  The results suggest that in fact, covenant effects are 
observed for firms issuing private, but not for firms issuing public bonds. Bankruptcy risk as 
proxied by zscore_low shows up insignificant but with a t-value of 1.29. Using it as point estimate, 
it would explain approximately 6.1% of  
In summary, controlling for uncertainty about credit risk does not change the main 
findings. The data suggests the use of covenants attached to privately placed bonds conveys 
information to investors ex ante, while, on the contrary, it does not convey information to 
investors when bonds are placed publicly.  
 
8 Conclusions 
 The main contribution of this study is twofold: First, is shows that use of covenants 
attached to privately placed bonds conveys information to investors ex ante. On the contrary, 
covenant use appears not to convey information when bonds are placed publicly. Second, the 
stock price response to issuing private bonds is negative in the cross-section. Privately placed 
bonds are much like bank loans with respect to ownership concentration (typically a few 
institutional investors) and show increased investor protection given their high covenant 
intensity. As with other private financings, one could then expect positive abnormal returns. The 
positive stock response to announcements of private financings is well documented and typically 
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rationalized as a reflection of valuable monitoring and screening services provided by banks 
(Fama, 1985; James, 1987) or other private lenders such as, for example, lenders with high 
reputation (Billett et al., 1995) or syndicates with few lenders (Preece & Mullineaux, 1996). 
Contrasting this event-study driven prior research, I find that private bonds differ in significant 
ways and result in negative stock returns when announced.  
Private bonds with below average covenant intensity or no financing covenants attached show 
abnormal returns that are not statistically significant. Additionally, a concave relationship 
between covenant intensity and the cumulative average abnormal return (CAAR) is evidenced, 
suggesting that the benefits of including restrictive covenants in debt contracts diminish after a 
certain level. It is suggested that negative abnormal returns root in the use of financing covenants 
attached to privately placed bonds. The CAAR also appears to be affected by the registration of 
the bonds. For firms issuing A144-registered bonds, the abnormal return is less negative than that 
of firms issuing non-registered bonds and the significance of the CAAR is only marginal for the 
first, whilst it is high for the latter group.  
Recent prior studies show that a lack of information about future economic events and their 
consequences for the borrower’s creditworthiness are positively related to covenant intensity 
(Demerjian, 2017) and that monitoring mechanisms, such as the use of covenants, are positively 
related to renegotiation intensity (Nikolaev, 2017). It appears investors do not place value on a 
firm’s option for flexible debt renegotiation when placing bonds privately.  
Left for future research is the question, whether other factors may explain abnormal returns. 
These may also be due to the cost of reducing the speed of capital structure adjustment (see 
Byoun, 2008 and Devos et al., 2017), which may be lowered by the inclusion of covenants into 
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Figure 1: Plot of cumulative average abnormal returns (CAAR) 
Figure 2: Plot of CAAR of Firms Issuing Bonds with High Covenant Intensity 
Figure 3: Plot of CAAR of Firms Issuing Bonds with Limit of Indebtedness Covenants 
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Appendix A     Description of Debt Covenants 
The following table provides an overview of all covenant variables and their Bloomberg 
definitions. 





Indicates a negative or restrictive covenant that limits an issuer's ability 
to make distributions, whether in the form of cash, assets or securities 
to shareholders, to redeem subordinated debt, repurchase equity or 





Indicates the existence of an affirmative or restrictive covenant 







Indicates whether covenant/default information is available. 
cov4 
 
Force Majeure  Indicates a clause that allows the underwriter to cancel the issuance of 





Indicates a covenant or clause in the loan documentation which is 
triggered by an event, condition or change which materially and 
adversely affects, or could reasonably be expected to materially and 
adversely affect, a company's financial results, financial condition, 





Indicates a covenant in the credit agreement whereby the company is 





Indicates a negative or restrictive covenant that places limitations on 
the amount of debt that the issuer can incur. This can be expressed as a 
percentage of assets or in monetary terms.  
cov8 
 
Cross Default  Indicates a stipulation stating that if an issuer is in default on other 
borrowings, such non-payment is also considered default in respect to 






Indicates a restrictive bond clause intended to prevent a corporation 




Sales of Assets 
Restriction  
Indicates a negative or restrictive covenant that limits the ability of the 





Indicates a negative covenant that can apply to any restrictions on the 




Coverage Ratio  
Indicates cash available for debt service/total or senior debt service. In 
corporate finance, it is the amount of cash flow available to meet 










Appendix A     Description of Debt Covenants (continued) 
cov13 
 
Free Cash Flow 
to Debt Service  
Indicates if the issuer has supplied specific ratios and has pledged 






Indicates any pledge made by the issuer to refrain from an activity 







Indicates a negative or restrictive covenant placed on the issuer 
which states that the issuer may not merge or consolidate with 







Indicates a restrictive or negative covenant that prevents the 
issuer from selling assets (or removing them from the balance 
sheet for accounting purposes) then leasing them back from the 




Subsidiary Debt  
Indicates a negative or restrictive covenant that places limitations 
on the amount of debt that the issuer's subsidiaries can incur. This 





Indicates an additional covenant clause designed to give a 
supermajority of bondholders (usually 66.66% or 75%) the ability 


















Appendix B   Creditmodel™ Corporates 2.6 of S&P Global Market Intelligence 
The following description of CreditmodelTM Corporates 2.6 (CM) is based on the S&P Global 
Market Intelligence technical note describing the short form credit scoring model (August 2016). 
A more comprehensive unpublished technical reference guide is available from S&P Global 
Market Intelligence.  
Overview: [CM is] a statistical model trained on credit ratings from S&P Global Ratings. [CM] is a 
widely used statistical tool that facilitates [the] evaluation of a company’s credit quality by 
generating rating scores [from aaa, with a numerical value of 1, to ccc or lower, with a numercal 
value of 18] for both public and private corporates globally. [It] utilizes both financial data from 
corporates and the most relevant macroeconomic data, to generate a quantitative rating score 
that statistically matches a credit rating issued by S&P Global Ratings. S&P Global Ratings does 
not contribute to or participate in the creation of rating scores generated by S&P Global Market 
Intelligence. Lowercase nomenclature is used to differentiate S&P Global Market Intelligence PD 
credit model scores from the credit ratings issued by S&P Global Ratings. [CM] covers both 
privately held and publicly listed corporates. The model’s primary output is a lower-case letter 
grade score. [It provides users] with access to estimates of creditworthiness for more than 
48,0003 non-financial corporations globally, spanning more than 10 years, based upon S&P 
Capital IQ’s database of public and private company fundamentals. 
Trained on S&P Global Ratings credit ratings and S&P Capital IQ Platform’s Financial Data: [CM] 
uses more than 10 years of S&P Global Ratings’ historical ratings for corporate companies. [CM] 
uses standalone credit profiles (SACP) where available, or strippes any group or parental support 
from the final rating if the standalone credit profile is unavailable, in order to obtain the credit 
profile of a company prior to any extraordinary support considerations. [CM] uses more than 
52,000 observations globally [and more than 8‘500 for Europe] for corporates, that [were] 
complemented with internal standalone assessments generated for companies operating in 
emerging markets to enrich [the] training dataset. [S&P] collected all relevant financial items for 
the same companies, from the S&P Capital IQ Platform standardized fundamentals. 
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Appendix B   Creditmodel™ Corporates 2.6 of S&P Global Market Intelligence (continued) 
Systemic Risk Data: [Context was considered when developing the] model [by considering] credit 
ratings by S&P Global Ratings via the Corporate Industry and Country Risk Assessment (CICRA). A 
CICRA is a combination of country risk and industry risk. Country risk refers to the risk associated 
with investing in a country. It is a broad and general term that represents risks linked to changes 
in the business environment that may adversely affect operating profits or the value of assets in 
a specific country. This type of risk affects all companies operating within a particular country and 
is a blend of monetary factors (e.g., currency control), political factors (e.g., civil war), and 
operating factors (e.g., corruption). For Country Risk, S&P Global Market Intelligence has 
developed a quantitative model that generates Country Risk Scores that closely align with S&P 
Global Ratings’ assessments, and expands the coverage to 247 countries worldwide by 
establishing a “proxy mechanism” based on geographic proximity considerations, regional 
influences, independence (or not ) of the central banks, the degree and evolution of a count ry’s 
economic development and financial regulatory environment and its type of political system. 
Industry risk is usually determined by elements such as barrier to entry, ease of conversion, level 
of competition, market fragmentation, etc. This is implicitly captured in CM2.6 by training 
industry-specific sub-models or adding dummy variables to reflect differences in specific industry 
sectors. 
Variable Selection Process:  [CM tested] more than 100 alternative financial and non-financial 
items, in order to investigate the most predictive variables for modelling purposes [and] applied 
a vigorous, cutting-edge procedure for the variable selection process that helps to prescreen what 
could be included as an input for the model. In order to select the final set of inputs and variables 
we used both statistical analysis and business judgment to weight the following considerations: 
[a.] Availability of Factors: All factors included in the model must be widely available on a 
consistent basis over time for companies in each sector. Some factors have a high predictive 
power but are seldom reported by companies (e.g. some cash flow items of private corporates); 
while these factors may help boost a model’s performance, such a model would be irrelevant for  
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Appendix B   Creditmodel™ Corporates 2.6 of S&P Global Market Intelligence (continued) 
firms that do not report similar information. [b.] Correlation: Highly correlated factors do not 
provide additional insights and could distort model performance. [CM] used correlation analysis 
to identify and remove correlated variables. [c.] Representation of All Relevant Risk Dimensions: 
In order to capture the variety of factors that influence the creditworthiness of corporates, [CM] 
referred to the list of “risk dimensions” that S&P Global Ratings uses for the analysis of corporate 
firms, and classified each candidate variable into its corresponding risk dimension, using expert 
judgement. Then, [CM] selected the variables that would comprise these risk dimensions from a 
range of categories, including financial information, as well as economic and industry-based risk 
indicators to ensure a proper balance of microeconomic and macroeconomic factors, similar to 
how a credit analyst would analyze a corporate company. [CM controls for] potential differences 
in the explanatory power of factors in different industries, where relevant [and] early warning 
signals such as low values of Debt / Capital. [According to the technical reference guide, p. 33, CM 
applies the following variables for European corporates: total assets to represent the company 
size effect, return on capital to reflect profitability, cash from operations interest coverage to 
account for debt service capability, asset turnover to reflect efficiency, debt / debt + equity to 
represent gearing, free operating cash flow / debt to calculate debt service capability, operating 
income before depreciation and amortisation to reflect profitability and long term liability / equity 
to again reflect gearing.] 
Regional and Sector Segmentation: In order to achieve optimal model performance and stability 
of the results, CM2.6 was trained using a regional/sector segmentation based on similarities of 
available financials and rating distributions, as well as taking into account data availability and 
other macroeconomic considerations. Europe was trained with 10 sub-regions based on the 
ratings distribution [and] 19 industry sector dummy variables. Finally, the airlines industry was 
treated as a separate, global model due to the globalized nature of this industry. More details can 
be found in the technical reference guide. 
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Appendix B   Creditmodel™ Corporates 2.6 of S&P Global Market Intelligence (continued) 
Methodology Most of the models available in the market only employ simple logistic regression 
techniques. [The CM] model employs an advanced generalization of the logistic regressions, 
based on the family of Exponential Density Functions. It uses the prior distribution of all S&P 
Global Ratings credit ratings in the training dataset as an “anchor distribution”, and modifies it in 
proportion to how much the financials of a specific company deviate from those of companies 
used in the anchor distribution. The process of variable selection considers both linear terms and 
terms of higher order, and selects the final variables according to k-fold Greedy Forward 
Approach, a widely-used statistical method that ensures a good fit out-of-sample and out-of-time. 
The model uses a number of techniques, including variable t ransformations, which minimize the 
impact of extreme values. It also uses various constraints, which avoid risk of model over-fitting 
without any loss of data as well as a more accurate estimation of the parameters and final output. 
The model maximizes the maximum likelihood function within a Maximum Expected Utility, 
adapted to a multi-state case (the rating categories, on which the model is trained, are not binary, 
but 18 in total), and uses the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) to limit the maximum number of 
variables that are included (model parsimony). This optimization process ensures the model 
exhibits greater stability and out-of-time performance. Monotonicity constraints are applied to 
ensure that the model produces outputs that follow economic intuition. 
Annual Model Validation Since the release of CM2.6 in 2013, S&P Global Market Intelligence has 
conducted a detailed performance evaluation annually, based on the actual performance data 
and provided the results of the validation to users. If a significant deterioration in model 
performance is observed, S&P Global Market Intelligence will consider a recalibration of the 
parameters or a review of the risk drivers. [The CM performance is measured in percent of exact 
matches, +/- 1 notch, +/- 2 notches and +/- 3 notches deviation from the S&P Global Ratings. The 
last available validation was done in July 2016 and has resulted in 22% exact matches, 56 % 
matches within 1 notch, 78 % within 2 notches and 88 % within 3 notches.] 
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This paper investigates the returns, their persistence across subsequent funds of a 
partnership and the alpha of private debt funds. It is based on a worldwide sample of 347 funds 
with vintage years 1986-2016, timed cash flow data and uses the Kaplan and Schoar (2005) 
public market equivalent. Over the lifetime of a private debt fund, the net of fee market 
outperformance amounts to 17%, on average. Annualizing this outperformance yields an 
average alpha (α) of 1.6%. The dispersion between top- and bottom-quartile private debt fund 
performance is large and goes from a market outperformance (annualized α) of +44% (+6%) to 
an underperformance of -16% (-2.6%). Using a one-factor market model and relaxing the 
Kaplan and Schoar (2005) assumption of a unit beta, I find betas reliably lower than one, 
indicating diversification benefits. Also and importantly, the annualized α’s are considerably 
higher than those estimated from the Kaplan and Schoar (2005) public market equivalent and 
increase to 9 – 10%, significant at the 1% level. Both, quartile transition probabilities and OLS 
regressions of current on prior performance, indicate economically important and statistically 
significant persistence in returns across subsequent funds of a partnership. This persistence is 
driven by direct lending, special situations, distressed debt and venture debt funds. However, 
controlling for additional factors, I find that performance is significantly affected by credit 
market conditions, i.e. credit standards and funding liquidity: The public market equivalent 
declines by approximately -9.1% when funds are launched in times of overly loose credit 
standards. Likewise, it declines by -6.5% for funds launched in times of bad funding liquidity.  
 
1  Introduction         
Private capital markets have grown tremendously over the last decade. Increasingly, 
companies are seeking flexible terms of private funding rather than capital from public capital 
                                                     
90 TIAS School for Business and Society and Tilburg School of Economics and Management, Tilburg 
University, the Netherlands, Remaco Group, Basel / Zürich, Switzerland 
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markets. This manifests itself in the number of firms traded on public exchanges and the number 
of Initial Public Offerings (IPOs), which are consistently going down (Gao et al., 2013; Srivastava, 
2014). The evolution of new and growing alternative asset classes have caught the attention of 
academic researchers. For example, a large body of research analyzes private equity (PE) fund 
performance and its persistence (see Kaplan & Sensoy, 2015, or Korteweg, 2018, for two 
comprehensive reviews). On the contrary, research related to private debt (PD) is very sparse.91  
The PD asset class gains increased attention from the media92 and is attracting attention from 
consultants and institutional investors for its inclusion in portfolios. According to the Preqin 
(2019) report, of all investor categories listed, all are currently below their median target 
allocation.93 From 2008 through 2017, PD funds have grown faster than real estate or private 
equity funds (see Figure 1). This growth is expected to continue and double the PD volume from 
USD 0.7 trillion in 2017 to more than USD 1.4 trillion in total assets by 2023 (Preqin, 2018). While 
the total assets of real estate funds surpassed the USD 500 billion threshold in 2011, PD has 
exceeded this mark in 2015 and is today comparable in total assets under management to real 
estate.94 Despite the continued growth of PD assets under management of the last years (see 
Figure 2), to the best of my knowledge PD fund performance and its persistence have not been 
subject to academic analysis yet and we are still missing a comprehensive account.  
 Assessing PD fund performance and its persistence is a first-order concern. As with PE funds, 
PD investors often base their investment decisions on past performance and the belief that 
performance persists across funds of the same asset manager, that is, the general partner (GP) of 
                                                     
91 A noteworthy exception are (Cumming et al., 2019), who analyze primary and secondary debt 
issuances of firms in the Asia-Pacific markets. 
 
92 See Financial Times, February 4, 2019, «Non-bank lenders thrive in the shadows. Explosive growth 
of US private debt market brings parallels to wild west.» 
 
93 The reported median current allocation (target allocation) amounts to 2% (3%) for asset managers, 
2.5% (5%) for endowment plans, 5% (6.5%) for family offices, 1.9% (5%) for foundations, 1% (3%) for 
insurance companies, 1.7% (5%) for private sector pensions funds, 2% (5%) for public pension funds, 1% 
(5%) for superannuation schemes and 5% (8.3%) for wealth managers. 
 
94 According to Preqin (2018), total assets under management 2017 by asset class for private equity, 
private debt and real estate, to mention the most important, are USD 3.1tn, 0.7tn and 0.8tn. 
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a PD fund. No academic study has yet provided rigorous analysis of the public market equivalent 
(PME) of PD funds. Also, it is unclear whether performance persists across GPs for this asset class. 
Albeit widely practiced, using past performance as a naïve estimate for future performance may 
therefore lead to erroneous PD fund selection per se. This study aims to provide an in-depth PD 
fund performance and persistence analysis. In addition, it provides an analysis which factors, 
other than persistence, affect fund performance. This is important given the strong growth of this 
asset class and the closed end nature of PD funds, the latter leading to long-term capital 
commitments of generally ten plus years from investors. 
This paper analyses 347 PD funds from vintage years 1986 through 2016. It is based on a 
sample of 117 mezzanine, 54 direct lending, 32 special situations, 127 distressed debt and 17 
venture debt funds.95 The average fund size is 1,342 million US dollars (in 2018 dollars) and the 
main geographic investment focus is the United States (84%), followed by Europe (13%) and Asia 
(3%). Fund data is provided by Preqin, a commercial data provider and data source that is 
increasingly used for the purpose of academic research.  
As in PE studies, the analysis of the data is inherently complicated by the fact that returns can 
not be observed on a regular basis. Also, cash flows are highly skewed. Additionally, analysing 
cash flow data involves taking a stand on the fair market value of unrealized assets of a PD fund 
as long as one does not limit the analysis to fully liquidated funds. The latter is the case in this 
study. For the purpose of calculating fund performance, self-reported and unrealized net asset 
values (NAVs) are treated in two ways. First, they are treated as market values as in Kaplan and 
Schoar (2005) or Harris et al. (2014a), that is, as liquidating distribution to investors. Second, to 
address the academic debate around the various practices related to NAV valuations (see, for 
example, Phalippou and Gottschalg , 2009;  Stucke, 2011; Driessen et al.; 2012, Jenkinson et al. 
2013; Brown et al., 2017; Barber & Yasuda, 2017), unrealized NAVs are adjusted to reflect a 
potential upward bias in fair market values. Motivated by prior research, unrealized NAVs of PD 
                                                     
95 These are investment strategies described in more detail in the Appendix to this paper.  
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funds that are not fully liquidated are written down by 5%, and those of PD funds beyond their 
typical liquidation age by 30%. On the one side, these write-downs should reflect potential biases 
arising from potential NAV manipulation by GPs in times of fund raising, which Barber and Yasuda 
(2017) find to amount to approximately 5% in the PE fund industry.  On the other side, the 30% 
write-down of unrealized NAVs is motivated by the findings of Driessen et al. (2012), who estimate 
that NAVs of PE funds beyond their typical liquidation age are substantially overvalued. 
To assess how PD funds perform and whether they out- or underperform the markets, I provide 
a number of performance calculations using absolute and relative performance metrics.  
Performance. As investors still focus more on absolute performance as opposed to risk-
adjusted returns (Gompers et al., 2016) and to accommodate typical fund investors’ habit of 
analysing performance, the internal rate of return (IRR) and the total value to paid in capital (TVPI) 
are calculated for each PD fund. On average, PD funds provide an IRR of 10.6% and a TVPI ratio of 
1.4. Distressed debt funds with an IRR of 12% provide higher performance than special situations 
/ mezzanine / direct lending / distressed debt and venture debt funds with an IRR of 11%/ 9% / 
10% / 11% and 8% respectively. While the best funds provide an IRR (TVPI) of 23% (1.8X), the 
worst distribute as much money to investors as they previously collected from them. Their IRR 
(TVPI) amounts to 0% (1.0X). This dispersion appears to be independent of fund type as mean 
(median) performance metrics are relatively close to each other.  
Whilst useful, absolute performance measures suffer from a number of drawbacks and do not 
adjust for risk. More recent literature gravitates towards stochastic discount factor (SDF) 
approaches and relative or market-adjusted performance.96 In this vein, this study follows two 
methodological approaches in measuring risk-adjusted performance. First, it follows Kaplan and 
Schoar (2005) in calculating the public market equivalent (PME), based on timed fund cash flows 
and using two alternative benchmark indices. Second, a generalized method of moments 
                                                     
96 See Kaplan and Sensoy (2015) or Korteweg (2018) for two surveys on the literature on PE 









procedure (GMM) is deployed to estimate the abnormal return (alpha, α) and beta (β) of PD funds 
as in Driessen et al. (2012).  
Turning to relative performance as measured by PME, PD funds show an average market 
outperformance of 12% over the lifetime of a PD fund97 and an annualized alpha of 2% when 
compared to the Bloomberg Barclays US Corporate Bond Total Return Index (PMEIG), which 
provides a benchmark for investment grade bonds. Benchmarked to the Bloomberg Barclays US 
Corporate High Yield Index (“PMEHY”), the cross-sectional lifetime outperformance (PME) drops 
to 7% or an annualized excess return of 1% respectively. The large dispersion between top- and 
bottom quartile funds shown earlier is confirmed: For top-quartile funds, the average lifetime 
outperformance / annualized alpha as measured by the PMEIG (PMEHY) amounts to 44% (37%) / 
6.0% (4.9%). Bottom-quartile funds provide an underperformance / annualized alpha of -16% (-
20%) / -2.6% (-3.2%). Sorted by vintage years, the average PME as compared to the investment 
grade benchmark is 17%. This translates into an annualized alpha of 1.6%. Benchmarked to the 
high yield benchmark, investors profit from a market outperformance (annualized alpha return) 
of 12% (0.9%), on average.  
The estimation of cross-sectional abnormal returns (α) and systematic risk (β) as in Driessen et 
al. (2012) is used to relax the assumption of a beta equal to one as in Kaplan and Schoar (2005). 
It appears that betas of PD funds are lower and reliably different from one in the cross-section. 
This indicates diversification benefits from PD funds. Also, it appears that the annualized alphas 
as estimated with the Kaplan and Schoar (2005) PME may be downward biased. Finding high 
alphas and using a capital asset pricing model (CAPM) logic, PD funds therefore provide value to 
investors in that they have returns well in excess of their cost of capital.  
Persistence. Given the relatively attractive top-quartile performance of PD funds, it would be 
interesting to know whether past performance is indicative of future PD fund performance. The 
persistence of PD fund performance is therefore evaluated in a next step. Persistence of returns 
                                                     
97 For brevity, the total market outperformance over the lifetime of a PD fund shall also be called 
“lifetime outperformance” or “market outperformance”.  
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across successive funds of the same GP is calculated using a regression framework and the 
calculation of transition probabilities based on performance quartiles, methodologically as in 
Kaplan and Schoar (2005) or more recently in Harris et al. (2014b). Focusing on PME, which is 
(Lerner et al., 2018, p. 17) “the standard performance measure used in the academic literature”, 
I find significant persistence. In the cross-section, a 10% increase in lagged performance increases 
current performance by an approximate 2%, the coefficient being highly significant. Moreover, 
persistence appears to be driven by positive lagged performance, not negative lagged 
performance, and by the post-2007 period.  
Calculating transition probabilities, GPs with a previous fund in the top-quartile are expected 
to remain in this quartile with their next fund with a probability of 50% and for the post-2007 sub-
period. For the pre-2007 period, this probability is lower and amounts to 30%. Interacting fund 
type with previous fund performance and repeating the fund persistence regressions, previous 
fund performance appears to be a significant predictor of current fund performance for direct 
lending, special situations and distressed debt funds, the coefficients on the lagged performance 
being significant at the 1%, 5% and 5% level respectively. For these fund types, it appears to be a 
good strategy to invest in PD funds managed by GPs that have previously managed top-quartile 
funds. Relative to a randomized strategy and calculated from quartile transition probabilities, the 
average increase in market outperformance as measured by PME to be achieved from such 
prediction would have been 8% for the overall sample period and 13% for the post-2007 sub-
period. 
Factors affecting performance and persistence. Although not the main focus of this study, I 
also control if and how several fund specific factors (such as fund type, industry focus, 
geographical focus or size) and credit market conditions (such as funding liquidity, credit 
standards, the aggregate amount of capital flowing into the PD industry and recessionary market 
periods) affect fund performance. Methodologically, I follow Kaplan and Strömberg (2009) who 
show that factors such as capital inflows in the early life of a fund can explain realized returns 
during the subsequent ten- to twelve-year period. Univariate and multiple OLS regressions of fund 
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performance as measured by PME on a set of factors measured for the vintage year (t) and the 
subsequent year (t+1) are used. The results suggest that credit market conditions observed for t 
and t+1 significantly impact a fund’s performance but also persistence. 
First, I test how loose (tight) credit standards affect performance. The data are from the US 
Federal Reserve quarterly survey and indicate the net percentage change of reported senior loan 
officers’ standards (SLOS), i.e. tightening or loosening credit standards for loans. This variable (see 
Axelson et al., 2013) is a proxy for nonprice aspects of credit market conditions, such as debt 
covenants and quantity constraints. I find that PD funds launched in years allowing for very loose 
credit standards (at the 10th percentile of SLOS) perform worse by approximately 9.1%. A 
potential explanation for the observed relationship is that PD funds that invest in times of loose 
credit standards may find it difficult to renegotiate their initial lending contracts in the later stage. 
Lower covenant protection and fewer quantity constraints might affect PD fund performance 
negatively.  
Second, I control for the market’s funding liquidity as measured by the TED spread, which is 
the difference between the interest rates on 3 months US government debt and interbank loans. 
TED spread appears to be an incrementally strong predictor of future PD fund performance. If 
investors requiring higher or lower rates in compensation for higher or lower systemic liquidity in 
years t and t+1, TED spread should be positively related to performance. However, I find that an 
increase in TED spread (worsening of funding liquidity) is negatively related to PD fund 
performance: a 10% worsening of funding liquidity reduces performance by 1.3%. Funds launched 
in market states of bad funding liquidity show a PME that is reduces by approximately 6.5%. A 
potential explanation for this negative sign is that funds may find it difficult to refinance their 
portfolio in times of low funding liquidity and be confronted with higher borrowing costs, 
translating into lower returns. 
Other credit market conditions such as global risk (credit spread) or the aggregate amount of 
capital flowing into the PD industry are controlled for. They appear to leave PD fund performance 
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unaffected. These findings are robust to a set of additional tests explained in the robustness 
section. 
Given the used methodology as in Kaplan and Strömberg (2009), I only measure credit market 
conditions of periods t and t+1, i.e. for the vintage year and the following year. Any one proxy for 
expected PD fund performance is therefore noisy. Although the presented results are strong, it 
must be cautioned against overinterpreting them. Nevertheless, the presented findings related 
to credit market conditions are suggested to be illustrative of broader patterns and the data 
suggests that the main factors affecting PD fund performance beyond persistence are credit 
standards and funding liquidity.  
This study contributes to the sparse literature on PD funds in that it provides information on 
the market outperformance of PD funds using the Kaplan and Schoar (2005) PME. It advances our 
understanding of the risk and return of the fast growing PD asset class in that it calculates 
annualized alphas (α), both by deriving them from cumulative alphas calculated from the PMEs 
and by application of the Driessen et al. (2012) method to estimate risk and return of nontraded 
assets. Moreover, it analyses performance across funds managed by the same GP. Using the PMEs 
of PD funds quantified in the first part of this study, it answers the question whether past market 
outperformance can be used as a naïve estimate of future PD fund performance. Furthtermore, 
it provides information how credit market conditions affect the outcome of such estimations. 
Finally, it shows that PD fund performance persistence is not declining with increasing 
competition, as was the case with PE funds. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. I start the paper by describing how the private 
debt industry works (Section 2), followed by the review of related literature in Section 3. In section 
4, I discuss the data used and provide an outlook of the methodologies used. In Section 5, 
descriptive statistics and PD fund performance is presented. Section 6 explores persistence, 
followed by section 7, in which several factors affecting PD fund performance are assessed. A set 
of robustness tests are provided in Section 8. Section 9 concludes this paper.  
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2  Private Debt Funds, Firms, Investors and Fees  
PD funds are organized much like PE funds.98 PD funds are financial intermediaries that pool 
investors’ capital and make investments in portfolio companies that are typically private 
companies. These investments include a variety of debt-like instruments. Funds are organized as 
limited partnerships (LPs), managed by an asset manager (the general partner, GP) and have a 
contracted life in many cases around ten years, which is often extended upon mutual agreement 
between LPs and GP for an additional time period. The year the fund makes its first capital calls is 
referred to as vintage year, followed by an investment period in the first years of a PD fund’s life. 
Subsequent years are then devoted to manage redemptions and exit debt investments. The fund 
returns originate in cash coupons (mostly fixed rate and paid regularly), payments in kind 
(typically accrued interest paid at the end of a financing agreement), upfront fees collected at the 
origination of a financing contract, and penalty fees, which are usually asked from a borrower if a 
financing agreement is repaid prior to maturity. While many PD funds follow a buy-and-hold 
strategy, some also buy and sell debt in secondary markets. This may additionally impact the 
returns of PD funds. While investors in PD funds can not redeem their investment prior to the 
contracted lifetime of the fund, redemptions of debt contracts and interest payments at the 
portfolio level are typically distributed directly to LPs, that is, they do receive cash distributions 
over the lifetime of a fund.  
GPs receive fee payments from their LPs, deducted directly from the fund assets and 
influencing cash flows and hence performance. Although I use net-of-fee cash flows in this study 
to calculate performance, it is interesting to shed light on the general fee structure of PD funds. 
Typically, PD fund fee payments consist of a fixed management fee, which is not based on the 
performance of the fund, and an additional performance based variable fee. According to Preqin 
Pro (2019), the average (median) fixed management fee of closed end PD funds (n=588) amounts 
to 1.7% (1.8%). The average (median) performance fee (n=542) amounts to 19.2% (20%) and is 
                                                     
98 See Kaplan and Strömberg (2009) for a review of how PE firms and funds function or Zimmerman 
(2015), figure 1, for a graphical illustration of the PE capital investment cycle. 
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typically charged to the return in excess of a preferred return to LPs. This preferred return is 
preset in the prospectus at the inception of a PD fund. Of the reporting funds (n=420) the average 
(median) preferred return is 7.6% (8%). Management and performance fees as well as the preset 
return are comparable to those extensively studied in private equity, for example by Gompers & 
Lerner (1999), Metrick and Yasuda (2010), Robinson and Sensoy (2013) or Robinson and Sensoy 
(2016). In these PE studies, a clustering of average management fees of around 2%, average 
performance fees of approximately 20% and average hurdle levels of 8% are observed.99   
 It appears surprising that PD GPs generate a compensation comparable to that of PE GPs. 
One could expect that investing in debt is different from and less intensive than investing in 
equity. However, as is illustrated in Deloitte (2019), more than two thirds of all direct lending 
transactions in Europe are mergers and acquisitions related and do involve a private equity 
sponsored transaction. On a global basis including all geographies, approximately 73% of all PD 
fund transactions are sponsored transactions. A large fraction is driven by buyout financing (46%), 
growth financing (22%) and public to private transactions (3.3%). Only about 13.4% of all PD 
transactions are based on recapitalization needs of corporates. Also, only about 20.4% of all PD 
transactions involve senior debt, leaving almost 80% to subordinated and mezzanine debt and 
other special transaction types. 100 Thus, the majority of PD transactions are complex and different 
from bank lending and involve corporates making transformational acquisitions, seeking growth 
capital, aiming to consolidate their shareholder base or raising junior debt / debt subordinated to 
bank debt. Investments are habitually done in sub-investment grade firms and involve SME 
transactions. The value creation process of PD funds is very much comparable to that described 
                                                     
99 Various other fee components exist in PE but also in PD. For example, fees depend on the carry basis, 
which describes the standard by which profits are measured and the carry timing, which refers to the set of 
rules that govern the timing of carried interest distributions. Also, many PD funds request portfolio 
companies to pay drawdown fees, monitoring fees and transaction fees (see, for example, Phalippou et al., 
2018), which are sometimes distributed to the PD fund and sometimes to the GPs, thereby affecting fund 
performance and potential agency conflicts between GPs and LPs. However, this paragraph provides an 
introduction to the economics of PD funds only and a more detailed description of fee components and 
structures lies beyond the focus of this study.  
 
100 see Preqin Pro, August 12, 2019. Deal level data are from approximately 15,000 transactions.  
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in Gompers et al. (2016) and for PE funds. It involves financial engineering activities (valuation, 
capital structure advisory and incentive management at the portfolio company level), governance 
engineering (board composition, monitoring, hiring and firing of top management) and 
operational engineering and value creation. 
Also, the PD asset class stands up to a comparison with the PE asset class in terms of size and 
investor sophistication. In recent years, PD funds have raised large amounts of investor capital. 
Albeit somewhat smaller than PE funds, according to Preqin Pro (2019), the 30 largest PD fund 
managers raised a very large average of USD 13.9 billion per fund and a total amount of USD 416 
billions in the last ten years (see Appendix Table 1, Panel A).101 The three largest of them exceed 
the amount of USD 30 billions (Oaktree Capital Management, Goldman Sachs and GSO Capital 
Partners) whilst the three smallest (EQT, Kayne Anderson Capital Advisors and Strategic Value 
Partners) each raised capital in excess of USD 5 billion. As of January 2019, the 30 largest funds 
together have approximately USD 144 billion ready to invest but not yet allocated, thus, the PD 
fund market is currently looking for attractive debt investments and highly competitive. As is 
shown in Panels B through E of Appendix Table 1, the largest PD fund managers are domiciled in 
the US (Panel B), followed by those in Europe (Panel C). Asian (Panel D) and rest of the world fund 
managers (Panel E) are much smaller in size and estimated dry powder. Appendix Table 2, Panels 
A through E, shows the largest PD funds according to their geographical focus. They are primarily 
focused on North-America and Europe (Panels A through C) and to a lesser extent on Asia and the 
rest of the world (Panels D and E). As is shown in Appendix Table 3, investors are typically fund of 
funds, public and private pension funds, banks, insurance companies and sovereign wealth funds. 
The largest investors are domiciled in Switzerland, followed by the US and Canada and to a lesser 
extent in other regions (see Panels A through D). Interestingly, the largest endowment plan 
investors in PD funds (Panel E) are public institutions (Church Commissioners for England, Texas 
Treasury Safekeeping Trust Company) or University endowment funds (University of Chicago 
                                                     
101 Compared to private equity (PE) funds and according to Preqin Pro (2019), this compares to 
approximately USD 1.4 trillion in total and USD 46 billions on average in fund raising over the last ten years 
and for the 30 largest PE fund managers.  
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Endowment, Northwestern University Endowment and Oxford University Endowment). These 
institutions appear to invest larger amounts into PD funds as US family offices (Panel F) and 
amounts comparable to insurance companies (Panel G). Within the pension and sovereign wealth 
funds, US public pension funds (Panel I) appear to dominate the investor landscape, followed by 
large UK private pension funds (Panel H) and sovereign wealth funds across the world (Panel J).  
Overall, it appears that the structure, fee level, value creation process as well as the size and 
investor sophistication of PD funds are very much comparable to those of PE funds.  
 
3  Related Literature  
Fund performance and its persistence are a critical issue for investors in their choice of fund 
managers. The equity mutual fund literature has reached a consensus that performance, net of 
fees, is negative and just well enough to cover the costs (Eugene F. Fama & French, 2010; 
Wermers, 2000). Persistence in fund performance has been difficult to detect. Malkiel (1995), for 
example, finds that while persistence was considerable in the 1970s, there was no consistency in 
returns during the 1980s.102 Similarly, performance persistence for hedge funds is little or modest 
(see, for example, Bares et al., 2002; Brown et al., 1999; Edwards & Cagalyan, 2001; Kat & 
Menexe, 2002) and on average, net alphas are zero (Fung et al.,  2008).  
An asset class for which both, performance persistence and positive alphas have been 
detected, tested and in which the persistence claim withstands academic scrutiny appears to be 
private equity (PE). PD funds are much like PE funds in terms of organizational structure, cash flow 
distribution and inherent potential agency conflicts between GPs and LPs (such as for example 
NAV manipulation). I therefore take advantage of the methodologies applied in the PE related 
studies. These are described in section 3.1. Prior literature on PD funds and additional literature 
                                                     
102 See also Carhart et al. (2002), who provide a comprehensive review of this topic, basically 
confirming the findings of Malkiel (1995). 
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deemed relevant to the analysis of PD fund performance and its persistence is then summarized 
in section 3.2. 
 
3.1. Prior literature on private equity (PE) funds 
Early contributions to the understanding of PE performance have been provided by Kaplan 
and Schoar (2005) and Phalippou and Gottschalg (2009).103 Kaplan and Schoar (2005) examine a 
sample of PE funds with vintage years beginning in 1980 until 1997. They focus on the public 
market equivalent (PME) as performance measure. It is calculated as the ratio of the sum of 
discounted distributions to the sum of discounted contributions. The discount rate is the total 
return on the relevant market benchmark. A fund with a PME greater than 1 and net of all fees 
outperforms the market, a fund with a PME less than 1 underperforms it. The PME thus provides 
a cumulative measure of performance. For example, a PME of 1.2 means that an investor earns 
20% more by investing in a fund rather than the public market benchmark. Kaplan and Schoar 
(2005) find that overall PE returns are approximately equal to the S&P 500. Additionally, they find 
that large differences in the returns of individual funds ranging from a 3% cash flow IRR at the 
25th percentile to one of 22% at the 75th percentile exist. In a second analysis, they show that 
repeating performance is not random. They use two methods to provide evidence of performance 
persistence. First, they employ OLS regressions of current on previous fund performance. Second, 
Kaplan & Schoar (2005) calculate the probability of repeating top-tercile (bottom-tercile) 
performance and find that it amounts to 55% (44%). Moreover, they suggest a concave relation 
between fund size and performance, implying that when funds become very large, performance 
declines. Like in this study, Kaplan & Schoar (2005) use quarterly cash flow data to calculate PME. 
For the purpose of calculating performance, Kaplan and Schoar (2005) treat last-observed net 
asset values (NAVs) of funds as a liquidating distribution to investors.  
Contrasting Kaplan and Schoar (2005), Phalippou and Gottschalg (2009) claim that treating 
NAVs as accurate estimates of fund market value creates a performance bias and recommend 
                                                     
103 For a review of additonal early studies analyzing PE performance see Kaplan and Sensoy (2015). 
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writing them off when calculating the performance of largely liquidated funds. In doing so, they 
find that average fund performance decreases. Support for the views of  Pahlippou and Gottschalg 
(2009) is presented by Driessen et al. (2012), who estimate that self-reported NAVs for funds 
beyond their typical liquidation age may significantly deviate from market values. They predict 
that NAVs of mature and inactive funds significantly overstate fund values and are around 30%. 
Additionally, they propose a new method to estimate alphas and betas of nontraded assets from 
cash flows for PE funds. Driessen et al. (2012) use a discount rate for contributions and 
distributions equal to the risk-free rate plus the alpha to be estimated and the excess market 
return times beta to be estimated and minimize the sum of squared differences between the 
present value of a fund’s contributions and distributions. 
Stucke (2011) contrasts Phalippou and Gottschalg (2009). He re-examines the PE data and 
finds that self-reported NAVs in previous studies were wrong because funds ceased to update 
their data in the database. He collects the true cash flows and NAVs for a large portion of the 
previously researched funds from LPs and finds NAVs greater than those reported in the database. 
Not surprisingly, he finds performance which is markedly better than that calculated by Kaplan 
and Schoar (2005) or Phalippou and Gottschalg (2009) and concludes that the estimates of these 
two studies are downward biased because of missing true cash flows and self-reported NAVs.  
More recently, Jenkinson et al. (2013), Brown et al. (2017) and Barber & Yasuda (2017) have 
found that NAVs are usually conservative. However, they appear to spike around likely 
fundraisings and in the fourth quarter of the year (Jenkinson et al., 2013), are more conservative 
for top performing funds (Brown et al., 2017) and are used by GPs to time subsequent 
fundraisings, after which size and frequency of NAV markdowns increase (Barber & Yasuda, 2013). 
This paper is also related to Sensoy et al. (2014), Harris et al. (2014b) and Braun et al. (2017), 
who analyze, amongst other aspects, how the maturing of the PE industry has changed 
performance and persistence. Sensoy et al. (2014) show an industry-wide decline in returns and 
a decline in the relations between GP experience and return. They analyze performance at the GP 
level. Harris et al. (2014b) confirm persistence in pre-2000 funds. For post-2000 funds they find 
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little evidence of persistence in fund returns. Braun et al. (2017), using portfolio company cash 
flows instead of fund level cash flows, also evidence that persistence has substantially declined 
as the PE sector has matured and become more competitive.  
A number of additional recent studies investigate other aspects of PE performance and 
persistence based on the PME. Harris et al. (2014a), using stated NAVs in their analysis of Venture 
Economics data, confirm the lifetime outperformance of public markets by US buyout funds and 
find large time variation for venture funds, with outperformance in the 1990s but 
underperformance in the 2000s. Moreover, they show that fund performance is significantly 
negatively related to capital commitments: an increase from the bottom quartile of years to the 
top quartile of years of capital influx declines IRRs by more than 5% per year. Kaplan and 
Strömberg (2009) provide another study that observes a strong negative relation between 
fundraising and PE fund performance. Phalippou (2014), shows the sensitivity of fund 
performance to the choice of the benchmark. Using a micro-cap mutual fund as a benchmark, he 
finds that the average and median PME fall to 1.04 and 0.99 respectively, suggesting that the 
average buyout fund return is similar to that of similar sized listed equity. In this vein, L’Her (2016) 
study PE buyout fund performance. Using a bottom-up approach, they identify the systematic 
risks of underlying companies in buyout funds to inform an appropriate risk-adjusted benchmark. 
After making several risk adjustments, they find no significant outperformance of buyout fund 
investments versus the PME. Harris et al. (2018) identify outperformance at the fund of fund level. 
Further, Robinson and Sensoy (2016) investigate cash flow liquidity and find substantial 
comovement with public markets: contributions from and distributions to limited partners of PE 
funds both have a procyclical systematic component. Also, they find that funds raised in hot 
markets underperform those raised in bad times, the explanation rooted in a liquidity premium 
for calling capital in bad times. Ang et al. (2018) decompose PE returns into a component due to 
publicly traded factors and a time-varying PE premium and find that time series variation in PE 
returns is highly cyclical and differs across subclasses of PE.  
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3.2 Prior literature on private debt (PD) funds 
Somewhat surprisingly, other than with PE funds, PD fund performance has not been 
researched a lot. Carey (1998) investigated a portfolio of private loans and found that it has lower 
default and higher recovery rates than a portfolio of public bonds with equivalent risk. His study 
is based on the data of 13 major life insurance companies in the US, sampling loans from 1986 to 
1992. The study of Carey (1998) does not cover a time period in which the PD fund industry 
evolved. Observed PD fund activity starts in 1986 and years with more than 5 PD funds raised per 
vintage year are only observed approximately 10 years later, that is from 1996 onwards. Cumming 
and Fleming (2013) and Cumming et al. (2019) are two studies related to PD loans provided by 
two institutional investors and specialist credit investment funds. Cumming and Fleming (2013) 
document the performance of 311 loans used by private firms across 25 countries over 2001-
2010. According to them, performance depends on the portfolio size per manager, highlighting 
the role of time allocation for due diligence and monitoring. Additionally, performance according 
to them is related to borrower (firm-specific) risk. By contrast, they find that market conditions 
such as TED spreads and country level legal factors such as creditor rights are insignificantly or 
weakly related to the returns to private debt. Cumming et al. (2019) study more than 400 loans 
acquired through new issuances or secondary market transactions. They analyse data at the 
transaction level in 13 Asia-Pacific markets between 2001 and 2015 and find that trading private 
debt delivers higher returns than buying and holding a primary issuance. Additionally, they create 
an index and find that private debt investments deliver excess returns to public markets over 
time, these excess returns being affected by volatility, funding liquidity, and the global financial 
crisis (GFC).  
Carey (1998), Cumming and Fleming (2013) and Cumming et al. (2019) study debt 
performance at the loan level. However, the PD industry has seen an immense growth in PD funds, 
creating the necessity to analyse performance at the fund level. To the best my knowledge, only 
one study has researched the performance of PD funds. Munday et al. (2018) use the Burgiss 
database and analyse 476 private credit funds together with a subset of 155 direct lending funds. 
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They find positive IRRs for the top three quartiles across all investment strategies and relatively 
low beta and positive alpha using leveraged loan or high yield indices, indicating diversification 
benefits. The study of Munday et al. (2018) does, however, not investigate a fund’s persistence in 
performance, nor does it control for factors affecting performance or persistence.  
 
3.3 Additional literature 
It appears that another strand of literature is relevant to the analysis of PD fund 
performance. Credit market conditions, such as the aggregate amount of capital flowing into the 
PD fund industry, bank loan supply, loan conditions or credit standards, affect firms’ ability to 
access external finance. In this study, I cover a period before and after the global financial crisis 
(GFC), thus providing information about different states of bank loan expansion and contraction 
and credit market conditions. For example, Leary (2009) provides evidence that following an 
expansion (contraction) of bank loan supply, the bank loan ratio of small and bank-dependent 
firms significantly increases (decreases) relative to that of large, less bank-dependent firms. 
Lemmon and Roberts (2010) show that substitution to alternative sources of capital given 
contraction in the supply of credit is limited, leading to an almost one-for-one decline in net 
investment for below-investment-grade firms. Duchin et al. (2010) study the effect of the global 
financial crisis (GFC) and negative shocks to the supply of external finance on corporate 
investment. They find that corporate investment declines significantly following the onset of the 
crisis, this decline being largest for firms that operate in industries dependent on external finance. 
This finding is confirmed by a later study of Carvalho et al. (2016), who additionally suggest that 
public debt markets do not mitigate the effects of relationship bank distress during financial 
crises.  
Is appears that important and large gaps exist in the PD fund literature First, to the best of 
my knowledge, no prior research has calculated PD fund performance using timed cash flow data. 
Analysing cash flows from and to the LP allows to calculate the public market equivalent (PME) of 
PD funds and net of fees. Second and obviously related to the first deficit, no prior research has 
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yet analysed the persistence of performance across funds managed by the same GP. However, 
this information is needed to gauge for the accuracy of using past performance as a naïve estimate 
of future performance. Third, the examination of the question how credit market conditions 
affect PD fund performance is missing. Fourth, it is unclear whether persistence for PD funds is 
declining with increasing competition, as was the case with PE funds. This study aims to shed light 
on these research gaps and contributes to closing them.  
 
4  Data & Methodology 
This study uses an extensive worldwide PD data set including timed cash flows obtained 
from Preqin. It provides fund level as well as GP level information such as performance, size, type 
and geography, firm inception etc.  
 
4.1 Data 
Cash flow data is made available by Preqin. This cash flow data is gathered from reliable 
sources such as U.S. pension funds and obtained via Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests. 
Cash flow data from Preqin is increasingly used in academia and found to be reliable.104  
As Braun et al. (2017) remark, any data source that relies on GPs to reveal their returns is 
subject to biases that arise from the lower probability of revealing the past performance of funds 
that performed poorly. Also, to the extent that data from GPs are back-filled, there are 
survivorship biases. Given that not much research related to PD funds is available, little is known 
about the extent of attrition among GPs focused on PD funds. The fact that data for this study are 
                                                     
104 See, for example, Phalippou (2014), Barber & Yasuda (2017) or Ang et al. (2018). Phalippou (2014), 
for example, compares the Preqin cash flow dataset with the proprietary datasets of Harris et al. (2014a) 
and Higson and Stucke (2012) and finds that the average PME of PE funds using the different datasets is 
very similar. Similarly, Ang et al. (2018) calculate PMEs by vintage year and based on Preqin data and 
compare their results to those of Harris et al. (2014). Ang et al. (2018) report that the output statistics are 
extremely close. As is reported in Korteweg (2018), out of 14 scientific studies analyzing fund-level (or LP 
level) PE returns, 4 use the Preqin database. Given the findings of Phalippou (2014) and Ang et al. (2018) 
and the review in Korteweg (2018), a priori, it appears prudent to base this study on Preqin cash flow data. 
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gathered from reliable sources such as U.S. pension funds and obtained via Freedom of 
Information Act (FOIA) may invalidate some of the concerns of Braun et al. (2017) partially. 
Gathering the data in this way is comparable to Harris et al. (2014a), for example, who rely on 
Burgiss data, sourced from more than two hundred institutional investors. Such data appear 
unlikely to suffer from any major biases. However, survivorship biases can not be excluded. I 
therefore control for potential survivorship effects as attrition might affect PD fund performance. 
Specifically, I control for the performance effects of first generation funds and one-time funds. 
First generation funds are those funds for which data has entered the Preqin database for the 
first time, followed by successive funds managed by the same GP. One-time funds are funds that 
enter the sample once but for which no subsequent fund is observed. After their first listing, GPs 
of one-time funds disappear from the sample. Of the 347 PD funds, 75 are one-time funds with 
no subsequent fund and 77 are first generation funds, followed by successive funds. I will show 
later that first-time fund performance is significantly better than one-time fund performance and 
that accounting for PD fund survivorship, performance increases in the cross-section. 
 
4.2 Sample 
Special attention is given to the fact that of 921 PD funds reported in Preqin,105 
performance data (IRRs and multiples) is only available for approximately 820 funds and cash flow 
data solely for 396 or only 43% of all PD funds. As reported in the robustness section, I find no 
upward bias in the data used in this study when comparing the results to the Preqin database. 
This limits the concern that only performing funds make cash flow data available while the non-
availability of data of some PD funds could be driven by GPs not disclosing poor past performance. 
I address this point later in the robustness section and show that the used fund performance 
information appears to be conservative.  
Since this study uses cash flows to calculate relative performance (PME), funds that do not 
provide cash flow information are eliminated from the sample. Moreover, I eliminate 48 funds 
                                                     
105 As per October 1st, 2018. 
183 





with a lifetime shorter than one year since these funds have only just started their investment 
activity and, therefore, are unlikely to have had sufficient time to deliver meaningful 
performance. The final sample consists of 347 PD funds managed by 157 GPs. The funds follow 
an investment strategy broken down into five distinct although not mutually exclusive fund types. 
These are mezzanine (117), distressed debt (127), direct lending (54), special situation (32) and 
venture debt (17). The sample size of this study is comparable to early research on the 
performance of private equity funds. Kaplan and Schoar (2005), for example, draw conclusions on 
the performance of buyout (VC funds) using a sample of 169 (577) funds.  
The sample covers vintage years 1986 through 2016 and therefore also includes relatively 
young PD funds with more recent vintage years. By construction, these younger funds have high 
portions of unrealized remaining values (NAV) in relation to the total paid-in contribution of a LP 
(RVPI). Other researchers have included funds with high RVPI, for example Harris et al. (2014a).106 
This may raise concerns related to the valuation of unrealized fund assets. I deviate from Kaplan 
and Schoar (2005) or Braun et al. (2017),107 who focus on largely liquidated funds.  The chosen 
vintage year cut-off and inclusion of funds with relatively high RVPI has several advantages. First, 
it increases sample size. This is a necessary condition for most of the analyses presented. Using 
fully liquidated funds would reduce the sample size to 26 PD funds launched in vintage years 1986 
through 1997.  Second, given that PD funds have seen a huge increase in number and size in more 
recent years, including funds with higher RVPI allows to provide performance data on more recent 
PD funds and avoids a bias towards funds launched prior to the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), which 
eclipsed the fundraising of PD funds. Finally, the longer observation period allows the analysis of 
time variation in PD fund performance over a 30 year horizon, including the analysis of periods of 
recession as identified by the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER).  
                                                     
106 Harris et al. (2014a) report a median RVPI for their last four sample years of 90.3%, 89.2%, 98.1% 
and 93.7% (see Table II).  
 
107 Braun et al. (2017), for example, include funds in which at least 50% of the capital invested has 
been realized. 
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The inclusion of funds with higher unrealized values appears diligent for additional 
reasons. First, with the introduction of topic 820 of the Financial Accounting Standards Board 
(FASB) by the end of 2009, funds are required to value their assets at fair value every quarter, 
rather than valuing them at cost.108 As Harris et al. (2014b, p. 5) note “This has likely had the 
practical effect of making estimated unrealized values closer to true market values than in the 
past […].” Funds with unrealised values in excess of 50% have vintage years 2011 and beyond and 
are therefore launched after the introduction of topic 820. Unrealized values should therefore 
approximate true market values. Second, there is empirical evidence that unrealized values are, 
on average, conservative. Jenkinson et al. (2013) and Harris et al. (2014a) deem unrealized NAVs 
to be conservative or close to fair market values. Robinson and Sensoy (2016), for example, 
calculate performance statistics using smaller and fully liquidated samples containing no self-
reported NAVs and compare them to larger samples including self-reported NAVs. They conclude 
that their performance statistics are almost identical (p. 526): “pre-liquidation NAVs, although 
self-reported by GPs, are not generally biased estimates of the realized market value of the fund.” 
Brown et al. (2017) also find that top-performing funds under-report returns and suggest that, on 
average, unrealized values are conservative. They observe that NAV manipulation is primarily a 
problem with poor performing funds. These make up roughly 15 percent of all funds in their 
sample.  As I will show later in the robustness section, using only largely liquidated funds does not 
materially affect the findings of this study. 
To accommodate potential concerns related to the fair value of self-reported NAVs, 
however, and to gauge the potential effect from NAV manipulations, an adjustment to residual 
values is considered. This adjustment is based on the findings of Driessen et al. (2012), Jenkinson 
et al. (2013), Brown et al. (2017) and Barber and Yesuda (2017): Driessen et al. (2012) find that 
self-reported NAVs of non-liquidated PE funds beyond their typical liquidation age may deviate 
substantially from their real market values. Jenkinson et al. (2013) find that periods in which 
                                                     
108 See the more recent update 2018-13 of the FASB which introduces some modifications and 
additions related to topic 820 and the changes in unrealized gains and losses to develop fair values.  
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follow-on funds are being raised are the exception to general conservatism and lead to inflated 
self-reported NAVs. In the same vein, Brown et al. (2017) evidence that reported unrealised 
values may be manipulated and boosted during times that fundraising activity is likely to occur. 
Barber and Yasuda (2017) evidence that NAVs of PE funds are exaggerated by up to 5% in times 
of fundraising. Motivated by these findings and to avoid a potential upward bias in performance 
measures, I calculate adjusted IRRs using the LP cash flow data provided by Preqin and correct 
the unrealised fair value, that is the self-reported NAV calculated by the GP. The latter is 
considered the firm’s opinion rather than a market value. Instead of treating the self-reported 
NAVs as a market value and final cash flow as in, for example, Kaplan and Schoar (2005) or Harris 
et al. (2014a) or writing them off completely as in Phalippou and Gottschalg (2009), this study 
adjusts self-reported NAVs: First, I write down the unrealised NAV by 5% for all funds that are not 
beyond their typical liquidation age and that are not liquidated. The 5% write-off rate is taken 
from Barber and Yasuda (2017) and accounts for potentially exaggerated NAVs in times of 
fundraising. Second, motivated by the findings of Driessen et al. (2012) or Phalippou and 
Gottschalg (2009), self-reported NAVs of funds that are beyond their typical liquidation age, that 
is the median age of the cross-section, are written-off by 30%. This write-off rate is based on 
studies related to recovery rates for defaulting debt instruments (Chen, 2010; Van de Castle et 
al., 2000; Davydenko et al., 2012; Altman et al., 2005) and an estimate related to the probability 
of default based on the findings of Robert and Sufi (2009) as explained in more detail in Appendix 
II.   
Several reasons may justify an adjustment of NAVs lower than that estimated for PE funds 
by Driessen et al. (2012) or recommended by Phalippou and Gottschalg (2009). First, the expected 
payoffs for different asset classes are increasing with seniority. Other than with PE funds, the 
assets of a PD fund typically rank higher than those of a PE fund and may in some cases be secured 
or partially secured by company assets. The market value of such debt assets, even for PD funds 
beyond their typical liquidation age, might therefore be higher than that of equity-like assets. 
Second, according to Preqin (2017), the valuation of NAVs should be carried out in accordance 
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with IFRS, GAAP, FAS 157 and/or the relevant industry guidelines such as for example the 
International Private Equity and Venture Capital (IPEVC) guidelines. Also, the aforementioned 
FASB requirements apply to PD funds and asset valuations appear to be more objective when 
applied to debt instruments which will typically have a face value and which are less prone to 
subjective assessments of potential future cash flows. Third, as mentioned before, there is 
empirical evidence that contradicts the opinion that self-reported NAVs are generally overvalued. 
Overall, applying a write-off of 5% to NAVs of all funds that are not beyond their typical liquidation 
age and one of 30% to NAVs of funds beyond their typical liquidation age appears prudent.  
 
5  Descriptive Statistics and Private Debt Fund Performance 
This section provides descriptive and performance statistics for the sample of 347 PD 
funds analysed. Table 1 reports descriptive statistics. The sample consists of 117 mezzanine, 54 
direct lending, 127 distressed debt, 32 special situations and 17 venture debt funds. Roughly one 
third of all funds are mezzanine funds and a somewhat larger fraction (37%) consists of distressed 
debt funds, these two fund types together representing approximately 70% of the sample. The 
average fund size is USD 950 million (all figures in 2001 US dollars),109 with distressed debt funds 
(USD 1,498 million) being the largest and venture debt funds (USD 216 million) the smallest funds, 
on average. Fund maturity for liquidated funds is 12.6 years, fund maturity for largely liquidated 
funds is 10.6 years on average.110 Mezzanine funds have the longest, direct lending funds the 
shortest maturity.111 The effective duration of PD funds, however, is much shorter since PD funds 
distribute cash over the lifetime of a fund. Table 1 also documents the fraction of funds with an 
                                                     
109 Fund size is inflation adjusted, based on the Consumer Price Index (CPI) as retrieved from the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), https://beta.bls.gov.  
 
110 Funds with undistributed assets below 5% are considered liquidated funds, those with less than 50% 
undistributed assets are considered largely liquidated funds. This is similar in spirit to the approach of Braun 
et al. (2017), who include funds in which at least 50% oft he capital invested has been realized.  
 
111 Note that these maturities are largely affected by the fact that direct lending funds, for example, 
have very late vintage years and are largely unliquidated. Maturity information must therefore be 
considered with caution.  
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investment focus on the United States, Europe, Asia or other geographical regions. Clearly, PD 
funds’ geographical investment focus is on the United States with 83.9% of all funds focussing on 
this region, followed by Europe, with 12.7%, on average. Asia and other regions appear to be of 
lesser importance with some 3.5% of PD funds investing primarily in these regions. On average, 
56% of all PD funds follow a diversified strategy and invest in several unrelated industries. Only 
44% focus on one or related industries (such as, for example, health care and pharma).  
Additional descriptive statistics are provided in Table 2, columns 1 – 5, sorted by vintage 
year in Panel B. The number of funds per vintage year (columns 1 and 2) increases strongly in the 
pre-GFC period and remains consistently high thereafter.112 This illustrates the trend for market 
based financing. Fund maturity (column 3) for fully liquidated funds (vintage 1986 through 1997) 
/ largely liquidated funds (vintage years 1986 through 2003) using a threshold of a maximum of 
5% remaining value (RVPI) is 14.3 years / 14.05 years, on average for these vintage years. Allowing 
for some non-liquidated NAV and extending the observation period from 1986 through 2010, for 
example, reduces fund maturity to an average 12.8 years. This number is close to the cross-
sectional maturity as shown in Table 1. Mean fund size is increasing and peaking in 2007, the start 
of the crisis in the subprime mortgage market. In this vintage year, the 16 funds launched had an 
average size of approximately USD 1.2 billion (all figures in 2001 dollars), double the size as 
observed in the cross-section (Table 1). Clearly, fund size has increased with the developing PD 
market. The average fund size prior to the GFC (vintage years 1986 through 2006) is USD 467 
million. It increases to approximately USD 641 million in the period including the GFC and the 
aftermath of it (2007 and vintage years thereafter). The average size decreases somewhat after 
the GFC (vintages 2009 – 2016) but remains at a high average of approximately USD 571 million. 
By construction, the remaining net asset value (NAV) scaled by paid-in capital in % (“RVPI”) is 
highest for younger, smallest for older and zero for liquidated funds.  
                                                     
112 The declining number of observed funds in 2016 is due to the fact that PD funds typically start 
reporting cash flows only after the investment period and not in the fundraising period. The dataset from 
Preqin is of October 1st, 2018 and does therefore cut-off a number of funds for 2016 that did not yet start 
their cash-flow-reporting. Interpreting the number of funds launched in the year 2016 to be declining would 
therefore be misleading. 
188 





Performance. Turning to performance in Table 2, I report two performance measures and 
the average performance by vintage year: the internal rate of return (IRR) and the total value over 
paid-in capital (TVPI) are shown in Table 2, columns 6 and 7. The public market equivalent (PME) 
is shown in Table 3, columns 6 and 7. Performance is calculated from LP cash flows using 
unadjusted self-reported NAVs  as in Kaplan and Schoar (2005) on the left hand side of the 
columns. Additionally, self-reported NAVs are adjussted as described before and resulting in 
adjusted IRRs, TVPIs and PMEs shown on the right hand side of the columns.   
 
 5.1 Internal Rate of Return (IRR) 
Kaplan and Schoar (2005), Korteweg and Nagel (2016) or Korteweg and Sorensen (2017) 
have used this absolute performance measure, which is also widely used by practitioners 
(Gompers et al., 2016). I use fund cash flows to calculate the IRR. First, an unadjusted IRR is 
calculated treating self-reported NAVs as market values and including them as if they were 
distributions to LPs. Formally, the input to this calculation is cash flow data for N funds. For 
portfolio i (i = 1, ...,N), I observe a series of cash flows between the inception date (denoted t0i) 
and the end date (denoted T). The cash flows consist of investments from LPs (called 
“contributions” and denoted “C”) and distributions to LPs (denoted “D”). The IRR of a PD fund i is 
then calculated as in equation (1): 
 







                                    (1) 
  
Treating NAVs as market values is the approach that has been applied by Kaplan and 
Schoar (2005) or Harris et al. (2014a), for example. Empirical support for this approach is provided 
by Robinson and Sensoy (2016) who find that (p. 526): “pre-liquidation NAVs, although self-
reported by GPs, are not generally biased estimates of the realized market value of the fund.” 
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Turning to Table 2, treating self-reported NAVs as market values (“IRRCF”) and aggregating by 
vintage year, the average (median) performance amounts to 12% (11%). Adjusting self-reported 
NAVs results in the IRRs depicted on the right-hand side of column 6 (“IRRadjusted”). Larger 
performance differences are only found for younger funds. Their unrealized NAV scaled by paid-
in capital (column 5) increases with more recent vintage years and decreases as funds approach 
liquidation age. On average, the IRR drops by 1% to 11%, whereas the median IRR remains 
unchanged at a value of 11% when using adjusted NAVs to calculate IRR. It appears that the 
difference between IRR’s is relatively small. The observed IRR of 12% seems high for a debt 
investment. However, one has to remember that the fund returns comprise multiple elements 
(cash coupons, payments in kind, upfront fees collected at origination and profits from secondary 
markets debt transactions).  
Panel A of Table 2 shows large performance differences between top-quartile and 
bottom-quartile PD funds. Top quartile funds show an IRR of 23%, on average, while bottom 
quartile funds exhibit an IRR of 0%. The large dispersion between top and bottom quartile fund 
performance seems qualitatively similar for all used performance measures. The average cross-
sectional fund performance by fund type is between 8% (for venture debt funds) and 12% (for 
distressed debt funds).  
 
5.2 Total value over paid-in capital (TVPI)   
Next, another commonly used measure of fund performance is used. This is the total value 
over paid-in capital (“TVPI”),113 net of fees. That is the sum of all cash distributions to a LP plus 
the remaining value of non-liquidated funds (self-reported NAV), scaled by sum of all cash 
contributions of a LP. The TVPI of a PD fund i is then calculated as in equation (2).  
 
                                                     
113 Some studies call this multiple the «MOIC», meaning the multiple of invested capital. The terms are 
exchangeable.  
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                                    (2) 
Table 2, column 7, shows this multiple. As before, I first treat the remaining value as a true 
market value. The calculations and adjustments to self-reported NAVs from the previous section 
apply and result in a TVPI-multiple calculated myself using LP cash-flows (“TVPICF”) and a TVPI-
multiple using adjusted remaining values (“TVPIadjusted”). Treating self-reported NAVs as market 
values (“TVPICF”) and aggregating by vintage year, the mean (median) performance amounts to 
1.54X (1.52X). Adjusting self-reported NAVs results in a mean (median) TVPI multiple depicted on 
the right-hand side of column 7 (“TVPIadjusted”) of 1.50X (1.51X). As could be expected and as with 
the IRR, adjusting the self-reported and undistributed NAVs primarily affects younger funds (later 
vintage years) but in the cross-section, the adjustment reduces the mean (median) TVPI multiple 
only slightly from 1.54X to 1.53X (1.52X to 1.51X). Top-quartile funds show a mean multiple of 
1.84X, on average, while bottom-quartile funds exhibit a multiple of 1X. The large dispersion 
between top- and bottom-quartile fund performance seems qualitatively similar to that observed 
when measuring the IRR of PD funds. Fund performance by fund type is lowest for venture PD 
funds with a multiple of 1.31X and highest for distressed PD funds with a multiple of 1.43X, on 
average.  
 
5.3 Public Market Equivalent (PME) 
Although practitioners focus much on IRRs and investment multiples, one of the key 
questions regarding PD is how returns compare with those to public debt. Using timed cash flows, 
I calculate the public market equivalent (“PME”) measure introduced by Kaplan and Schoar (2005) 
and later used as “the state-of-the-art measure of fund-level performance” (Kaplan & Sensoy, 
2015, p. 601) or “the standard performance measure used in the academic literature” (Lerner et 
al., 2018, p. 17). The PME can be viewed as a market-adjusted multiple of invested capital and is 
a widely accepted measure in the asset management industry and under the Global Investment 
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Performance Standards (L’Her, 2016). Rather than absolute performance measures (such as the 
IRR or the TVPI), the PME adjusts for the market return or the risk of the investments spanned by 
the benchmark returns and evaluates performance based on cash flows alone. The PME compares 
an investment in a private debt fund to an investment in a benchmark index. A fund with a PME 
greater than one outperformed the benchmark index net of all fees over its lifetime. Sorensen 
and Jagannathan (2013) and Korteweg and Nagel (2013) link PE performance to asset pricing 
theory and establish that the PME suffices to adjust for risks spanned by the benchmark return, 
regardless of beta with respect to the benchmark. The assumption is that investors have log 
utility.  
I calculate the present value (PV) of distributions and contributions from the fund level 
cash-flow data provided by Preqin. The PME compares these PVs from a private debt investment, 
adjusted for the time value of money. The realized market return (Rmt) as given by the benchmark 
index is used as the discount rate to calculate the PVs. Sorensen and Jagannathan (2014) describe 
it as the ratio of the present value of distributions scaled by the present value of contributions:  
 
𝑃𝑀𝐸 =  [𝛴t
𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠(t)
∏ (1+ 𝑅ms)𝑡𝑠=𝑡𝑜𝑖
]  /   [𝛴t
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠(t)
∏ (1+ 𝑅ms)𝑡𝑠=𝑡𝑜𝑖
]   (3) 
 
The sum runs over the life of the fund from the first cash flows at s=t0i to the time of the 
distributions or capital calls respectively. As is pointed out by Phalippou (2014), the choice of 
benchmark is critical to measuring performance. Following the recommendation of Sorensen and 
Jagannathan (2014) and as practiced in other studies in the PE asset class (see, for example, Harris 
et al., 2014 or L’Her et al., 2016), I evaluate performance using different benchmark indices. The 
aim is to find a publicly traded portfolio or index that mimics the return on a typical PD investor’s 
portfolio. Most PE studies use a broad equity index, such as the S&P500, to calculate the PME. 
Cumming et al. (2019) use the J.P.Morgan Asia Credit Index (JACI) for their PD study focusing on 
the Asia-Pacific markets. The JACI is a broad index of the public credit markets comprising USD-
denominated bonds, invested 76% in investment-grade and 24% in non-investmet-grade debt. An 
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accurate equivalent to these market benchmarks and used in this study are the Bloomberg 
Barclays indices. They have been the most widely used indices by credit and fixed income 
investors. An important advantage of these indices is the availability of historical prices that date 
back to the early vintage years of the PD fund industry.114 I use two total return indices as 
benchmarks for the PME calculations. First, the Bloomberg Barclays US Corporate Bond 
Index.115,116 It measures the investment grade, fixed-rate taxable corporate bond market and 
includes USD denominated securities publicly issued by US and non-US industrial, utility and 
financial issuers. It is also available in local currencies, which are used for PD funds denominated 
in Euro (EUR) or British Pounds (GBP). Second, corresponding to the notion of tailored PMEs as 
used in PE analyses (see, for example, Fang et al., 2015; or Robinson and Sensoy, 2016), I use an 
alternative benchmark: the Bloomberg Barclays US Corporate High Yield Index.117,118 This index 
measures the USD denominated, high yield, fixed-rate corporate bond market. I chose these two 
indices of the public credit market because institutional investors typically compare private 
market returns with a public index and because these two benchmarks allow a comparison with 
two indices with different risk profiles. 
Panel A of Table 3 shows cross-sectional PME results. The average PME is 1.12 (column 
3). This equals an average market outperformance over the lifetime of a fund and using the 
investment grade benchmark of 12%. Using the high yield benchmark in column 4, the cross-
sectional PME is reduced to 1.07 (7%). Splitting the sample into PME performance quartiles, the 
                                                     
114 This is not the case for the S&P Global Bond index family, for example, for which corporate credit or 
fixed income indices have only been introduced in 1993 and later. Also, a potentially suitable benchmark, 
the S&P/LSTA Leveraged Loan Index (LL100), as used in Munday et al. (2008) dates back only to 2002.  
 
115 US Corporate Baa TR Index: Bloomberg ticker “LCB1TRUU” 
 
116 Daily index prices are available from December 24, 2003. From September 1, 1988, only monthly 
index values are available on Bloomberg and daily index prices are estimated using linear interpolation.  
 
117 US Corporate High Yield: Bloomberg ticker “LF98TRUU”. Securities are classified as high yield if 
the middle rating of Moody's, Fitch and S&P is Ba1/BB+/BB+ or below. 
 
118 Daily index prices are available from July 31, 1998. Prior to this date, only monthly index values are 
available on Bloomberg. Daily prices before this date are estimated using linear interpolation. 
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top funds outperform the investment grade benchmark by a mean (median) of 44% (34%). Over 
their lifetime, bottom quartile funds underperform the market by a mean (median) of 16% (11%). 
The cross-sectional PME varies largely by fund type: At the lower end, a mean market 
outperformance of 6% for venture debt funds is observed, compared to an outperformance of 
15% for distressed debt funds at the higher end. Figure 3 graphs kernel densities of PMEs for the 
five fund types analysed as well as for the cross-section of all funds. Direct lending fund PMEs 
appear to be less dispersed than those of other fund types. The cross-sectional PME for direct 
lending funds has a standard deviation (sd) of 0.11, followed by venture debt funds (sd = 0.16), 
mezzanine funds and special situation funds, each with a sd of 0.29, and distressed debt funds (sd 
= 0.34). Clearly, fund performance as measured is fat tailed and right skewed, on average.  
Panel B, columns 3 and  4 of Table 3 show the PME as calculated with the investment 
grade benchmark (high yield benchmark), sorted by vintage year. Both columns show the mean 
and median PME determined with unadjusted cash flows on the left side (PMECF) and using 
adjusted cash flows (PMEadjusted) on the right side. Aggregated by vintage year, the mean 
unadjusted (adjusted) and equal-weighted PMEs over the sample period are 1.17 (1.18). The 
median unadjusted (adjusted) PMEs amount to 1.16 (1.14). This indicates that over their lifetime, 
PD funds outperform the investment grade benchmark by an unadjusted (adjusted) average 17% 
(18%), the difference from the NAV-adjustments amounting to 1%.   
Kaplan and Schoar (2005) use the term cumulative alpha for the performance in excess of 
a PME of 1. In their terminology, a PME of 1.2 is equivalent to a cumulative alpha of 20%, created 
over the life of a fund. I a comparable vein, I calculate the annualized alpha (α) from the 
cumulative alphas. The days of each fund’s life from the first to the last reported cash flow (or last 
reported NAV) are counted and divided by 365 to calculate the investment periods measured in 
calendar years (yi). For each fund, alpha is then approximated by (PMEi)(1/yi) – 1. Columns 6 and 7 
of Panels A and B show the annualized alpha as calculated from the PME. Using the investment 
grade (high yield) benchmark and sorted by vintage year, alpha amounts to 2% (1%) in the cross-
section. The large performance dispersion between top- and bottom performance funds is 
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reflected in likewise large differences in annualized alpha. Measured with the investment grade 
(high yield) benchmark, top funds provide an alpha of 5.96% (4.88%), while bottom funds provide 
an alpha of -2.57% (-3.23%).  
As can be seen in Panel B of Table 3, alphas show large time variation if sorted by vintage 
years. The data suggests that alphas vary strongly in the period prior to the Global Financial Crisis 
(GFC), whereas they become more stable and remain consistently positive in the post-GFC period. 
I therefore compare the cross-sectional alpha for the pre- and post-2008 period: alpha as 
calculated from the investment grade benchmark has increased more than sixfold in the post-
2008 period, on average, and increased from 0.46% to 2.87%.  Likewise, alpha as calculated from 
the high yield benchmark is close to zero (-0.02) for the period pre-2008, on average. Thereafter 
it increases to 1.61%.  
 
5.4 Risk and Abnormal Performance of PD funds 
It has been shown above that PD funds outperform the market as measured by the PMEIG 
(PMEHY) by 17% (12%), on average, and by 44% (35%) in the cross-section of top quartile funds. 
This outperformance is calculated from the PME as in Kaplan and Schoar (2005) and adjusts for 
risks spanned by the benchmark returns, regardless of beta and under the assumption that 
investors have log utility.119 However, investors may not have log utility and it is likely that there 
exist risks associated with PD funds that are not spanned by the two benchmarks. It therefore 
appears accurate to decompose PD fund returns by estimating the beta (and alpha) for the cross-
section of PD funds.  
Driessen et al. (2012) provide a methodology to estimate risk and return of nontraded 
assets from cash flows. They minimize the sum of squared differences between the present value 
of fund distributions and contributions using a stochastic discount factor (SDF) calculated from 
the risk-free rate (Rf) plus the estimated alpha (α) plus the realized excess market return (Rm-Rf) 
times beta (β). In their methodology, the standard IRR calculation is extended by incorporating 
                                                     
119 See Sorensen and Jagannathan (2013) and Korteweg and Nagel (2013) for a formal justification. 
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exposure to realized market returns. Using a discount rate that is different in each period and 
equal to 1 + Rf + α + β(Rm-Rf), this can be expressed as in equation (4): 
 
NPVi(α,β) =  [Σt
Distributions(t)
∏ ((1+ Rfs + α + β(Rms-Rfs) )𝑡𝑠=𝑡𝑜𝑖
]   -  [Σt
Contributions(t)
∏ ((1+ Rfs + α + β(Rms-Rfs) )𝑡𝑠=𝑡𝑜𝑖
]     (4) 
 
As in Driessen et al. (2012), Section IV.C, I use portfolios grouped by vintage year to 
eliminate small sample biases. This yields 28 value weighted portfolios sorted by vintage year and 
thus 28 moment conditions. Quarterly cash flows for the period 1986 through 2016 are used to 
calculate the present values of portfolio i. The realized market returns (Rm) are employed when 
discounting cash flows (and not expected returns). The USD 1-year treasury constant maturity 
rate is used as the risk-free rate (Rf). As above, the Bloomberg Barclays US Corporate Bond Index 
(IG) and the Bloomberg Barclays US Corporate High Yield Index (HY) are used as market return 
(Rm) and serve to estimate abnormal performance (α) and risk loadings (β) within a one-factor 
market model. Additionally, I use the the value-weighted index of all US stocks compiled by the 
Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP).120 Using the stochastic discount factor (SDF) as in 
equation (4), I estimate α and β so as they most closely force all fund NPVs equal to zero. Table 4 
shows the alphas and betas using the methodology as in Driessen et al. (2012) for the three 
benchmarks.  
Starting with the investment grade benchmark in Panel A, PD funds have a quarterly 
(annualized) alpha of 2.46% (10.21%), significant at the 1% level. Beta amounts to -0.13 and is 
statistically not significant. Turning to the high-yield (HY) benchmark in Panel B, PD funds have a 
quarterly (annualized) alpha of 2.19% (9.05%), significant at the 1% level and an insignificant beta 
of 0.05.  Benchmarking PD fund cash flows against US stocks in Panel C, I find a quarterly 
(annualized) alpha of 1.62% (6.64%), significant at the 1% level. The beta of 0.43 is now significant 
at the 5% level. 
                                                     
120 Data on CRSP indices are from CRSP, accessed via 
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html 
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 This analysis suggests that PD fund returns resemble, if anything, those of US stock 
returns. The t-value for the beta using the stock return benchmark is 2.19 as compared to those 
of the IG- and HY-benchmarks, which are -0.39 and 0.15 respectively. Given these betas, PD funds 
may be considered market neutral with respect to bond markets and, with a significant beta of 
0.4, moderately related to equity markets. It appears that PD fund returns are not significantly 
affected by the bond benchmarks. If it holds that beta is zero, then alpha is essentially the 
expected return in excess of the risk-free rate. Taking the cross-sectional (over the sample period) 
risk-free rate of 3.59% as a naïve estimate and using these alphas, the expected returns for PD 
funds as estimated from Panels A and B are 13.80% (3.59% + 10.21%), 12.64% (3.59% + 9.05%).  
Taking a naive estimate for the equity premium of approximately 4.5% (assuming an average long-
term equity market return of 8%) and the same risk-free rate, the cost of capital is 3.59% + 0.43 
X 4.5% = 5.5%. Using the significant abnormal positive return (α) of 6.64%, this results in an 
approximate IRR of 5.5% + 6.6% = 12.1%, according to the CAPM. 
One could expect that the cross-sectional static IRR is close to this expected return 
calculated from a time-varying discount rate. Comparing the previously calculated static IRR of 
10.6% to the expected returns using the bond benchmarks, however, the difference is between 
2% (Panel B) and 3.2% (Panel A).  
The estimated risk and abnormal performance characteristics of PD funds shown in Table 
4 provide several insights. First, the data suggests that PD fund returns are largely unsystematic 
or market neutral when compared to bond and moderately systematic when compared to equity 
markets, indicating diversification benefits. Second, although the significance being 
indistinguishable from zero for the bond benchmarks, betas appear to be reliably different from 
one. This observation is in line with Munday et al. (2018), who find relatively low betas. The results 
presented before in Section 5.3 using the Kaplan and Schoar (2005) public market equivalent 
(PME) and assuming a beta of one, may therefore be downward biased in terms of alpha and 
understate the true risk-adjusted returns (α’s) to bond markets. Third, it appears that PD funds 
constitute an asset class that is largely independent of bond markets. Finally, as PD fund 
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performance is not largely explained by the return on the market portfolio as mimicked by the 
used benchmark indices (β), it appears that, on average, there is high alpha in this asset class, 
suggesting that PD funds add value.121 
 
5.5 Performance of first-time and one-time PD funds 
In this Section I control for the performance effects of first generation funds and one-time 
funds. First-time funds are those funds for which data have entered the Preqin PD database for 
the first time. At least one or more funds then follow these first-time funds, managed by the same 
GP. First-time funds differ from one-time funds. The latter are funds that enter the sample once 
but for which no subsequent fund managed by the same GP is observed in the dataset. Little is 
known about the extent of attrition among GPs focused on PD funds. However, I find that a 
substantial 78 in 160 first-time GPs do not have a second PD fund in the database. This fact can 
be related to GPs simply ceasing to report their performance to Preqin. Alternatively, their 
disappearance, or attrition, can be rooted in their bad performance. If so, a conditioned 
subsample should evidence that one-time funds have a performance which is worse than that of 
other funds. Table 5 compares the performance measures used in the previous sections (IRR, 
TVPI, PME and annualized α for the unconditioned cross-section (column A) and as a baseline, to 
one-time PD funds (column B), first-time funds followed by successive funds (column C), the cross-
section without one-time PD funds (column D) and the difference between columns D and A as 
an indication of potential effects from attrition. 
 Compared to the baseline, one-time fund performance (column B) is substantially worse 
for all performance measures, the difference always statistically significant at the 1%-level. One-
time funds appear to add little or no value to investors when using annualized alphas. They 
underperform the high-yield benchmark by an approximate -0.3% per annum and barely keep up 
with the investment-grade benchmark. Also, their IRR (TVPI multiple) is reduced from the cross-
                                                     
121 Assessing value creation is typically measured by abnormal returns gross of fees. However, if α is 
positive after fees, as calculated in this paper, it gets only better before fees. 
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sectional baseline result of 10.6% (1.4) to a lower 6.7% (1.2). Turning to first-time funds with 
follow-on funds managed by the same GP (column C), they appear to perform substantially better 
than those funds that are not first-time funds. Comparing their performance to one-time funds 
(column B), all performance measures are better for the first-time funds. When comparing the 
cross-sectional performance of the sub-sample that does not include one-time funds (column D) 
to the baseline results (column A), performance is better for all performance metrics.  This 
comparison shows a potential survivorship bias in the PD fund data. Related to the IRR, TVPI-
multiple, PMEIG and PMEHY as well as annualized alphas for IG and HY, the potential survivorship 
bias accounts for (column E) approximately 1.1%, 0.05X, 3% and 3% as well as 0.31% and 0.37%. 
The data therefore suggests that attrition affects the performance data of PD fund samples. The 
magnitude is approximately comparable to that observed in longer term mutual fund samples 
(Carhart et al., 2002). It appears that accounting for PD fund survivorship, the average 
performance as depicted in Tables 2 and 3 increases. However, these results should be 
interpreted with caution and do not necessarily represent the PD fund population as funds might 
disappear from the Preqin database for reasons other than low performance. Also, I can only 
identify one-time funds with high accuracy for the early vintages in my sample. For more recent 
vintages it is unclear whether a fund is a one-time fund or one that will later be followed by a 
successive fund and consequently be classified as first-time fund. More comprehensive studies 
focusing solely on the question of PD fund survivorship biases are needed to understand better, 
how survivorship biases affect PD fund performance.  
 
6  Performance Persistence 
Can past performance help investors to make performance predictions? This question is 
considered next. I employ three analyses to evaluate whether performance of a given fund, as 
measured by PME, is associated positively with the performance of the next fund managed by the 
same GP. First, current performance is related to past performance running cross-sectional linear 
OLS regressions. This approach has been applied in the seminal work of Kaplan and Schoar (2005), 
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in more recent studies (for example Braun et al., 2017) and in Harris et al. (2014b). According to 
Kaplan and Sensoy (2015), Harris et al. (2014b) conduct the most comprehensive analysis of fund-
level performance persistence in PE.  
Second, I consider persistence by performance quartile and calculate Markov transition 
probabilities from one performance quartile into the same or another performance quartile by 
funds managed by the same PD firm. In a third analysis, which is presented in Section 7 separately, 
I control for other factors that potentially affect fund performance and persistence.  
 
6.1 Regressing current fund performance on past performance  
First, current fund performance is related to past performance. Of the 347 funds in the 
sample, 184 have performance data of a partnership’s previous fund.122 While it would be 
preferred to have no gap in the fund sequence, the sample is considerably larger than that of 
Kaplan and Schoar (2005), who analyze persistence of buyout fund performance based on only 
76 funds with prior performance history, or that of Robinson and Sensoy (2016), who measure 
performance persistence based on 73 venture capital fund sequences. It is, however, comparable 
to the 152 buyout funds with prior performance that Robinson and Sensoy (2016) use to estimate 
persistence and to the 179/193 funds with prior performance that Harris et al. (2014a) have in 
their sample to analyze persistence of buyout/venture capital funds in the period post 2000. 
Panel A of Table 6 shows ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions of current PMEIGit and 
PMEHYit on the lagged PMEIGit-1 and PMEHYit-1. Since the number of PD funds has markedly picked 
up just prior to the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), I run the regressions for three periods: for the 
whole sample period (columns 1 and 4), for the pre-GFC period (columns 2 and 5) and for the post 
GFC-period (columns 3 and 6), that is for all vintages as well as the pre- and post-2007 vintage 
funds.123 Given that PME is right skewed, I estimate regressions using log PME (for both current 
                                                     
122 For the high yield (HY) benchmark index three additional observations are available since index 
data dates back longer than that of the IG benchmark. 
 
123 The post-2007 period includes also vintage year 2007. 
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and previous PME). To gauge for the effect of vintage years and the impact of vintage year specific 
economic and market conditions, I include vintage year fixed effects as indicated. As shown in 
Table 3, there is large variation in performance across the different fund types. I therefore control 
for the average differences across fund types and include fund type dummy variables. 
As shown in Panel A of Table 6, for the whole sample period, previous performance as 
measured by the log of PMEt-1 is significantly related to current fund performance (log of PMEt). 
A 10% increase in the lagged performance using the investment grade benchmark (high yield 
benchmark) is associated with a 1.7% increase in the log of current fund performance. Using the 
cross-sectional PME of 1.12, for example, a 10% increase in previous performance is associated 
with an improvement in market outperformance from 12% to 13.8%.124 For funds with vintages 
in the pre-2007 period,  persistence in PD fund performance disappears and is statistically not 
different from zero. The opposite is observed for funds launched in or after vintage year 2007. 
Persistence for these funds is highly statistically significant: a 10% increase in prior fund 
performance predicts an increase in the log of PMEt by 2.3% to 2.4% (columns 3 and 6) or an 
increase in average market outperformance from 12% to approximately 14.6%.125   
Given that performance for top-quartile funds is considerably higher than that for bottom 
quartile funds (see Table 3), I next analyse whether persistence for those funds with a prior fund 
that has outperformed the market (i.e. PME >=1) is different from that of funds with a prior fund 
that has underperformed  the market (i.e. PME <1). Underperforming funds represent the 4th 
quartile, while outperforming funds represent the top and the 2nd quartile primarily. Panel B of 
Table 6, shows ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions of current PMEIGit on the lagged positive 
PMEIGit-1(+) and negative PMEIGit-1(-). Vintage year fixed effects are used in all regressions. No funds 
with negative previous PME are observed for the pre-2007 period and column 4 is therefore 
                                                     
124 As the ln(1.1) = 0.095, the expected log outperformance is 0.095*0.171 = 0.016 in 
the next period, leading to a PME of exp(0.016) = 1.016. Given the average PME of 1.12 this 
leads to a PME of 1.0163*1.12 = 1.138. 
 
125 Same calculation as in footnote 27, but multiplying the log outperformance by 0.238 (= 0.234 + 
0.243 / 2).  
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empty. The results suggest that persistence is driven by outperforming funds of the post-2007 
period. Performance persistence for these funds is statistically significant at the 1% level. Contrary 
to this, persistence for underperforming funds is not significant for the same sub-period. Positive 
prior outperformance appears to be a statistically significant predictor of current performance for 
the post-2007 period, while underperformance does not predict low performance of a 
subsequent fund. For the post-2007 period, a 10% increase in the previous funds PME of 
outperforming funds is associated with a 3% increase in the current fund log PME or an increase 
in average market outperformance from 12% to approximately 15.3%.126 The results are 
qualitatively similar when using the HY-benchmark.  
 
6.2 Quartile transition probabilities 
Next, as in Kaplan and Schoar (2005) or Harris et al. (2014b), 127 I consider whether 
previous fund quartile performance, as measured by PME, is informative of current performance 
calculating conditional transitions probabilities. Each previous fund is grouped into the top-, 2nd, 
3rd or bottom-quartile. Current funds with past performance quartile information are then also 
grouped into the top-, 2nd, 3rd or bottom-quartile. Table 7, Panel A, reports the crosstabs per PME 
quartile for the whole sample. These show the probability that a partnership’s next fund wll either 
stay in the same performance quartile, or move into one of the other three quartiles. PD funds 
with a previous fund in the top-quartile are in the top-quartile in 39.1% of all cases. Likewise, 
funds with prior bottom-quartile performance remain in the bottom quartile in 37.0%. This finding 
indicates very high performance persistence in general and at both ends of the distribution. Top-
quartile to 3rd quartile (bottom quartile) transitions are observed in 21.7% (15.2%) of all cases and 
                                                     
126 As the ln(1.1) = 0.095, the expected log outperformance is 0.095*0.302 = 0.029 in the 
next period, leading to a PME of exp(0.029) = 1.029. Given the average PME of 1.12 this leads 
to a PME of 1.029*1.12 = 1.1527 or an outperformance of 15.3%. 
127 Kaplan and Schoar (2005) use terciles, instead of quartiles. Methodologically the categorization into 
performance groups is identical.  
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the inverse, bottom-quartile to second (top quartile) transitions are observed in 23.9% (13.0%). 
Selecting PD funds with previous top-quartile performance in Panel A, for example, yields an 
expected performance of the follow on fund managed by the same GP of E(PMEIG|PQ) = 1.2.128  
Panel D includes a naïve model predicting the expected return from given previous quartile 
performances and the observed probability distribution of funds staying in the same or switching 
into another performance quartile. Overly simplified, this naïve model must be extended by the 
findings from a more complete model presented in the next Section.  
Next, the analysis is repeated for the pre- and post-2007 periods. The results are presented 
in panels B and C of Table 7. While the persistence remains high in both periods, it is much higher 
in the post-2007 period, especially for the top-quartile. PD funds with a previous fund in the top-
quartile are expected to remain in the top-quartile in 50% of all cases in the post-2007 period. 
Likewise, funds with prior bottom-quartile performance remain in the bottom quartile in 41.7% 
of all cases. For the pre-2007 period, persistence for the top-quartile is lower and amounts to 
30%. Also, the expectation of remaining in the bottom-quartile if a previous fund was a bottom-
quartile fund is slightly lower and amounts to 40%. It appears that persistence in the post-2007 
period is very high in general and at both ends of the distribution. Persistence in PD fund 
performance as compared to that of PE funds is sizeable. For example, Harris et al. (2014b)129 find  
a persistence of 27.5% for PE funds remaining in the top-quartile.  
 Overall, it appears that investors can improve their choice of funds by using quartile 
transition probabilities. The results from the OLS regressions (Table 6) and the quartile transition 
probabilities (Table 7) are consistent at the high end of the performance distribution. Positive 
previous performance is related to positive current performance. In both analyses, persistence is 
driven by post-2007 observations. For funds launched prior to 2007, persistence appears to be 
lower.  These results deviate from persistence observations in the PE fund universe. Harris et al. 
                                                     
128 The expected average PMEIG of the follow-on fund given previous quartile information [E(PMEIG|PQ) 
] of 1.2 is calculated from the probability of staying in a specific quartile, multiplied by the observed 
performance of this quartile, i.e.: (0.39 X 1.44 + 0.24 X 1.15 + 0.22 X 1.06 + 0.15 X 0.84). 
129 Kaplan and Schoar (2005) use terciles for a somewhat smaller sample and find a 55% chance of 
staying in the top tercile using PME as performance measure. 
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(2014b), for example, document persistence in PE in pre-2000 funds. After 2000, they find little 
evidence of persistence for buyout funds. Likewise, Braun et al. (2017) find declining persistence 
over time and little evidence of persistence in investments made since the late 1990s. Contrasting 
these results for PE, PD fund persistence in performance has raised over time: I find significant 
persistence in post-2007 funds. Pre-2007, I find little evidence of persistence. 
 
7  Other Factors Affecting PD Fund Performance & Persistence 
This Section analyses other factors that may influence performance and persistence. 
Motivated by prior research investigating PE fund performance as reviewed by Kaplan and Sensoy 
(2015) and Korteweg (2018) and the PD related study of Cumming et al. (2019), I include 
additional factors that might affect PD fund performance. I differentiate between fund specific 
factors, such as fund type, focus and size on the one side and economic factors, such as funding 
liquidity, recessionary periods and the amount of aggregate capital flowing into the PD fund asset 
class on the other side. Paragraphs 7.1 through 7.8 define the used independent variables and 
show the results of simple linear regressions in Table 9 employing these variables. A multiple 
linear regression approach is used in paragraph 7.9. The results are shown in Table 10.   
Returns can not be observed on a regular basis and cash flows are highly skewed. I 
therefore use the log of performance on the independent variables that represent either the 
average level or the average change of an independent variable for the vintage year (t) and the 
following calendar year (t+1). The variables are assumed to be exogenously determined. 
Estimating performance from observations of years t and t+1 solely, the following analyses are 
based on somehow noisy measures. Factors relevant in periods other than year t and t+1 may 
influence ultimate fund performance. However, the approach is in line with Kaplan and Strömberg 
(2009), who use this approach to analyse the relation between capital commitments to US PE 
funds and their later returns. The following analyses adopt the regression approach as used in 
Kaplan and Strömberg (2009). Given the methodological approach, it is suggested that the 
regression results presented below are considered illustrative of broader patterns.  
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7.1 Fund type 
First, fund type variables are considered. Preqin provides PD fund type grouping 
differentiating between different investment strategies (mezzanine, direct lending, special 
situations, distressed and venture debt funds). Although not mutually exclusive, a fund’s 
investment strategy most likely affects a fund’s performance and persistence in performance. To 
analyse this, previous fund performance PMEit-1 is interacted with the five fund types grouped by 
Preqin. Fund type dummy variables are added to account for the large dispersion of performance 
across the different investment strategies. Table 8 shows how persistence varies by fund type 
using the investment grade (columns 1 through 3) and the high yield benchmark (columns 4 
through 6). For special situations funds, no previous fund information is available in the pre-2007 
period. The data suggests there is significant persistence for direct lending funds, special 
situations and distressed debt funds for the post-2007 period and using both benchmark indices.  
 
7.2 Focus 
 Gompers et al. (2009) find that venture capital (VC) partner specialization can explain 
cross-sectional differences in performance. According to their study, increased specialization of 
VC firms is associated with greater average success. The poorest performance they find is for 
unspecialized firms that follow a generalist investment approach. Gompers et al. (2009) relate 
their result to industry-specific human capital and specialization of partners. In this vein, Ewens 
and Rhodes-Kropf (2015) observe that GP partners’ human capital is important in explaining VC 
firm performance. Cumming et al. (2019) find that manager experience is positively associated 
with PD fund returns, suggesting learning effects from investing in PD markets. Since human 
capital is limited, it appears to be an empirical question whether focus facilitates specialization 
and learning, affecting PD fund performance and its persistence. As is shown in Table 1, PD funds 
focus their activities in at least two dimensions beyond their investment strategy as indicated by 
fund type. First, they focus geographically. Second, they focus on one or more industries and thus 
follow a diversified or non-diversified investment strategy in that respect. Approximately 84% of 
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all funds have their primary investment focus in the US market, the remaining regions being 
Europe (12.7%), Asia (2.9%) and other regions (0.6%) or together 16.1%. This may reflect the 
relatively low reliance of US borrowers on the banking sector.130 Overall, approximately 56% of 
PD funds follow a diversified investment strategy, that is they invest in several and unrelated 
industries. Whereas geographical focus is mostly on the US for all fund types, industry focus 
differs from type to type. Mezzanine funds, for example, appear to be very focused with 63.3% 
investing in only one or related industries, whereas direct lending funds are generally diversified 
with only 35.2% investing in only one or related industries and 64.8% of capital being allocated to 
multiple and unrelated industries. The impact of geographical focus is measured by a dummy 
variable in column 1 of Table 9. The dummy variable takes the value of one if a fund is focused 
on the US market, zero if focused towards Europe, Asia or other regions. I find no significant 
relationship between geographical focus and PD fund performance. Turning to “ industry focus” 
in column 2, it appears to be unrelated to fund performance. Given the simple regression results, 
focus appears to be unrelated to PD fund performance. However, in view of the findings of 
Gompers et al. (2009), Ewens and Rhodes-Kropf (2015) or Cumming et al. (2019), the statistical 
evidence might at this point of the study be insufficient to suggest that PD fund performance is in 
effect unrelated to industry focus. I will control for this when using the multiple regression 
approach in the next section. 
 
                                                     
130 According to the latest Global Shadow Banking Monitoring Report, the US accounts for approximately 31% of global shadow 
banking assets (held by non-banks), followed by Europe with a total of 22%. See exhibit 4-5, p.50 Financial Stability Board (2018). In 
the US, non-bank credit is larger than the size of bank credit, whereas in Europe, firms largely rely on bank credit. As can be taken 
from the BIS (www.bis.org/statistics/totcredit.htm), the market share of total credit to non-financial corporations as a percentage of 
GDP by banks relative to total credit to non-financial corporations in the US was approximately 34.4 % in 2017. This compares to a 
more bank reliant system in Europe (G20 aggregate) with a relative market share of banks of 54.8% (58.4%).  
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As shown in Table 2, fund size has, on average, increased substantially over time. The 
average fund size (measured in 2001 dollars) has experienced a more than tenfold increase from 
approximately USD 160 million for the 1986 vintage to  later vintages just prior and during the 
GFC in 2007 and onwards. As has been shown in PE studies, the relationship between fund size 
and performance may vary across different fund types. Kaplan and Schoar (2005), Harris et al. 
(2014a) and Lopez-de-Silanes et al. (2014), for example, find no statistically significant 
relationship between size and performance for buyout funds. Harris et al. (2014a), however, find 
that performance of venture capital funds is negatively related to fund size. In Harris et al. 
(2014b), the analysis of this variable provides mixed results. Cumming et al. (2019) find a 
marginally significant effect of size on performance using a sample of private debt transactions. 
To control for a potential effect of size, I use the log of fund size (in 2001 US dollars)131 in column 
3 of Table 9. The result suggests that fund size is negatively related to performance.  
 
7.4 Capital raised  
Kaplan and Strömberg (2009) and Harris et al. (2014a) observe and suggest that PE fund 
performance is significantly negatively related to capital commitments. To test this for PD funds, 
I use the historical private debt fundraising data from Preqin and verify how aggregate capital 
inflow into the PD asset class may affect fund performance. One may assume that more capital 
inflow into the PD industry may increase competition amongst PD funds for investment projects, 
lowering project returns. Kaplan and Strömberg (2009) find that inflows of capital in the vintage 
phase can explain realized fund returns during the subsequent ten- to twelve-year period. As PD 
funds typically draw down committed capital in the first two years of their life, I use the total 
                                                     
131 In unreported tables, I also control for the change of fund size from the previous to the current fund, 
which is measured as the log of change in fund size. Additionally, I use size measured in non-inflation 
adjusted US dollars. The result remain unchanged. 
207 





aggregate amount raised in the vintage year (t) and one year thereafter (t+1) to measure 
aggregate capital inflow into the PD industry. The log of PMEit is then regressed on capital raised 
as an additional independent variable. Preqin provides information related to aggregate raised 
capital per vintage year only from the year 2000 onwards, which reduces the sample size 
marginally to 171 observations. The result in Table 9, column 4 suggests that PD fund 
performance is not related to the aggregate capital inflow into the PD industry.  
This result contrasts the finding of Kaplan and Strömberg (2009) or Harris et al. (2014a), 
who find that performance is negatively related to capital commitments. However, the t-value of 
1.63 indicates a relationship between capital commitments and performance, this relationship to 
be explored in more detail in the multiple regression approach in the next section.  
 
7.5 Credit standards (SLOS) 
A different broad pattern that is related to liquidity and reflects debt market conditions is 
the change in credit standards as reported in the Federal Reserve’s Senior Loan Officer Survey.132 
The change of credit standards, according to Axelson et al. (2013, p. 2257) “captures nonprice 
aspects of credit market conditions, such as debt covenants and quantitiy constraints.”. They find 
that this measure is strongly related to the amount of leverage used in the PE industry. Franzoni 
et al. (2012) proxy funding liquidity by SLOS and define it as a positive (negative) percentage 
change of loan officers tightening (loosening) their credit standards. When including SLOS 
together with market liquidity into their regressions, they observe that SLOS absorb half of the 
market liquidity effect and impact cash flows to LPs, which are reduced when credit standards are 
tightened. Motivated by the results of Axelson et al. (2013) and Franzoni et al. (2012), I expect 
that tight (loose) credit standards are related to PD fund performance. I include two dummy 
variables indicating the state of SLOS at the extreme deciles. The average SLOS tightening 
(loosening) of the vintage year (t) plus the following calendar year (t+1) are used as independent 
                                                     
132 Data are from the Federal Reserve, https://www.federalreserve.gov/data/sloos/sloos-201810-chart-
data.htm 
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variable. “Credit standards loose” takes the value of one if changes in Senior Loan Officer 
Standards (SLOS) are at the extreme left hand side of the distribution, that is at the 10th percentile. 
This state indicates very loose SLOS. ”Credit standards tight” takes the value of one if changes in 
SLOS are at the extreme right hand side of the distribution, that is the 90th percentile, indicating 
very tight SLOS. Column 5 of Table 9 shows the result. Loose credit standards are negatively 
related to PD fund performance and reduce it by a marginally significant 6.4%.133 On the contrary, 
no statistically significant relation between very thight credit standards and performance is 
observed. Roberts and Sufi (2009) have shown that the terms of the initial lending contract play 
an important role in renegotiation as it is partially controlled by the contractual assignment of 
bargaining power. As is the case in the PE context (Axelson et al., 2013), loose credit standards 
might be a proxy for lower covenant protection and fewer quantity constraints, both affecting a 
PD fund’s performance negatively. The data suggests comparable mechanisms are at play also in 
the PD industry.  
 
7.6  Funding Liquidity (TED spread) 
 Investors require higher or lower discount rates in compensation for higher or lower 
liquidity of an asset.134 Given that LPs commit to PD funds for a long time period, it is possible that 
there is a large liquidity risk premium. Controlling for liquidity therefore appears to be informative 
when evaluating PD fund performance and its persistence. Since PD funds are illiquid per se, that 
is they can generally not be traded without consent of the GP, it is difficult to proxy for the 
required illiquidity premium requested by investors.  For the PE industry, Nadauld et al. (2018) 
show that LPs who sell their PE fund stakes in the secondary market accept discounts of 
                                                     
133 Remember that the dependent variable is log-transformed and the dummy variable “credit 
standards_loose”  is in its original metric. To interpet the amount of change in the original metric of the 
outcome, here the log of PME, I exponentiate the coefficient of census to obtain exp(-0.0623) = 1.0642. 
Subtracting one from this number and multiplying it by 100 results in the percentage change of 6.4%.  
 
134 Different types of liquidity exist. The large and growing literature is described in a comprehensive way 
in Dimitri and Jiang (2013) . In this paper, I focus on concepts of liquidity that have been used in prior PE or 
PD research. 
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approximately 9%, fluctuating with fund age and market conditions. This explanation appears to 
be unlikely to explain large fractions of performance of PD funds, however. Given the underlying 
assets, PD funds should be less risky than PE funds and the discounts observed by Nadauld et al. 
(2018) for PE funds should be smaller when analysing PD funds. Systemic liquidity of the market 
as a whole might be related to performance and explain parts of the PME. I therefore control 
whether PD fund performance, like that of other asset classes, is affected by market liquidity. 
Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) find that in times of market illiquidity, funding liquidity also 
dries up. Cumming et al. (2019) apply this concept and use funding liquidity as proxied by changes 
in the TED spread. They suggests that an increase in TED spread (worsening funding liquidity) is 
positively related to the outperformance of a PD loan portfolio versus the market. Their 
explanation is that secondary market price discounts increase with shrinking liquidity, thereby 
increasing the returns to debt investors. In fact, they find the supposed positive relationship 
between funding liquidity and performance. 
TED spread is the difference between the three-month LIBOR and the three-month T-bill 
rate as calculated by the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. I control for funding liquidity using the 
log of the average level of TED spread for the vintage year (t) and the consecutive year (t+1), 
which in my view approximates funding liquidity in the market. PD funds usually allocate the 
capital called from LPs in the first and the second year of a fund’s lifetime. Data are from 
Bloomberg and TED spread is measured in basis points.135 Table 9, column 6 shows the result. 
Funding liquidity proxied by TED spread is negatively and significantly related to performance. A 
10% increase in TED spread (worsening funding liquidity) decreases performance by 0.8%, the 
coefficient being significant at the 5% level.136 This result contrasts with the finding of Cumming 
                                                     
135 TED spread is only available on Bloomberg from January 2nd, 2001 onwards. However, the rate on 
interbank loans (LIBOR) and short-term US government debt are available. I therefore replicate the spread 
using these two rates as available with the Bloomberg tickers US0003M / USGG3M.  
 
136 To make this result comparable to the study of Cumming et al. (2019), I also use the average change 
in the TED spread of the vintage year compared to t-1 plus the change of the TED spread of the consecutive 
year compared to that of the vintage year. Using the log of change in TED spread  instead of the level of 
TED spread renders a coefficient that is approximately half in size and significant at a lower 10% level. 
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et al. (2019). A potential explanation for the negative sing is that PD funds may find it difficult to 
refinance their investments in times of low funding liquidity and be confronted with higher 
borrowing costs, translating into lower returns to PD funds.  
   
7.7 Recession 
 Adverse economic conditions may impact PD fund performance independent of funding 
liquidity or capital inflows. I therefore control for the effects of US business cycle expansions and 
contractions. Data are from The National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) and used to 
identify vintage years that fall together with times of recession. A recession dummy variable 
(“recession”) is used. It takes the value of one if a PD fund vintage year is equal to a recession year 
as reported by the NBER. This includes vintage years 1990, 1991, 2001, 2008 and 2009.137 Default 
rates tend to be higher during recessions, recovery rates are typically below their long-run means 
and spreads increase (Duffie & Singleton, 1999;  Chen, 2010). This may affect PD fund 
performance in many ways. For example, it may lead firms to manage their leverage ratios 
counter cyclically, making it harder to PD funds to find attractive investment opportunities during 
recessions (Hackbarth , 2006). Also, it may make it harder to PD funds to restructure debt 
positions as recovery rates typically decrease and loss given defaults increase respectively in 
recessions (Acharya et al., 2007; Jankowitsch, 2014). As a consequence, PD fund performance of 
funds raised in recessionary periods may be negatively affected. These explanations appear to be 
unlikely given the empirical results shown in Table 9, column 7. PD fund performance of funds 
raised during the recession of 1990/91 or the internet bubble (2001) period is positively related 
to performance. The performance estimation for funds raised in these times indicates an 
economically important and significant difference compared to funds raised outside recessionary 
periods of 35.9% (33.5%). Interestingly, the global financial crisis (GFC) dummy variable is not 
                                                     
137 I do also control for the effect of including the year 2002 as a recession year since the Nasdaq 
Composite stock market index peaked in March 2000 before crashing, with a burst of the bubble (dot-com 
crash) until October, 2002. Results are not materially affected by this.  
211 





significant. It appears that the early recessions offered attractive investment opportunities to PD 
funds. These might have been affected by the bank lending channel drying out in recessions (for 
example based on credit rationing as described in Stiglitz & Weiss, 1981) or by banks seeking to 
de-risk their balance sheets and protect bank equity (Acharya, et al., 2016; Acharya et al., 2015) 
in recessions. Lemmon and Roberts (2010), Duchin et al. (2010) and Carvalho et al. (2016) show 
that substitution to alternative sources of capital given contraction in the supply of credit is 
limited. While short-term loan-to-bond substitution may help large corporates to compensate for 
decreasing bank credit supply in crisis periods (Adrian, Colla, & Shin, 2013; De Fiore & Uhlig, 2015), 
firms without direct access to public markets may therefore find it difficult to use alternative 
financing channels and want to borrow from more flexible PD funds. A contraction in the supply 
of bank credit may therefore lead to attractive investment opportunities and increase PD fund 
performance.  
 
7.8 Credit spread 
Finally, I also control for the pricing of global risk using credit spread as in Cumming et al. 
(2019). I hypothesize that market outperformance as measured by PME is positively related to 
credit spread, as investors require higher discount rates in compensation for higher global risk. 
Credit spread is the average yield spread between Moody’s Seasoned Baa Corporate Bond Yield 
relative to the 10year Treasury constant maturity yield, of the vintage year (t) and the following 
year (t+1). Data from the Federal Reserve of St. Louis. As is shown in column 8 of Table 9, it is 
positively related to PD fund performance. A one standard deviation increase in spread (sd = 0.55) 
increases fund performance by approximately 4%.138  
 
                                                     
138 The dependent variable is log-transformed and credit spread  is in its original metric. To interpet the 
amount of change in the original metric of the outcome, here the log of PME, I exponentiate the coefficient 
of census to obtain exp(-0.071) = 1.073. Subtracting one from this number and multiplying it by 100 results 
in the percentage change of 7.358% X 1 sd = 4%. 
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7.9 Full Model 
 Having tested the independent variables as described in paragraphs 7.1 through 7.8, a full 
model predicting performance can now be specified.   The variables are defined above. The 
regression model is expressed as in equation 5: 
 
𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑃𝑀𝐸𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + ∑ 𝛽1𝑗𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑗𝑖𝑡
𝐾𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑
𝑗=1 + ∑ 𝛽2𝑗𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑗𝑖𝑡
𝐾𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑑.
𝑗=1 +
                                 ∑ 𝛽3𝑗𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗𝑖𝑡
𝐾𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛
𝑗=1 + ∑ 𝛽4𝑗𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑃𝑀𝐸𝑗𝑖𝑡−1 ∗  𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒𝑗𝑖𝑡
𝐾𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑜𝑢𝑠
𝑗=1 +
                                 ∑ 𝛽5𝑗𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒𝑗𝑖𝑡
𝐾𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒
𝑗=1
+ 𝜀𝑖𝑡 .    (5) 
 
Thus, I regress the log of PME for fund i in vintage year t on a constant and the different 
categories of variables discussed above: fund specific variables, credit market conditions 
(including credit spread, credit standards, funding liquidity and aggregate capital flows), 
recessionary periods and the log of previous fund performance (t-1) as measured by PME, 
interacted with fund type. Fund type dummy variables are included to hold the average 
performance effects of each fund type constant. Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors are 
used throughout all specifications.  
Table 10 shows the results. The baseline model is shown in specification 1. As shown in 
column 2 of Table 10, of the fund specific variables “US focus”, “industry focus” and “size” only 
the latter is related to performance, although only marginally significant. Also, extending the 
baseline model by fund specific variables leaves the explanatory power as measured by the 
adjusted R2 almost unchanged. 
Next, the impact of credit market conditions, as proxied by the variables described above, 
are tested. The results are presented in column 3 of Table 10:139  Credit spread, loose credit 
                                                     
139 It is conceivable that the variables proxying for credit market conditons are multicollinear. However, 
as measured by the variance inflation factor (VIF) and using pairwise correlation of factors, I find no 
multicollinearity in specification 3. According to Kutner et al. (2005), the largest VIF value among all 
independent variables can be used as an indicator of the severity of multicollinearity. A maximum VIF value 
in excess of 10 is frequently taken as an indication that multicollinearity may be unduly influencing the least 
squares estimates. The highest VIF value that I find is 1.38. The mean of the VIF values also provides 
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standards and liquidity as proxied by TED spread are significantly related to performance. A one 
standard deviation increase in credit spread (= 0.55) increases performance by 4.9%.140 Loose 
credit standards as measured by SLOS are negatively related to performance. The PME of funds 
raised in times of loose credit standards is reduced by an important 7.9%. Also, a worsening of 
liquidity as measured by (an increase in) the log of TED spread is negatively related to fund 
performance. A 10% percent increase in spread reduces PD fund performance by an approximate 
1.2%. Using the cross-sectional PME of 1.12, for example, a 10% increase in TED spread is 
associated with a reduction of market outperformance from 12% to 10.7%.141 Considering the 
median TED spread of 40.5 basis points and the standard deviation of 26.3 basis points, a one 
standard deviation increase in TED spread reduces PD fund performance by an approximate 8.5% 
(26.3 bps over 40.5 bps being equal to approximately 65% or 6.5 X 1.3%). The aggregate amount 
of capital flowing into the PD industry appears to be unrelated to PD fund performance. Overall, 
credit risk, credit standards and liquidity appear to explain an important fraction of current fund 
performance. As measured by the adjusted R2, the explanatory power increases from an 
approximate 25% in the baseline model to 37.1% once credit market conditions are considered. 
Turning to the persistence results of specification three, performance is persistent for direct 
lending, special situations and venture debt funds, at a level only marginally deviating from model 
one. 
Next, the relation between recessionary periods and performance is studied. The results 
in column 4 of Table 10 indicate a strong positive relation between recessionary periods and fund 
performance. All else equal, a PD fund launched in the recession period of 1990/91 (2001) 
                                                     
information about the severity of potential multicollinearity in terms of how far the estimated standardized 
regression coefficients are from the true values. Excluding credit spread, for example, results in an average 
VIF of 1.14. Including credit spread increases VIF minimally to 1.19. Examination of the pairwise correlations 
does also not indicate any multicollinearity problem.  
 
140 To interpet the amount of change in the original metric of the outcome, here PME, I exponentiate the 
coefficient of census in column 3 to obtain exp(0.086) = 1.0906 or -9.07% X 0.55 = 4.9%. 
141 As the ln(1.1) = 0.095, the expected log outperformance is 0.095*-0.12 = -0.0114 in the next period, 
leading to a PME of exp(-0.0114) = 0.9886. Given the average PME of 1.12 this leads to a PME of 
0.9886*1.12 = 1.1072. 
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performs better by a substantial 36% (31%), the crisis coefficient being significant at the 1%. 
Contrary to this, the GFC in 2008/9 appears to be unrelated to fund performance. However, as 
indicated by the adjusted R2, credit market conditions (as in specification 3) explain more of the 
variation in PD fund performance than recessions. When replacing credit market conditions by 
the recession dummies, the adjusted R2 drops from 37.1% to 27.2%.  
Column 5 of Table 10 represents the full specification including fund criteria, credit market 
conditions and recessionary periods. Again, credit spread and TED spread remain significant, but 
at a lower level (10% and 5%) and with approximately unchanged coefficients. The amount of 
capital raised and recessionary periods, however, render insignificant when the full specification 
in column 5 is used.  
Turning to the the post-2007 sub-period142 in columns 6 through 8 of Table 10, the analysis 
provides some important observations:  
First, fund criteria (focus and size) are never significantly related to PD fund performance 
in all there models. This contrasts the findings for funds operating in the PE industry (Gompers et 
al., 2009; Ewens & Rhodes-Kropf, 2015) or the analysis of Cumming et al. (2019) related to PD 
loans. 
Second, previous fund performance t-1 appears to be positively related to current fund 
performance in all models and previous performance is significant for all fund types, with the 
exception of mezzanine funds, at either the 1% or 5% level. Controlling for credit market 
conditions or recessionary periods does not change this finding. Based on the results in column 8, 
a 10% percent increase in lagged performance for direct lending, special situations, distressed 
debt and venture debt funds increases the average fund specific market outperformance from 
10%, 10%, 15% and 6% to an improved outperformance of 14%, 17%, 16% and 9%.  
Third, credit market conditions during the vintage year (t) and the following year (t+1) 
importantly affect subsequent PD fund performance. These credit market conditions include 
                                                     
142 A comparison to the pre-2007 period is inaccurate given the large number of predictors and the 
relatively low number of observations for this period.  
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nonprice aspects proxied by credit standards (SLOS) as well as price aspects as proxied by TED 
spread. Credit market conditions of the vintage year (t) and the following year (t+1) appear to be 
a good proxy for a PD fund’s returns during its subsequent life. The data suggests that loose credit 
standards and market liquidity as measured by TED spread are incrementaly important and strong 
predictors of future PD fund performance. The adjusted R2 of the regressions increases by 17% 
from approximately 25% when only prior performance and fund type dummies are used to an 
approximate 42% when credit market conditions are considered. As taken from column 8,: when 
credit standards are loose or liquidity lowers (TED spread increases), predicted fund performance 
is lower. Predicted performance for PD funds that are launched in times of loose credit standards 
is lower by 9.1%.143 A 10%  increase in TED spread reduces PD fund performance by an 
approximate 1%. Using the cross-sectional PME of 1.12, for example, a 10% increase in TED spread 
is associated with a reduction of market outperformance from 12% to 10.9%144 or an approximate 
change of 6.5% for a one standard deviation change in TED spread. 
Fourth, confirming the PE related studies of Kaplan and Strömberg (2009) and Harris et al. 
(2014a), I find that fund performance is negatively related to the aggregate amount of capital 
flowing into the PD asset class (column 7). However, extending the model and allowing for 
additional variables proxying for credit market conditions, the aggregate amount of capital 
flowing into the PD asset class (log capital raised) becomes insignificant, suggesting the used 
credit market conditions are stronger predictors of PD fund performance. 
Fifth, turning to the fund type dummy variables and comparing the significance of their 
coefficients in columns 7 to column 8, it appears that extending the model by credit market 
conditions picks up the difference in performance of different fund types. This suggests that 
specific types of PD funds may be correlated with specific credit market conditions.  
                                                     
143 To interpet the amount of change in the original metric of the outcome, here PME, I exponentiate the 
coefficient of census in column 8 to obtain exp(0.087) = 1.091 or -9.1%. 
 
144 As the ln(1.1) = 0.095, the expected log outperformance is 0.095*-0.104 = -0.0099 in the next period, 
leading to a PME of exp(-0.0114) = 0.9886. Given the average PME of 1.12 this leads to a PME of 
0.9886*1.12 = 1.1072. 
216 





Finally, Braun et al. (2017) find that persistence in fund performance has substantially 
declined as the PE sector has matured and become more competitive. Contrasting with their 
findings for PE funds, I find prevailing PD fund performance persistence, i.e. it does not 
systematically decline over time, and is driven by the more recent vintages (the post-2007 period) 
rather than early observations.  
 
8  Robustness 
It is conceivable that standard errors of funds managed by the same GP are not 
independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.). I therefore rerun the regressions clustering 
standard errors at the GP level and using specification 8 of Table 10 as baseline regression. The 
result is shown in Table 11, column  2.  Compared to the baseline regression, the only coefficients 
of the main analysis that change in significance are the lagged performance of venture debt funds 
now significant at the 10% instead of the 5% level, and the lagged performance of distressed debt 
funds, increasing from the 5% to the 1% significance level. However, p-values are almost identical. 
For the lagged performance of venture debt funds, the p-value increases from p = 0.049 to 0.056. 
For the lagged performance of distressed debt funds, the p-value increases from p = 2.02 to 2.68.  
Overall, clustering standard errors at the GP level to account for the potential correlation of error 
terms does not affect the presented results in any material way. 
Phalippou (2014) shows the sensitivity of fund performance to the choice of the 
benchmark. While it has been demonstrated that PD funds outperform the market using both the 
investment grade - and the high yield -benchmark, it is conceivable that the analyses in Section 7 
are affected by the use of the high yield instead of the investment grade benchmark. I therefore 
re-run specification 8 of Table 8 using the log of PMEHY instead of the log of PMEIG as dependent 
and lagged variable. The result is shown in Table 11, column 3. As in the baseline, a state of loose 
credit standards and TED spread seem to drive PD fund performance. The significance of these 
coefficients now increase to the 1% level. Additionally, industry focus becomes significant at the 
10% level.  Persistence of venture debt funds drops and becomes insignificant, while it remains 
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detected for those fund types identified in the baseline regression. However, adjusted R2 drops 
to a level of 27.6%. It appears that the results are sensitive to the choice of the benchmark. This, 
however, does not to invalidate the findings of this study in a material way.  
Persistence results can be biased because of time period overlap or investment overlap. If 
so, persistence should decline with the amount of time that elapses between the vintage years of 
PD funds. To test for the possibility of a bias induced by time period or investment overlaps, I 
interact the log of previous PME with the log of time (years) between the current and the previous 
fund PME. This is methodologically in line with Kaplan and Schoar (2005), who likewise control 
for the potential effects from time period overlaps. As is shown in Table 11, column 4, the 
coefficient on the interaction term is negative but statistically not significant. This result suggests 
that my persistence results are not caused by an effect of time overlap. This robustness test fails 
however, to distinguish between time period and investment overlaps. One way to accomplish 
this distinction would be to include previous funds with vintage years at least 5 years distant from 
current fund vintages. This would likely make an investment overlap very little. Doing this reduces 
the sample size to only 38 observations, however. It can therefore not be excluded that current 
and previous funds of a particular GP have some investments in common and that this could 
mechanically induce persistence. 
Other than in this study, Kaplan and Schoar (2005) and Braun et al. (2017) include funds 
that are largely liquidated in their studies. Braun et al. (2017), for example, use funds in which at 
least 50% of the capital invested has been realized. Although in line with Harris et al. (2014b) and 
other researchers, who use funds with high unrealized assets, I control for a potential upward 
bias in reported performance originating from manipulations of self-reported NAVs. Investigating 
the variation in returns as measured by PMEIG I test the difference in performance means for 
analysed funds with low self-reported NAVs (below 50%) versus those with high (beyond 50%) 
self-reported NAVs. Using a student t-test and the Wilcoxon ranksum test for the equality of 
performance between funds with a remaining value to paid in capital of below 50% and those 
above this level. I find no statistically significant difference in performance across the two groups 
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for either the overall sample period (t=0.8, z=1.5) or the post-2007 sub-period (t=1.4, z=1.2). This 
finding is in line with the relatively low changes in performance when adjusting self-reported 
NAVs in Tables 2 and 3.  To analyse this further, I control whether the regression results are 
sensitive to the level of self-reported NAVs. In Table 12, I let the level of self-reported NAVs 
(remaining value to paid-in capital, “rvpi”) increase in increments of 25% from <50% to <150% in 
columns 1 through 5. Column 6 is the baseline regression including all observattions. Specification 
8 is now the baseline, as it includes all the observations.The results do not change importantly 
when rvpi increases from a very low level in column 1 to the maximum level in column 6. Also, 
the adjusted R2 grows only little from 30.7% to 36.3%. The data suggests that using only largely 
liquidated funds for reasons of potential NAV manipulation is not a necessary condition for 
accurate performance evaluations when researching PD funds.  
Next, to control for a potential upward bias in performance resulting from GPs of funds 
with bad performance that do not disclose cash flow data, I compare the larger Preqin sample to 
the sample of this study. The larger sample consists of 921 funds of which 729 report the internal 
rate of return (IRR). I conduct two analyses to detect a potential bias. First, I take the IRR 
information as available from Preqin and for the same funds researched in this study and compare 
the reported IRRs to those calculated from timed cash flows. I call this the matched sample. 
Second, I exclude from the larger sample those funds studied in this paper. This results in two 
mutually exclusive samples that I call the unmatched samples. The cross-sectional IRR of the 
matched sample shows only marginal differences in IRRs. Overall, the IRR of the matched sample 
amounts to an average 10.36%, whereas I find 10.61%. Sorted by fund type, the IRR differences 
are small and amount to 0.01%, -0.09%, -1.01%, -0.18% and -0.40% for mezzanine, direct lending, 
special situations, distressed debt and venture debt funds. Likewise, the differences as sorted by 
IRR quartiles are minimal. This suggests that IRRs of funds that disclose cash flows to Preqin are 
approximately correct. The analysis of the unmatched samples reveals a different result: I find 
that the average performance of this mutually exclusive group of funds deviates importantly from 
the average values computed in this study. Overall, the IRR of the unmatched sample amounts to 
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an average IRR of 12.7%, whereas I find 10.6%. Sorted by fund type, the IRR differences are much 
larger and amount to 1.7%, -0.4%, 4.3%, 4.6% and 14.8% for mezzanine, direct lending, special 
situations, distressed debt and venture debt funds. This does not necessarily imply that the IRRs 
of the unmatched sample are manipulated or exaggerated. However, they still deviate 
substantially from the IRRs found in this study, suggesting there may exist an upward bias in 
performance of funds that do not provide cash flow data. Potential reasons for such an upward 
bias have been discussed earlier. Also, it can be taken from this observation that the performance 
data reported in this study can be considered conservative or biased downwards rather than 
upwards. 
 
9  Conclusions 
Over their lifetime, PD funds outperform public bond markets, as measured by the 
Bloomberg Barclays US Corporate Bond Index and using the Kaplan and Schoar (2005) PME, by 
12% in the cross-section and by an average 16% if sorted by vintage years. I find a large 
performance difference between top- and bottom quartile funds. While the best funds 
outperform the market by 44%, the worst underperform it by 16%.  Annualizing market 
outperformance reveals attractive alpha of approximately 2% in the cross-section and 6% for top- 
and -2.6% for bottom-quartile funds. This alpha is confirmed by the application of a generalized 
method of moments approach. The observed interquartile range of 60% in terms of aggregate 
lifetime outperformance and 8.6% in terms of annualized alpha makes fund selection a first-order 
concern.  
I relax the assumption that beta equals one as in Kaplan and Schoar (2005) and use the 
method to estimate risk and return of nontraded assets from cash flows as proposed by Driessen 
et al. (2012). The data suggests that betas of PD funds are reliably different from one. This finding 
is in line with Munday et al. (2018), who find relatively low betas and high alphas for PD funds.  
Persistence in returns across subsequent funds of a partnership may help to select good 
and avoid bad performing funds. Prima facie, it appears to be a good strategy to invest in PD funds 
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managed by GPs that have previously managed top-quartile funds. Relative to a randomized 
strategy and based on quartile transition probabilities, the average increase in in market 
outperformance to be achieved from such prediction would have been 8% for the overall sample 
period or 13% for the post-2007 sub-period. However, credit market conditions affect PD fund 
performance importantly and should be considered when selecting PD funds: performance is 
significantly and negatively related to credit market conditions such as loose credit standards and 
funding liquidity as measured by TED spread.  
Given that the betas in my study are statistically not distinguishable from zero and the 
assumption underlying the Driessen et al.’s (2012) method that alphas and betas are the same 
across a cross-section of funds, I conclude with the suggestion that future research might shed 
more light on this important topic. Specifically, the risk and return of specific investment 
strategies of PD funds (mezzanine, direct lending etc.) could be analysed in respect to their alphas 
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Appendix I: Private Debt Fund Types / Strategies 
Preqin describes the private capital investment strategies as follows in their Glossary of terms: 
 
Mezzanine Investments in debt subordinate to the primary debt issuance and senior to 
equity positions. 
 
Direct lending The practice of non-bank lenders extending loans to small and medium-
sized businesses in return for debt securities rather than equity. 
 
Special situations Classification covering several areas including distressed and mezzanine, 
where loan decision or grade is defined by 
something other than underlying company fundamentals. 
 
Distressed debt Debt of companies that have filed for bankruptcy or have a significant 
chance of filing for bankruptcy in the near future. 
 
Venture debt Debt provided to venture capital-backed companies by a specialized 
financier to fund working capital or expenses. Venture debt providers 
combine their loans with warrants or rights to purchase equity to 













Appendix II: NAV write-down of 30% for PD funds beyond their typical liquidation age 
 
Although a subjective exercise, I lean against the expected loss rate of defaulting debt and 
an estimated probability of default to determine the estimated market value of self-reported 
NAVs. Studies related to recovery rates for defaulting debt instruments (Chen, 2010; Van de 
Castle et al., 2000; Davydenko et al., 2012; Altman et al., 2005) and an estimate related to the 
probability of default based on the findings of Robert and Sufi (2009) provide some empirical 
support for this adjustment, which is smaller than that proposed by Driessen et al. (2012) or 
Phalippou and Gottschalg (2009):145 Self-reported NAVs of funds beyond there typical liquidation 
age are deemed to be defaulting assets. The value is defined by the loss given default that can be 
derived from empirical research. Recovery rates for defaulting debt instruments (Chen, 2010; Van 
de Castle et al., 2000; Davydenko et al., 2012; Altman et al., 2005). Recovery rates that are closest 
to the nature of PD fund assets are between 37% and 53.5%.146 Next, the probability of default 
                                                     
145 They find that market values of nonliquidated PE funds beyond the typical liquidation age are around 
30 % of self-reported NAVs. Applying the predictions of Driessen et al. (2012) to self-reported NAVs of PD 
funds would require a write down for self-reported NAVs of PD funds beyond their typical liquidation age by 
70%. Phalippou and Gottschalg (2009) recommend to set the market value of nonliquidated and mature PE 
funds to zero. 
 
146 Chen (2010) reports on the average Moody’s recovery rates during 1982 to 2008 on defaulted bonds 
observed roughly 30 days after the default date. It amounts to 41.4%, on average. Van de Castle et al. 
(2000) analyse recovery rates for a sample of bonds and bank loans between 1987 and 1996 and find an 
average rate for all debt instruments (bank debt, senior secured debt, senior notes, subordinated debt and 
junior subordinated debt) of 51.1%. This recovery rate declines with increasing time in default. Davydenko 
et al. (2012) find average debt recovery rates from 1997 through 2010, equal to the market value of 
outstanding debt instruments (bonds and bank debt) at the end of the calendar month of default and 
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related to credit assets held by PD funds beyond their typical liquidation age, which is unknown, 
needs to be estimated. The probability distribution of unrealized assets to default is unknown. A 
probability of default of 0.5 is therefore applied. This compares to the cumulative default rate for 
BBB-rated firms, which amounts to a lower 4% to 5% (see, for example, Kuehn & Schmid, 2014 or 
Altman et al., 2002). The relatively high probability of default used can be explained from two 
perspectives. First, a probability of default of 0.5 reflects the diverging approaches used in prior 
empirical research, which, on the one side, completely depreciate self-reported NAVs (for 
example in Phalippou & Gottschalg, 2009) or use them, on the other side, as fair market values 
(Kaplan & Schoar, 2005; Harris et al. (2014a). Second, from a different perspective, Roberts and 
Sufi (2009) provide support for the application of a relatively high probability of default: They 
quantify the frequency and importance of private debt renegotiation and show that private credit 
agreements are renegotiated with a probability of 96%. According to their study, maturity 
extensions are the outcome in 57% of such renegotiations, these maturity extensions amounting 
to an average of 766 days or approximately 64% that of the original stated maturity. Such maturity 
extensions may significantly delay the liquidation of PD funds and can therefore be treated as 
defaults.  
In this study, the loss rate for a sample of bonds and bank loans as observed by Van de 
Castle et al. (2000) is used. For debt that is in default for more than one year, they find a loss rate 
of 53.5%. Applying a probability of default of 0.5 and this loss rate leads to an estimated write-off 
of 26.8%. This loss rate is rounded up to 30%.  All self-reported and undistributed NAVs of PD 
funds beyond their typical liquidation age are depreciated by 30% for the purpose of calculating 
adjusted performance mesasures. 
                                                     
expressed as a proportion of the face value of total debt in the amount of 43.5 %. A lower recovery rate in 
the amount of 37.2% on defaulted debt assets and for an observation period from 1982 through 2001 is 
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The essays collected in this PhD thesis concern the pricing, wealth effects and return of private 
market debt, which has grown tremendously over the last two decades. Increasingly, companies 
are seeking flexible terms of private funding rather than capital from public capital markets. The 
first essay shows how private placement bonds are priced and provides evidence how the use of 
covenants affects the cost of capital. The second essay examines how the use of restrictive 
covenants impacts shareholder wealth ex ante and in the context of issuing privately placed 
bonds. The third essay investigates the risk and returns of private debt funds and their persistence 
across subsequent funds of a partnership.  
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